Caesar’s Commentaries on the Gallic and Civil Wars, Spanish wars

Caesar’s Commentaries on the Gallic and Civil Wars

With the Supplementary Books attributed to Hirtius

Including the Alexandrian, African and Spanish Wars

The Spanish Wars

caes.spain.1:[1] On the defeat of Pharnaces and reduction of Africa, those
who escaped from those battles fled to young Cn. Pompey, who had taken possession
of Further Spain, while Caesar was detained in Italy in exhibiting games. Pompey
began to throw himself on the protection of every state, in order the more readily
to establish the means of defense against him. Accordingly, with a considerable
force which had been collected, partly by entreaty, partly by force, he began
to lay waste the province. Under these circumstances some states voluntarily sent
him supplies, others shut the gates of their towns against him. If any of these
chanced to fall into his hands by assault, although some citizen in it had deserved
well of Cn. Pompey (his father), yet some cause was alleged against him on account
of the greatness of his wealth, so that, he being dispatched, his fortune might
become the reward of the soldiers. Thus the enemy, being encouraged by a few advantages,
their forces increased much, wherefore those states which were opposed to Pompey,
by continual messages dispatched to Italy, sought protection for themselves.

caes.spain.2:[2] When Caesar, now a third time dictator, and elected a fourth
time, having already proceeded many marches into Spain with prompt dispatch, was
coming to finish the war, he was met on the way by embassadors from Corduba, who
had deserted Cn. Pompey; these informed him that it would be an easy matter to
make himself master of the town by night, because the enemy as yet knew nothing
of his arrival in the province, as the scouts sent out by Cn. Pompey to inform
him of Caesar’s approach had been all made prisoners. They alleged besides many
other very plausible reasons. He, therefore, immediately sent intelligence of
his arrival to Q. Pedius, and Q. Fabius Maximus his lieutenants, to whom he had
left the command of the troops in the province, ordering them to send him all
the cavalry they had been able to raise. He came up with them much sooner than
they expected, and had not the protection of the cavalry, according to his desire.

caes.spain.3:[3] Sextus Pompey, the brother of Cneius, commanded at this time
at Corduba, which was accounted the capital of the province. Young Cneius Pompey
himself was employed in the siege of Ulia, which had now lasted some months. Notice
of Caesar’s arrival having been received, messengers having passed Pompey’s guards
came to him from that town and besought him to send them relief as soon as possible.
Caesar, knowing that this people had deserved very well of the Romans, detached,
about nine o’clock, at night eleven cohorts, with a like number of horse, under
the command of L. Julius Paciecus, a man known in that province, and also well
acquainted with it. When he arrived at Pompey’s quarter, a dreadful tempest arising,
attended with a violent wind, so great a darkness ensued that you could scarcely
have distinguished even the person next you. This accident proved of great advantage
to Paciecus: for being arrived at Pompey’s camp, he ordered the cavalry to advance
two by two, and march directly through the enemy’s quarters to the town; one of
their guards calling to know who passed, one of our troopers bade him be silent,
for they were just then endeavoring by stealth to approach the wall, in order
to get possession of the town; and partly by this answer, partly by favor of the
tempest, the sentinels were prevented from examining things diligently. When they
reached the gates, upon a signal being given, they were admitted; and both horse
and foot raising a loud shout, after leaving some troops to guard the town, sallied
in a body upon the enemy’s camp. This came upon them so unexpectedly that the
greater number of the men in the camps thought that they were captured.

caes.spain.4:[4] Ulia being relieved, Caesar, to draw Pompey from the siege,
marched toward Corduba; sending the cavalry before, with a select body of heavy-armed
foot; who, as soon as they came within sight of the place, got up behind the troopers.
By this stratagem they could not possibly be perceived by those of Corduba. Upon
their approach to the walls, the enemy sallied in great numbers to attack our
cavalry; when the infantry, whom we have mentioned above, leaping down, fell upon
them with such fury that out of an almost infinite multitude of men, very few
returned to the town. This so alarmed Sextus Pompey that he immediately sent letters
to his brother, requesting him to come speedily to his relief, lest Caesar should
make himself master of Corduba before his arrival. Thus Cn. Pompey, moved by his
brother’s letters, quitted the siege of Ulia, which was upon the point of surrendering,
and set out toward Corduba.

caes.spain.5:[5] Caesar, arriving at the river Guadalquivir, which he found
too deep to be forded, sank several baskets of stones in it. Thus having formed
a bridge, he transported his troops in three bodies to the camps. As I have just
mentioned, the beams of the bridge stretched over against the tower in two rows.
Pompey, arriving soon after with his troops, encamped directly over against him.
Caesar, to cut off his provisions and communication with the town, ran a line
from his camp to the bridge. Pompey did the same; so that a struggle arose between
the two generals, which should first get possession of the bridge; and this daily
brought on skirmishes, in which sometimes the one, sometimes the other party had
the better. When these merged into a serious engagement, both sides fought hand
to hand; in the heat of the struggle for this position, owing to the narrowness
of the bridge, they were pressed together, and in their efforts to extend themselves
toward the river-side, many fell headlong. Thus the loss was pretty equal; for
on either side lay heaps of slain, and Caesar for many days used all possible
endeavors to bring the enemy to an engagement on equal terms, that he might bring
the war to a conclusion as soon as possible.

caes.spain.6:[6] But finding that they carefully avoided a battle, with a view
to which chiefly he had quitted the route of Ulia; he caused great fires to be
lighted in the night, repassed the river with all his forces, and marched toward
Ategua, one of their strongest garrisons. Pompey, being informed of this by the
deserters, on the same day brought back many carriages and machines by narrow
paths, and betook himself to Corduba. Caesar began his attack upon Ategua, and
carried lines quite round the town. Pompey, having intelligence of this, set out
upon his march the same day. In order to guard against his arrival, Caesar possessed
himself of many forts; partly to shelter his cavalry, partly to post guards of
infantry for the defense of his camp. Pompey’s arrival happened at a time when
the mist was very thick, so that he found means, with some cohorts and troops
of cavalry, to hem in a party of Caesar’s horse, and fell upon them in such manner
that very few escaped slaughter.

caes.spain.7:[7] The following night Pompey set fire to his camp, passed the
river Rio Salado, and, marching through the valleys, encamped on a rising ground,
between the two towns of Ategua and Ucubis. Caesar cast up a mound and brought
forward his machines, with other preparations which were necessary for storming
the town. The country all around is mountainous, and seems formed for war, being
separated from the plain by the river Rio Salado, ascending on the side toward
Ategua, about two miles from the river. Pompey’s camp was upon these mountains,
within view of both towns; he could, however, send no relief to his friends. He
had the emblems and standards of thirteen legions, but of those on whom he trusted
for support two were natives which had deserted from Trebonius; one was formed
out of the Roman colonies in those parts; and a fourth, belonging to Afranius,
he had brought with him from Africa; the rest were for the most part made up of
fugitives and deserters; in light-armed foot and cavalry we far exceeded him in
both courage and numbers.

caes.spain.8:[8] Another reason why Pompey was enabled to protract the war
was that the country was full of mountains and extremely well adapted to encampments.
For almost the whole province of Further Spain, though of an extremely fertile
soil, and abounding in springs, is nevertheless very difficult of access. Here
too, on account of the frequent incursions of the natives, all the places remote
from great towns, are fortified with towers and castles, covered as in Africa,
not with tiles but with earth, on these they place sentinels, and their high situation
commands an extensive view of the country on all sides. Nay, the greatest part
of the towns of this province are built on mountains, and places exceedingly strong
by nature, the approaches to which are extremely difficult. Thus sieges are rare
and hazardous in Spain, since it is not easy to reduce their towns by force; as
happened in the present war. For Pompey having established his camp between Ategua
and Ucubis, as related above, and within view of both towns, Caesar possessed
himself of an eminence very conveniently situated, and only about four miles from
his own camp, on which he built a fortress.

caes.spain.9:[9] Pompey, who, from the nature of the ground, was covered by
the same eminence, which was besides at a sufficient distance from Caesar’s quarters,
became sensible of the importance of this post; and as Caesar was separated from
it by the river Rio Salado, he imagined that the difficulty of sending relief
would prevent his attempting any thing of that kind in its defense. Influenced
by this belief, he set out about midnight and attacked the fort, that he might
bring assistance to the besieged. Our troops, upon their approach, setting up
a shout, discharged their javelins in great numbers, and wounded multitudes of
men. After this, when those in the camp began to resist, and when tidings of it
was conveyed to the great camps to Caesar, he set out with three legions, and
when he approached them, many were killed, owing to their trepidation and flight,
and a great number made prisoners. Among these two * * *; and many others, having
thrown down their arms escaped, so that fourscore shields were found.

caes.spain.10:[10] The next day Arguetius arrived from Italy with the cavalry,
and five standards taken from the Saguntines; but was forced to quit his post
by Asprenas, who likewise brought a reinforcement from Italy to Caesar. The same
night Pompey set fire to his camp, and drew toward Corduba. A king, named Indus,
who was bringing some troops to Caesar with a party of cavalry, following the
pursuit of the enemy too briskly, was made prisoner, and slain by the Spanish
legionaries.

caes.spain.11:[11] On the next day, our cavalry pursued those who were employed
in carrying provisions from the town to Pompey’s camp, almost to the very walls
of Corduba, and took fifty prisoners besides horses. On the same day, Q. Marcius,
a military tribune in Pompey’s army, deserted to us. At midnight, a keen encounter
took place in the town, and they hurled fire and every means was resorted to by
which fire could be cast. When the attack was ended, C. Fundanius, a Roman knight,
quitted the enemy, and came over to us.

caes.spain.12:[12] On the next day, two Spanish legionaries, who pretended
to be slaves, were made prisoners by a party of our horse; but being brought to
the camp, they were known by the soldiers, who had formerly served under Fabius
and Pedeius, and deserted from Trebonius. No pardon was extended to them, and
they were slaughtered by our troops. At the same time, some couriers, sent from
Corduba to Pompey, entering our camp by mistake, were seized, had their hands
cut off, and then were dismissed. About nine at night, the besieged, according
to custom, spent a considerable time in casting fire and darts upon our soldiers,
and wounded a great number of men. At day-break they sallied upon the sixth legion,
while we were busy at the works, and began a sharp contest, in which, however,
our men got the better, though the besieged had the advantage of the higher ground.
Those who had begun the attack, being vigorously opposed on our side, notwithstanding
all the inconveniences we fought under, were at length obliged to retire into
the town, with many wounds.

caes.spain.13:[13] On the next day Pompey began a line from the camp to the
river Rio Salado; and a small party of our horse, being attacked by a much larger
body of the enemy, were driven from their post, and three of their number slain.
On the same day, A. Valgius, the son of a senator, whose brother was in Pompey’s
camp, mounted his horse and went over to the enemy, leaving all his baggage behind
him. A spy, belonging to Pompey’s second legion, was taken and slain. At the same
time, a bullet was shot into the town, with this inscription: That he should set
up a shield on whatever day they advanced to storm the town. This encouraging
some to hope that they might scale the walls, and possess themselves of the town
without danger, they fell the next day to sapping them, and threw down a considerable
part of the outward wall. * * In this action, being captured and protected by
the townsmen, as if they had been of their own party, they requested Caesar to
dismiss in armor even those who were appointed over the city by Pompey to guard
it. To this Caesar answered, That it was his custom to give, not accept of conditions:
which being reported to the garrison, they set up a shout, and began to pour their
darts upon our men from the whole circuit of the wall; which gave reason to believe
that the garrison intended that day to make a vigorous sally. Wherefore, surrounding
the town with our troops, the conflict was for some time maintained with great
violence, and one of our engines threw down a tower belonging to the enemy, in
which were five of their men, and a boy, whose office it was to observe the engine.

caes.spain.14:[14] After this Pompey erected a fort on the other side of the
Rio Salado, in which he met with no interruption from our men, and exulted not
a little in the idea of having possessed himself of a post so near us. Also the
following day, extending himself in like manner still further, he came up with
our out-post of cavalry; and charging them briskly, obliged several squadrons
and the light-armed foot to give ground: many of whom, owing to the smallness
of their numbers and their light armor, were trodden down by the enemy’s horse.
This passed within view of both camps, and not a little animated the Pompeians,
to see our men pushed so far: but the latter, being afterward reinforced by a
party from our camp, faced about with the intention of renewing the fight.

caes.spain.15:[15] It invariably happens in encounters of cavalry that when
the troopers dismount to charge the infantry, the match proves unequal, as happened
on the present occasion. For a select body of the enemy’s light-armed foot, coming
unexpectedly upon our horse, they alighted to sustain the charge. Thus in a very
little time, from a cavalry it became an infantry engagement, and again from an
infantry changed to a cavalry engagement, in which our men were driven back to
their very lines; but being there reinforced, about a hundred and twenty-three
of the enemy were slain, several forced to throw down their arms, many wounded,
and the rest pursued quite to their camp. On our side, three were slain, besides
twelve foot-soldiers and five troopers wounded. Toward the evening of the same
day, the fight, as usual, was renewed before the walls: and the enemy having thrown
many darts, and a great quantity of fire from the battlements, proceeded afterward
to an action of unexampled cruelty and barbarity: for in the very sight of our
troops they fell to murdering the citizens, and tumbling them headlong from the
walls, as is usual among barbarians: no parallel to this is to be found in the
memory of man.

caes.spain.16:[16] When night came on, Pompey sent a messenger unknown to us,
to exhort the garrison to set fire to our towers and mound, and make a sally at
midnight. Accordingly, having poured upon us a great quantity of darts and fire,
and destroyed a considerable part of the rampart, they opened the gate which lay
over against and within view of Pompey’s camp, and sallied out with all their
forces, carrying with them fascines to fill up the ditch; hooks and fire to destroy
and reduce to ashes the barracks, which the soldiers had built mostly of reeds
to defend them from the winter; and some silver and rich apparel to scatter among
the tents, that while our men should be employed in securing the plunder, they
might fight their way through and escape to Pompey; who, in expectation that they
would be able to effect their design, had crossed the Rio Salado with his army,
where he continued all night in order of battle, to favor their retreat. But though
our men had no apprehension of this design, their valor enabled them to frustrate
the attempt, and repulse the enemy with many wounds. They even made themselves
masters of the spoil, their arms, and some prisoners, who were put to death next
day. At the same time, a deserter from the town informed us that Junius, who was
employed in the mine when the citizens were massacred, exclaimed that it was a
cruel and barbarous action-that they had never deserved such treatment at their
hands-for that they had received them in their temples and their homes-that it
was in violation of all hospitality. He added many things besides, which made
such an impression upon the garrison that they desisted from the massacre.

caes.spain.17:[17] The next day, Tullius, a lieutenant-general, accompanied
by C. Antonius of Lusitania, came to Caesar, and addressed him to this effect:
Would to Heaven I had been one of your soldiers rather than a follower of C. Pompey,
and given those proofs of valor and constancy in obtaining victories for you,
rather than in suffering for him. The only advantage we reap from following his
banners are wretched applauses; being reduced to the condition of indigent citizens,
and by the melancholy fate of our country ranked among its enemies; we, who having
never shared with Pompey his good fortune, yet find ourselves involved in his
disgrace; and after sustaining the attack of so many armed legions, employing
ourselves day and night in the works of defense, exposed to the darts and swords
of our fellow-citizens; vanquished, deserted by Pompey, and compelled to give
way to the superior valor of your troops, find ourselves at last obliged to have
recourse to your clemency, and implore that you will not show yourselves less
placable to fellow-citizens, than you have so often been to foreign nations. I
shall, said Caesar, prove myself the same to fellow-citizens, as I have been to
conquered nations.

caes.spain.18:[18] The embassadors being dismissed, when Tiberius Tullius arrived
at the gate of the town, and C. Antony did not follow him, he returned to the
gate and laid hold of him, upon which drawing a poniard from his breast, he wounded
him in the hand, and in this condition they both fled to Caesar. At the same time
the standard-bearer of the first legion came over to our camp, and reported that
the day when the skirmish happened between the horse, no less than thirty-five
of his company fell; but it was not allowed to mention it in Pompey’s camp, or
so much as own the loss of one man. A slave, whose master was in Caesar’s camp,
and who had left his wife and son in the city, cut his master’s throat, and deceiving
the guards, escaped privately to Pompey’s camp; whence by means of a bullet, on
which he inscribed his intelligence, Caesar was informed of the preparations made
for the defense of the place. When we had read the inscription, those who were
employed to throw the bullet returning to the city, two Lusitanian brothers deserted,
and informed us that Pompey in a speech made to his soldiers, had said: That as
he found it impossible to relieve the town, he was resolved to withdraw in the
night from the sight of the enemy, and retire toward the sea; to which one answered
that it was better to hazard a battle than take refuge in flight, but he who said
so was instantly put to death. At the same time some of his couriers were intercepted,
who were endeavoring to get into the town. Caesar sent the letters to the inhabitants,
and ordered one of the messengers begging his life, to set fire to the townsmen’s
wooden turret, promising that if he did this he would grant him all. The enterprise
was not without difficulty: he undertook it, however, but was slain in the attempt.
The same night a deserter informed us that Pompey and Labienus were greatly offended
at the massacre of the citizens.

caes.spain.19:[19] About nine at night, one of our wooden towers, which had
been severely battered by the enemy’s engines, gave way as far as the third story.
A sharp encounter ensued under the walls, and the besieged, assisted by a favorable
wind, burned the remaining part of that tower and another. Next morning a matron
threw herself from the wall, and came over to the camp, reporting, that the rest
of her family had intended the same, but were apprehended and put to death; likewise,
a letter was thrown over, in which was written L. Minatius to Caesar; Pompey has
abandoned me; if you will grant me my life, I promise to serve you with the same
fidelity and attachment I have hitherto manifested toward him. At the same time
deputies who had been sent before to Caesar by the garrison, now waited on him
a second time, offering to deliver up the town next day, upon a bare grant of
their lives: to which he replied, That he was Caesar, and would perform his word.
Thus, having made himself master of the place, on the nineteenth of February he
was saluted imperator.

caes.spain.20:[20] Pompey, being informed by some deserters that the town had
surrendered, removed his camp toward Ucubis, where he began to build redoubts,
and secure himself with lines. Caesar also decamped and drew near him. At the
same time a Spanish legionary soldier deserting to our camp, informed us that
Pompey had assembled the people of Ucubis, and given them instructions to inquire
diligently who favored his party, who that of the enemy. Some time after in the
town which was taken, the slave, who, as we have related above, had murdered his
master, was apprehended in a mine and burned alive. About the same time eight
Spanish centurions came over to Caesar, and in a skirmish between our cavalry
and that of the enemy, we were repulsed, and some of our light-armed foot wounded.
The same night we took of the enemy’s spies, three slaves and one Spanish soldier.
The slaves were crucified, and the soldier was beheaded.

caes.spain.21:[21] The day following, some of the enemy’s cavalry and light-armed
infantry deserted to us; and about eleven of their horse falling upon a party
of our men that were sent to fetch water, killed some and took others prisoners;
among which last were eight troopers. On the next day Pompey beheaded seventy-four
persons supposed to be favorers of Caesar’s cause, ordering the rest who lay under
the same suspicion to be carried back to the town, of whom a hundred and twenty
escaped to Caesar.

caes.spain.22:[22] Some time after, the deputies from Bursavola (whom Caesar
had taken prisoners at Ategua, and sent along with his own embassadors to their
city, to inform them of the massacre of the Ateguans, and what they had to apprehend
from Pompey, who suffered his soldiers to murder their hosts, and commit all manner
of crimes with impunity), arriving in the town, none of our deputies, except such
as were natives of the place, durst enter the city, though they were all Roman
knights and senators. But after many messages backward and forward, when the deputies
were upon their return, the garrison pursued and put them all to the sword, except
two who escaped to Caesar, and informed him of what had happened. Some time after,
the inhabitants of Bursavola, sending spies to Ategua to know the truth of what
had happened, and finding the report of our deputies confirmed, were for stoning
to death him who had been the cause of the murder of the deputies, and were with
difficulty restrained from laying violent hands upon him, which in the end proved
the occasion of their own destruction. For having obtained leave of the inhabitants
to go in person to Caesar and justify himself, he privately drew together some
troops, and when he thought himself strong enough, returned in the night, and
was treacherously admitted into the town, where he made a dreadful massacre of
the inhabitants, slew all the leaders of the opposite party, and reduced the place
to subjection. Soon after, some slaves who had deserted informed us that he had
sold all the goods of the citizens, and that Pompey suffered none of his soldiers
to quit the camp but unarmed, because, since the taking of Ategua, many despairing
of success fled into Baeturia, having given over all expectation of victory; and
that if any deserted from our camp, they were put among the light-armed infantry,
whose pay was only sixteen asses a day.

caes.spain.23:[23] The day following Caesar removed his camp nearer to Pompey’s,
and began to draw a line to the river Salado. While our men were employed in the
work, some of the enemy fell upon us from the higher ground, and as we were in
no condition to make resistance, wounded great numbers. Here, as Ennius says,
our men retreated a little. This occurrence, so contrary to our usual custom,
being perceived, two centurions of the fifth legion passed the river, and restored
the battle; when, pressing upon the enemy with astonishing bravery, one of them
fell overwhelmed by the multitude of darts discharged from above. The other continued
the combat for some time, but seeing himself in danger of being surrounded, endeavored
to make good his retreat, but stumbled and fell. His death being known, the enemy
crowded together in still greater numbers, upon which our cavalry passed the river,
and drove them back to their intrenchments; so that, while they too eagerly desired
to slay them within their lines, they were surrounded by the cavalry and light-armed
troops. Many of these would have been captured alive, had not their valor been
pre-eminent, for they were so confined by the space included in the fortress,
that the cavalry could not well defend itself. Many of our men were wounded in
these two encounters, and among the rest Clodius Aquitius, but as the fight was
carried on mostly from a distance, none of our men fell, except the two centurions
who sacrificed themselves in the cause of glory.

caes.spain.24:[24] Next day both parties withdrawing from Soricaria, we continued
our works. But Pompey, observing that our fort had cut off his communication with
Aspavia, which is about five miles distant from Ucubis, judged it necessary to
come to a battle. Yet he did not offer it upon equal terms, but chose to draw
up his men upon a hill, that he might have the advantage of the higher ground.
In this respect, when both parties were seeking the superior position, our men
anticipating them, drove them into the plain, which gave us the advantage. The
enemy yielded on all hands, and we made immense havoc among them. The mountain
and not their valor protected them; of which advantage, and of all relief, our
men, though few in number, would have deprived them had not night intervened.
Three hundred and twenty-four light-armed foot, and about a hundred and thirty-eight
legionary soldiers of their number fell, besides those whose armor and spoils
we carried off. Thus the death of the two centurions, which happened the day before,
was fully revenged.

caes.spain.25:[25] The day after, Pompey’s cavalry advanced, according to their
usual custom, to our lines; for they only dared venture to draw up on equal ground.
They therefore began to skirmish with our men who were at work, the legionaries
calling out to us at the same time to choose our field of battle, with a view
to make us believe that they desired nothing so much as to come to blows; upon
this our men quitted the eminence where they were encamped, and advanced a great
way into the plain. But none of the enemy had the boldness to present themselves,
excepting Antistius Turpio; who, presuming on his strength, and fancying no one
on our side a match for him, offered us defiance. Upon this, as is recorded of
Memnon and Achilles, Q. Pompeius Niger, a Roman knight, born in Italy, advanced
from our ranks to the encounter. The fierce air of Antistius having engaged the
attention of all, the two armies drew up to be spectators of the issue of this
challenge, and expressed as much impatience as if the whole fortune of the war
had depended upon it. The wishes on both sides for success were equal to the anxiety
and concern each felt for his own combatant. They advanced into the plain with
great courage, having each a resplendent buckler of curious workmanship. And doubtless
the combat would have been soon decided, had not some light-armed foot drawn up
near the lines, to serve as a guard to the camp because of the approach of the
enemy’s horse, which we have before alluded to. * * * Our horse, in retreating
to their camp, being warmly pursued by the enemy, suddenly faced about with great
cries; which so terrified the Pompeians, that they immediately betook themselves
to flight, and retreated to their camp with the loss of many of their men.

caes.spain.26:[26] Caesar, to reward the valor of the Cassian troop, presented
them with thirteen thousand sesterces, distributed ten thousand more among the
light-armed foot, and gave to the commander of the cavalry five golden collars.
The same day, A. Bebius, C. Flavius, and A. Trebellius, Roman knights of Asta,
with their horses richly caparisoned and adorned with silver, came over to Caesar,
and informed him, that all the rest of the Roman knights in Pompey’s camp, had
like them conspired to come and join him, that, on the information of a slave
they had all been seized and cast into custody; that out of this number they only
had escaped. The same day letters were intercepted, sent by Pompey to Ursao, with
the usual greeting, and stating, That hitherto he had all the success against
the enemy he could desire, and would have ended the war much sooner than was expected,
could he have brought them to engage him upon equal terms; that he did not think
it advisable to venture new-levied troops on a plain; that the enemy, depending
on our supplies, as yet protract the war for they storm city after city, thence
supplying themselves with provisions: that he would therefore endeavor to protect
the towns of his party, and bring the war to as speedy an issue as possible: that
he would send them a reinforcement of some cohorts, and that having deprived them
of provisions he would necessitate the enemy to come to an engagement.

caes.spain.27:[27] Some time after, as our men were carelessly dispersed about
the works, a few horse were killed, who had gone to a grove of olives to fetch
wood. Several slave deserted at this time, and informed us that ever since the
action at Soritia on the 7th of March, the enemy had been under continual alarms,
and appointed Attius Varus to guard the lines. The same day Pompey decamped, and
posted himself in an olive-wood over against Hispalis. Caesar, before he removed,
waited till midnight, when the moon began to appear. At his departure he ordered
them to set fire to the fort of Ucubis, which Pompey had abandoned, and to assemble
in the greater camp. He afterward laid siege to Ventisponte, which surrendered;
and marching thence to Carruca, encamped over against Pompey, who had burned the
city, because the garrison refused to open the gates to him. A soldier who had
murdered his brother in the camp, being intercepted by our men, was scourged to
death. Caesar, still pursuing his march, arrived in the plains of Munda, and pitched
his camp opposite to that of Pompey.

caes.spain.28:[28] Next day as Caesar was preparing to set out with the army,
notice was sent him by his spies, that Pompey had been in order of battle ever
since midnight. Upon this intelligence he ordered the standard to be raised. Pompey
had taken this resolution in consequence of his letter to the inhabitants of Ursao,
who were his firm adherents, in which he told them that Caesar refused to come
down into the plain, because his army consisted mostly of new-levied troops. This
had greatly confirmed the city in its allegiance. Thus relying on this opinion,
he thought that he could effect the whole, for he was defended by the nature of
his situation, and by the position for defense of the town, where he had his camp:
for, as we observed before, this country is full of hills which run in a continued
chain, without any plains intervening.

caes.spain.29:[29] But we must by no means omit to mention an accident which
happened about this time. The two camps were divided from one another by a plain
about five miles in extent, so that Pompey, in consequence of the town’s elevated
position, and the nature of the country, enjoyed a double defense. Across this
valley ran a rivulet, which rendered the approach to the mountain extremely difficult,
because it formed a deep morass on the right. Caesar had no doubt that the enemy
would descend into the plain and come to a battle, when he saw them in array.
This appeared evident to all; the rather because the plain would give their cavalry
full room to act, and the day was so serene and clear that the gods seemed to
have sent it on purpose to favor the engagement. Our men rejoiced at the favorable
opportunity: some however were not altogether exempt from fear when they considered
that their all was at stake, with the uncertainty of what might be their fate
an hour after. He advanced however to the field of battle, fully persuaded that
the enemy would do the same; but they durst not venture above a mile from the
town, being determined to shelter themselves under its walls. Our men still continued
before them in order of battle; but although the equality of the ground sometimes
tempted them to come and dispute the victory, they nevertheless still kept their
post on the mountain, in the neighborhood of the town. We doubled our speed to
reach the rivulet, without their stirring from the place where they stood.

caes.spain.30:[30] Their army consisted of thirteen legions; the cavalry was
drawn up upon the wings, with six thousand light-armed infantry and about the
same number of auxiliaries. We had only eighty heavy-armed cohorts, and eight
thousand horse. When we reached the extremity of the plain, the real seat of disadvantage,
the enemy were awaiting us above, so that it would have been exceedingly dangerous
to proceed. When Caesar perceived this, he pointed out the locality, lest any
disagreeable occurrence should result from the temerity of his troops. The army
murmured greatly, as if they had been kept back from a certain victory, when this
was told them. The delay, however, served to enliven the enemy, thinking that
Caesar’s troops shrank from an encounter through fear: they therefore had the
boldness to advance a little way, yet without quitting the advantage of their
post, the approach to which was extremely dangerous. The tenth legion, as usual,
was on the right, the third and fifth on the left, with the auxiliary troops and
cavalry. The battle began with a shout.

caes.spain.31:[31] But though our men were superior to the enemy in courage,
the latter nevertheless defended themselves so well by the advantage of the higher
ground, and the shouts were so loud, and the discharge of darts on both sides
so great, that we almost began to despair of victory. For the first onset and
shout, by which an enemy is most apt to be dismayed, were pretty equal in the
present encounter. All fought with equal valor; the place was covered with arrows
and darts, and great numbers of the enemy fell. We have already observed that
the tenth legion was on the right, which, though not considerable for the number
of men, was nevertheless formidable for its courage; and so pressed the enemy
on that side that they were obliged to draw a legion from the right wing to reinforce
the left, lest we should come upon their flank; but they fought so bravely that
the reinforcement could not find an opportunity of entering the ranks. Upon this
motion, our cavalry on the left fell upon Pompey’s right wing. Meanwhile the clashing
of armor mingled with the shouts of combatants, and the groans of the dying and
the wounded, terrified the new-raised soldiers. On this occasion, as Ennius says,
they fought hand to hand, foot to foot, and shield to shield; but though the enemy
fought with the utmost vigor, they were obliged to give ground, and retire toward
the town. The battle was fought on the feast of Bacchus, and the Pompeians were
entirely routed and put to flight; insomuch that not a man could have escaped,
had they not sheltered themselves in the place whence they advanced to the charge.
The enemy lost on this occasion upward of thirty thousand men, and among the rest
Labienus and Attius Varus, whose funeral obsequies were performed upon the field
of battle. They had likewise three thousand Roman knights killed, partly Italian,
partly provincial. About a thousand were slain on our side, partly foot, partly
horse; and five hundred wounded. We gained thirteen eagles, and several standards,
and emblems of authority, and made seventeen officers prisoners. Such was the
issue of this action.

caes.spain.32:[32] The remains of Pompey’s army retreating to Munda, with the
intention of defending themselves in that town, it became necessary to invest
it. The dead bodies of the enemy, heaped together, served as a rampart, and their
javelins and darts were fixed up by way of palisades. Upon these we hung their
bucklers to supply the place of a breastwork, and fixing the heads of the deceased
upon swords and lances, planted them all around the works, to strike the greater
terror into the besieged, and keep awake in them a sense of our prowess. Amid
these mournful objects did they find themselves shut in, when our men began the
attack, which was conducted chiefly by the Gauls. Young Valerius, who had escaped
to Corduba with some horse, informed Sextus Pompey of what had happened; who,
upon receipt of the mournful news, distributing what money he had about him to
the troopers, left the town about nine at night, under pretense of going to find
out Caesar, to treat of an accommodation. On the other side, Cn. Pompey, attended
by a few horse and foot, took the road to Carteia, where his fleet lay, and which
was about a hundred and seventy miles distant from Corduba. When he was arrived
within eight miles of the place, he sent P. Calvitius his camp-marshal before,
to procure a litter to carry him to the town, as he found himself unwell. The
litter came, and when he entered the town, those of his party waited on him privately,
to receive his orders about the management of the war. As they assembled round
the place in great crowds, Pompey quitting his litter put himself under their
protection.

caes.spain.33:[33] After the encounter, Caesar seeing the circumvallation of
Munda completed, marched to Corduba. Those of the enemy who had escaped the slaughter,
possessing themselves of a bridge, upon the approach of our men, called out to
them with an air of derision- What! we who are no more than a handful of men escaped
from the battle, shall we be allowed no place of retreat? They immediately prepared
to defend the bridge. Caesar passed the river and encamped. Scapula, who had stirred
up the freedmen to a revolt, escaping after the battle to Corduba, when he found
himself besieged, assembled all his followers, ordered a funeral pile to be erected
and a magnificent supper served up; when, putting on his richest dress, he distributed
his plate and money among his domestics, supped cheerfully, anointed himself several
times, and, last of all, ordered one of his freedmen to dispatch him, and another
to set fire to the pile.

caes.spain.34:[34] Caesar had no sooner encamped before the place than a division
arose among the inhabitants, between the parties of Caesar and Pompey, till the
dispute almost reached to our camps. During the contest, some legions, composed
partly of deserters, partly of slaves made free by Pompey, came and surrendered
themselves to Caesar. But the thirteenth legion prepared to defend the town, and
with that view possessed themselves of the walls and some towers, in spite of
all opposition, which obliged the other party to send deputies to Caesar for aid.
Upon this those who had escaped out of the battle set fire to the place, and our
men entering at the same time, slew about twenty-two thousand of them, besides
those who were slain without the walls; thus Caesar obtained the town. While he
was employed in this siege, those who, as we have said, were blockaded at Munda
made a sally, but were driven back into the town with considerable loss.

caes.spain.35:[35] Thence Caesar marched to Hispalis, which sent deputies to
sue for pardon. Though the citizens assured him that they were able to defend
the town, he sent Caninius his lieutenant thither with some troops, and encamped
before the place. There was in the town a strong party of Pompeians, who, displeased
to see Caesar’s troops received within the walls, secretly deputed one Philo,
a zealous partisan of Pompey, and well known in Lusitania, to beg assistance of
Cecilius Niger, one of the barbarians, who lay encamped near Lenius, with a strong
army of Lusitanians. He is received into the town of Hispalis by night, surprises
the sentinels and garrison, shuts the gates, and begins to defend the place.

caes.spain.36:[36] During these transactions deputies arrived from Carteia,
with accounts of their having secured Pompey; hoping by this service to atone
for their former fault of shutting their gates against Caesar. Meantime, the Lusitanians
in Hispalis plundered the town, which, though known to Caesar, did not yet determine
him to press it too hard, lest they should in despair set fire to it, and destroy
the walls. It was resolved in council to suffer the Lusitanians to escape in the
night by a sally, yet so that the thing might not appear designed. In this sally,
they set fire to the ships that were in the river Guadalquivir, and while our
men were employed in extinguishing the flames, endeavored to get off; but being
overtaken by the cavalry, were mostly cut to pieces. Thence Caesar marched to
Asta, which submitted. Munda having been now a long while besieged, many of those
who had escaped out of the battle, despairing of safety, surrendered to us; and
being formed into a legion, conspired among themselves, that upon a signal being
given, the garrison should sally out in the night, while they at the same time
should begin a massacre in the camp. But the plot being discovered, they were
next night, at the changing of the third watch, all put to death outside the rampart.

caes.spain.37:[37] The Carteians, while Caesar was employed in reducing the
other towns upon his route, began to disagree about young Pompey. One party had
sent the deputies to Caesar, and another was in the Pompeian interest. These last
prevailing, seized the gates, and made a dreadful slaughter of their adversaries.
Pompey himself was wounded in the fray, but escaping to his ships, fled with about
twenty galleys. Didius, who was at Gades with Caesar’s fleet, hearing of what
had happened, immediately sailed in pursuit of them; stationing at the same time
some cavalry and infantry along the coast, to prevent his escaping by land. Pompey
had left Carteia with so much precipitation, that he took no time to furnish himself
with water, and this circumstance obliging him to stop by the way, Didius came
up with him after four days’ sailing, took some of his ships, and burned the rest.

caes.spain.38:[38] With a few friends, Pompey escaped to a place strongly fortified
by nature; of which the troops sent in pursuit of him having certain intelligence
by their scouts, followed day and night. He was wounded in the shoulder and left
leg, and had besides sprained his ankle, all which greatly retarded his flight,
and obliged him to make use of a litter. A Lusitanian having discovered the place
of his retreat, he was quickly surrounded by our cavalry and cohorts. Seeing himself
betrayed, he took refuge in a post fortified by nature, and which could easily
be defended by a few men, the approach to it being extremely difficult. We attempted
to storm it, but were repulsed, and pursued by the enemy; and meeting with no
better success after several trials, we at length resolved to lay siege to the
place, it seeming too hazardous to force it. Accordingly, a terrace was raised,
and lines drawn round the place; which the enemy perceiving, thought it best to
betake themselves to flight.

caes.spain.39:[39] Pompey as we have observed above being lame and wounded,
was in no condition to make a speedy retreat; and the rather, because the place
was such that he could use neither horse nor litter. Slaughter was dealt on all
hands by our troops, his fortress having been stormed, and his resources cut off.
In this extremity he fled to a cave, where he could not easily be discovered,
unless by the information of the captives. Here he was slain, his head was brought
to Hispalis on the day before the ides of April, and exhibited before the people
when Caesar was at Gades.

caes.spain.40:[40] After the death of young Pompey, Didius, proud of his success,
retired to the nearest fortress and hauled some of his vessels on shore to be
refitted. The Lusitanians, who had escaped from the battle, rallying in great
bodies, advanced to Didius. Though the preservation of the fleet principally engaged
his attention, he was obliged to leave his fort in order to restrain the frequent
sallies of the enemy. These daily skirmishes gave them an opportunity of projecting
an ambuscade; for which purpose they divided their troops into three bodies. Some
were prepared to set fire to the fleet, and in the mean time others were to come
to their relief. These were so arranged that they could advance to the battle
without any one seeing them. Didius sallied out according to custom; when upon
a signal being given, one of the parties advanced to set fire to the fleet; and
another, counterfeiting a retreat, drew him insensibly into the ambuscade, where
he was surrounded and slain with most of his followers, fighting valiantly. Some
escaped in boats which they found upon the coast; others endeavored to reach the
galleys by swimming; and, weighing anchor, stood out to sea. A great many saved
themselves in this manner, but the Lusitanians got all the baggage. Caesar meanwhile
returned from Gades to Hispalis.

caes.spain.41:[41] Fabius Maximus, whom he had left to continue the siege of
Munda, conducted it with great zeal; so that the enemy, seeing themselves shut
up on all sides, sallied out, but were repulsed with great loss. Our men seized
this opportunity to get possession of the town, and took the rest prisoners, in
number about fourteen thousand. Thence they retreated toward Ursao, a town exceedingly
strong both by nature and art, and capable of resisting an enemy. Besides, there
is not, within eight miles of the place any spring but that which supplies the
town, which was a decided advantage to the besieged. In addition to all this,
the wood necessary for building towers and other machines had to be fetched from
a distance of six miles. And Pompey, to render the siege more difficult, had cut
down all the timber round the place, and collected it within the walls, which
obliged our men to bring all the materials for carrying on the siege from Munda,
the nearest town which they had subdued.

caes.spain.42:[42] During these transactions at Munda and Ursao, Caesar, who
had returned from Gades to Hispalis, assembled the citizens, and made the following
speech: That when he was advanced to the quaestorship, he had chosen their province
in preference to all others, and during his continuance in that office, had done
them every service in his power; that during his praetorship he had obtained for
them from the senate the abolition of the taxes imposed by Metellus, declared
himself their patron, procured their deputies a hearing at Rome, and made himself
many enemies by undertaking the defense both of their private and public rights.
In fine, that when he was consul, he had, though absent, rendered the province
all the services in his power; that instead of making a suitable return for so
many favors, they had always discovered the utmost ingratitude both toward him
and the people of Rome; as well in this last war as the preceding. You, says he,
though no strangers to the law of nations and the rights of Roman citizens, have
yet like barbarians often violated the sacred persons of Roman magistrates. You
attempted in open day, in the public square, to assassinate Cassius. You have
been always such enemies to peace that the senate could never suffer the province
to be without legions. You take favors for offenses, and insults for benefits,
are insolent and restless in peace, and cowardly and effeminate in war. Young
Pompey, though only a private citizen, nay a fugitive, was yet received among
you, and suffered to assume the ensigns of magistracy. After putting many citizens
to death, you still furnished him with forces, and even urged him to lay waste
the country and province. Against whom do you hope to be victorious? Can you be
ignorant that even if I should be destroyed, the people of Rome have still ten
legions, capable not only of opposing you, but even of pulling down heaven? With
whose praises and virtues …

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