The History of the Peloponnesian War
By Thucydides
Written about 431 BC
Translated by Richard Crawley
London 1910.
The Sixth Book
Chapter XVIII
Seventeenth Year of the War – The Sicilian Campaign – Affair of the Hermae –
Departure of the Expedition.
The same winter the Athenians resolved to sail again to Sicily, with a greater
armament than that under Laches and Eurymedon, and, if possible, to conquer the
island; most of them being ignorant of its size and of the number of its inhabitants,
Hellenic and barbarian, and of the fact that they were undertaking a war not much
inferior to that against the Peloponnesians. For the voyage round Sicily in a merchantman
is not far short of eight days; and yet, large as the island is, there are only
two miles of sea to prevent its being mainland.
It was settled originally as follows, and the peoples that occupied it are these.
The earliest inhabitants spoken of in any part of the country are the Cyclopes and
Laestrygones; but I cannot tell of what race they were, or whence they came or whither
they went, and must leave my readers to what the poets have said of them and to
what may be generally known concerning them. The Sicanians appear to have been the
next settlers, although they pretend to have been the first of all and aborigines;
but the facts show that they were Iberians, driven by the Ligurians from the river
Sicanus in Iberia. It was from them that the island, before called Trinacria, took
its name of Sicania, and to the present day they inhabit the west of Sicily. On
the fall of Ilium, some of the Trojans escaped from the Achaeans, came in ships
to Sicily, and settled next to the Sicanians under the general name of Elymi; their
towns being called Eryx and Egesta. With them settled some of the Phocians carried
on their way from Troy by a storm, first to Libya, and afterwards from thence to
Sicily. The Sicels crossed over to Sicily from their first home Italy, flying from
the Opicans, as tradition says and as seems not unlikely, upon rafts, having watched
till the wind set down the strait to effect the passage; although perhaps they may
have sailed over in some other way. Even at the present day there are still Sicels
in Italy; and the country got its name of Italy from Italus, a king of the Sicels,
so called. These went with a great host to Sicily, defeated the Sicanians in battle
and forced them to remove to the south and west of the island, which thus came to
be called Sicily instead of Sicania, and after they crossed over continued to enjoy
the richest parts of the country for near three hundred years before any Hellenes
came to Sicily; indeed they still hold the centre and north of the island. There
were also Phoenicians living all round Sicily, who had occupied promontories upon
the sea coasts and the islets adjacent for the purpose of trading with the Sicels.
But when the Hellenes began to arrive in considerable numbers by sea, the Phoenicians
abandoned most of their stations, and drawing together took up their abode in Motye,
Soloeis, and Panormus, near the Elymi, partly because they confided in their alliance,
and also because these are the nearest points for the voyage between Carthage and
Sicily.
These were the barbarians in Sicily, settled as I have said. Of the Hellenes,
the first to arrive were Chalcidians from Euboea with Thucles, their founder. They
founded Naxos and built the altar to Apollo Archegetes, which now stands outside
the town, and upon which the deputies for the games sacrifice before sailing from
Sicily. Syracuse was founded the year afterwards by Archias, one of the Heraclids
from Corinth, who began by driving out the Sicels from the island upon which the
inner city now stands, though it is no longer surrounded by water: in process of
time the outer town also was taken within the walls and became populous. Meanwhile
Thucles and the Chalcidians set out from Naxos in the fifth year after the foundation
of Syracuse, and drove out the Sicels by arms and founded Leontini and afterwards
Catana; the Catanians themselves choosing Evarchus as their founder.
About the same time Lamis arrived in Sicily with a colony from Megara, and after
founding a place called Trotilus beyond the river Pantacyas, and afterwards leaving
it and for a short while joining the Chalcidians at Leontini, was driven out by
them and founded Thapsus. After his death his companions were driven out of Thapsus,
and founded a place called the Hyblaean Megara; Hyblon, a Sicel king, having given
up the place and inviting them thither. Here they lived two hundred and forty-five
years; after which they were expelled from the city and the country by the Syracusan
tyrant Gelo. Before their expulsion, however, a hundred years after they had settled
there, they sent out Pamillus and founded Selinus; he having come from their mother
country Megara to join them in its foundation. Gela was founded by Antiphemus from
Rhodes and Entimus from Crete, who joined in leading a colony thither, in the forty-fifth
year after the foundation of Syracuse. The town took its name from the river Gelas,
the place where the citadel now stands, and which was first fortified, being called
Lindii. The institutions which they adopted were Dorian. Near one hundred and eight
years after the foundation of Gela, the Geloans founded Acragas (Agrigentum), so
called from the river of that name, and made Aristonous and Pystilus their founders;
giving their own institutions to the colony. Zancle was originally founded by pirates
from Cuma, the Chalcidian town in the country of the Opicans: afterwards, however,
large numbers came from Chalcis and the rest of Euboea, and helped to people the
place; the founders being Perieres and Crataemenes from Cuma and Chalcis respectively.
It first had the name of Zancle given it by the Sicels, because the place is shaped
like a sickle, which the Sicels call zanclon; but upon the original settlers being
afterwards expelled by some Samians and other Ionians who landed in Sicily flying
from the Medes, and the Samians in their turn not long afterwards by Anaxilas, tyrant
of Rhegium, the town was by him colonized with a mixed population, and its name
changed to Messina, after his old country.
Himera was founded from Zancle by Euclides, Simus, and Sacon, most of those who
went to the colony being Chalcidians; though they were joined by some exiles from
Syracuse, defeated in a civil war, called the Myletidae. The language was a mixture
of Chalcidian and Doric, but the institutions which prevailed were the Chalcidian.
Acrae and Casmenae were founded by the Syracusans; Acrae seventy years after Syracuse,
Casmenae nearly twenty after Acrae. Camarina was first founded by the Syracusans,
close upon a hundred and thirty-five years after the building of Syracuse; its founders
being Daxon and Menecolus. But the Camarinaeans being expelled by arms by the Syracusans
for having revolted, Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, some time later receiving their
land in ransom for some Syracusan prisoners, resettled Camarina, himself acting
as its founder. Lastly, it was again depopulated by Gelo, and settled once more
for the third time by the Geloans.
Such is the list of the peoples, Hellenic and barbarian, inhabiting Sicily, and
such the magnitude of the island which the Athenians were now bent upon invading;
being ambitious in real truth of conquering the whole, although they had also the
specious design of succouring their kindred and other allies in the island. But
they were especially incited by envoys from Egesta, who had come to Athens and invoked
their aid more urgently than ever. The Egestaeans had gone to war with their neighbours
the Selinuntines upon questions of marriage and disputed territory, and the Selinuntines
had procured the alliance of the Syracusans, and pressed Egesta hard by land and
sea. The Egestaeans now reminded the Athenians of the alliance made in the time
of Laches, during the former Leontine war, and begged them to send a fleet to their
aid, and among a number of other considerations urged as a capital argument that
if the Syracusans were allowed to go unpunished for their depopulation of Leontini,
to ruin the allies still left to Athens in Sicily, and to get the whole power of
the island into their hands, there would be a danger of their one day coming with
a large force, as Dorians, to the aid of their Dorian brethren, and as colonists,
to the aid of the Peloponnesians who had sent them out, and joining these in pulling
down the Athenian empire. The Athenians would, therefore, do well to unite with
the allies still left to them, and to make a stand against the Syracusans; especially
as they, the Egestaeans, were prepared to furnish money sufficient for the war.
The Athenians, hearing these arguments constantly repeated in their assemblies by
the Egestaeans and their supporters, voted first to send envoys to Egesta, to see
if there was really the money that they talked of in the treasury and temples, and
at the same time to ascertain in what posture was the war with the Selinuntines.
`The envoys of the Athenians were accordingly dispatched to Sicily. The same
winter the Lacedaemonians and their allies, the Corinthians excepted, marched into
the Argive territory, and ravaged a small part of the land, and took some yokes
of oxen and carried off some corn. They also settled the Argive exiles at Orneae,
and left them a few soldiers taken from the rest of the army; and after making a
truce for a certain while, according to which neither Orneatae nor Argives were
to injure each other’s territory, returned home with the army. Not long afterwards
the Athenians came with thirty ships and six hundred heavy infantry, and the Argives
joining them with all their forces, marched out and besieged the men in Orneae for
one day; but the garrison escaped by night, the besiegers having bivouacked some
way off. The next day the Argives, discovering it, razed Orneae to the ground, and
went back again; after which the Athenians went home in their ships. Meanwhile the
Athenians took by sea to Methone on the Macedonian border some cavalry of their
own and the Macedonian exiles that were at Athens, and plundered the country of
Perdiccas. Upon this the Lacedaemonians sent to the Thracian Chalcidians, who had
a truce with Athens from one ten days to another, urging them to join Perdiccas
in the war, which they refused to do. And the winter ended, and with it ended the
sixteenth year of this war of which Thucydides is the historian.
Early in the spring of the following summer the Athenian envoys arrived from
Sicily, and the Egestaeans with them, bringing sixty talents of uncoined silver,
as a month’s pay for sixty ships, which they were to ask to have sent them. The
Athenians held an assembly and, after hearing from the Egestaeans and their own
envoys a report, as attractive as it was untrue, upon the state of affairs generally,
and in particular as to the money, of which, it was said, there was abundance in
the temples and the treasury, voted to send sixty ships to Sicily, under the command
of Alcibiades, son of Clinias, Nicias, son of Niceratus, and Lamachus, son of Xenophanes,
who were appointed with full powers; they were to help the Egestaeans against the
Selinuntines, to restore Leontini upon gaining any advantage in the war, and to
order all other matters in Sicily as they should deem best for the interests of
Athens. Five days after this a second assembly was held, to consider the speediest
means of equipping the ships, and to vote whatever else might be required by the
generals for the expedition; and Nicias, who had been chosen to the command against
his will, and who thought that the state was not well advised, but upon a slight
aid specious pretext was aspiring to the conquest of the whole of Sicily, a great
matter to achieve, came forward in the hope of diverting the Athenians from the
enterprise, and gave them the following counsel:
“Although this assembly was convened to consider the preparations to be made
for sailing to Sicily, I think, notwithstanding, that we have still this question
to examine, whether it be better to send out the ships at all, and that we ought
not to give so little consideration to a matter of such moment, or let ourselves
be persuaded by foreigners into undertaking a war with which we have nothing to
do. And yet, individually, I gain in honour by such a course, and fear as little
as other men for my person- not that I think a man need be any the worse citizen
for taking some thought for his person and estate; on the contrary, such a man would
for his own sake desire the prosperity of his country more than others- nevertheless,
as I have never spoken against my convictions to gain honour, I shall not begin
to do so now, but shall say what I think best. Against your character any words
of mine would be weak enough, if I were to advise your keeping what you have got
and not risking what is actually yours for advantages which are dubious in themselves,
and which you may or may not attain. I will, therefore, content myself with showing
that your ardour is out of season, and your ambition not easy of accomplishment.
“I affirm, then, that you leave many enemies behind you here to go yonder and
bring more back with you. You imagine, perhaps, that the treaty which you have made
can be trusted; a treaty that will continue to exist nominally, as long as you keep
quiet- for nominal it has become, owing to the practices of certain men here and
at Sparta- but which in the event of a serious reverse in any quarter would not
delay our enemies a moment in attacking us; first, because the convention was forced
upon them by disaster and was less honourable to them than to us; and secondly,
because in this very convention there are many points that are still disputed. Again,
some of the most powerful states have never yet accepted the arrangement at all.
Some of these are at open war with us; others (as the Lacedaemonians do not yet
move) are restrained by truces renewed every ten days, and it is only too probable
that if they found our power divided, as we are hurrying to divide it, they would
attack us vigorously with the Siceliots, whose alliance they would have in the past
valued as they would that of few others. A man ought, therefore, to consider these
points, and not to think of running risks with a country placed so critically, or
of grasping at another empire before we have secured the one we have already; for
in fact the Thracian Chalcidians have been all these years in revolt from us without
being yet subdued, and others on the continents yield us but a doubtful obedience.
Meanwhile the Egestaeans, our allies, have been wronged, and we run to help them,
while the rebels who have so long wronged us still wait for punishment.
“And yet the latter, if brought under, might be kept under; while the Sicilians,
even if conquered, are too far off and too numerous to be ruled without difficulty.
Now it is folly to go against men who could not be kept under even if conquered,
while failure would leave us in a very different position from that which we occupied
before the enterprise. The Siceliots, again, to take them as they are at present,
in the event of a Syracusan conquest (the favourite bugbear of the Egestaeans),
would to my thinking be even less dangerous to us than before. At present they might
possibly come here as separate states for love of Lacedaemon; in the other case
one empire would scarcely attack another; for after joining the Peloponnesians to
overthrow ours, they could only expect to see the same hands overthrow their own
in the same way. The Hellenes in Sicily would fear us most if we never went there
at all, and next to this, if after displaying our power we went away again as soon
as possible. We all know that that which is farthest off, and the reputation of
which can least be tested, is the object of admiration; at the least reverse they
would at once begin to look down upon us, and would join our enemies here against
us. You have yourselves experienced this with regard to the Lacedaemonians and their
allies, whom your unexpected success, as compared with what you feared at first,
has made you suddenly despise, tempting you further to aspire to the conquest of
Sicily. Instead, however, of being puffed up by the misfortunes of your adversaries,
you ought to think of breaking their spirit before giving yourselves up to confidence,
and to understand that the one thought awakened in the Lacedaemonians by their disgrace
is how they may even now, if possible, overthrow us and repair their dishonour;
inasmuch as military reputation is their oldest and chiefest study. Our struggle,
therefore, if we are wise, will not be for the barbarian Egestaeans in Sicily, but
how to defend ourselves most effectually against the oligarchical machinations of
Lacedaemon.
“We should also remember that we are but now enjoying some respite from a great
pestilence and from war, to the no small benefit of our estates and persons, and
that it is right to employ these at home on our own behalf, instead of using them
on behalf of these exiles whose interest it is to lie as fairly as they can, who
do nothing but talk themselves and leave the danger to others, and who if they succeed
will show no proper gratitude, and if they fail will drag down their friends with
them. And if there be any man here, overjoyed at being chosen to command, who urges
you to make the expedition, merely for ends of his own- specially if he be still
too young to command- who seeks to be admired for his stud of horses, but on account
of its heavy expenses hopes for some profit from his appointment, do not allow such
a one to maintain his private splendour at his country’s risk, but remember that
such persons injure the public fortune while they squander their own, and that this
is a matter of importance, and not for a young man to decide or hastily to take
in hand.
“When I see such persons now sitting here at the side of that same individual
and summoned by him, alarm seizes me; and I, in my turn, summon any of the older
men that may have such a person sitting next him not to let himself be shamed down,
for fear of being thought a coward if he do not vote for war, but, remembering how
rarely success is got by wishing and how often by forecast, to leave to them the
mad dream of conquest, and as a true lover of his country, now threatened by the
greatest danger in its history, to hold up his hand on the other side; to vote that
the Siceliots be left in the limits now existing between us, limits of which no
one can complain (the Ionian sea for the coasting voyage, and the Sicilian across
the open main), to enjoy their own possessions and to settle their own quarrels;
that the Egestaeans, for their part, be told to end by themselves with the Selinuntines
the war which they began without consulting the Athenians; and that for the future
we do not enter into alliance, as we have been used to do, with people whom we must
help in their need, and who can never help us in ours.
“And you, Prytanis, if you think it your duty to care for the commonwealth, and
if you wish to show yourself a good citizen, put the question to the vote, and take
a second time the opinions of the Athenians. If you are afraid to move the question
again, consider that a violation of the law cannot carry any prejudice with so many
abettors, that you will be the physician of your misguided city, and that the virtue
of men in office is briefly this, to do their country as much good as they can,
or in any case no harm that they can avoid.”
Such were the words of Nicias. Most of the Athenians that came forward spoke
in favour of the expedition, and of not annulling what had been voted, although
some spoke on the other side. By far the warmest advocate of the expedition was,
however, Alcibiades, son of Clinias, who wished to thwart Nicias both as his political
opponent and also because of the attack he had made upon him in his speech, and
who was, besides, exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce
Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means of
his successes. For the position he held among the citizens led him to indulge his
tastes beyond what his real means would bear, both in keeping horses and in the
rest of his expenditure; and this later on had not a little to do with the ruin
of the Athenian state. Alarmed at the greatness of his licence in his own life and
habits, and of the ambition which he showed in all things soever that he undertook,
the mass of the people set him down as a pretender to the tyranny, and became his
enemies; and although publicly his conduct of the war was as good as could be desired,
individually, his habits gave offence to every one, and caused them to commit affairs
to other hands, and thus before long to ruin the city. Meanwhile he now came forward
and gave the following advice to the Athenians:
“Athenians, I have a better right to command than others- I must begin with this
as Nicias has attacked me- and at the same time I believe myself to be worthy of
it. The things for which I am abused, bring fame to my ancestors and to myself,
and to the country profit besides. The Hellenes, after expecting to see our city
ruined by the war, concluded it to be even greater than it really is, by reason
of the magnificence with which I represented it at the Olympic games, when I sent
into the lists seven chariots, a number never before entered by any private person,
and won the first prize, and was second and fourth, and took care to have everything
else in a style worthy of my victory. Custom regards such displays as honourable,
and they cannot be made without leaving behind them an impression of power. Again,
any splendour that I may have exhibited at home in providing choruses or otherwise,
is naturally envied by my fellow citizens, but in the eyes of foreigners has an
air of strength as in the other instance. And this is no useless folly, when a man
at his own private cost benefits not himself only, but his city: nor is it unfair
that he who prides himself on his position should refuse to be upon an equality
with the rest. He who is badly off has his misfortunes all to himself, and as we
do not see men courted in adversity, on the like principle a man ought to accept
the insolence of prosperity; or else, let him first mete out equal measure to all,
and then demand to have it meted out to him. What I know is that persons of this
kind and all others that have attained to any distinction, although they may be
unpopular in their lifetime in their relations with their fellow-men and especially
with their equals, leave to posterity the desire of claiming connection with them
even without any ground, and are vaunted by the country to which they belonged,
not as strangers or ill-doers, but as fellow-countrymen and heroes. Such are my
aspirations, and however I am abused for them in private, the question is whether
any one manages public affairs better than I do. Having united the most powerful
states of Peloponnese, without great danger or expense to you, I compelled the Lacedaemonians
to stake their all upon the issue of a single day at Mantinea; and although victorious
in the battle, they have never since fully recovered confidence.
“Thus did my youth and so-called monstrous folly find fitting arguments to deal
with the power of the Peloponnesians, and by its ardour win their confidence and
prevail. And do not be afraid of my youth now, but while I am still in its flower,
and Nicias appears fortunate, avail yourselves to the utmost of the services of
us both. Neither rescind your resolution to sail to Sicily, on the ground that you
would be going to attack a great power. The cities in Sicily are peopled by motley
rabbles, and easily change their institutions and adopt new ones in their stead;
and consequently the inhabitants, being without any feeling of patriotism, are not
provided with arms for their persons, and have not regularly established themselves
on the land; every man thinks that either by fair words or by party strife he can
obtain something at the public expense, and then in the event of a catastrophe settle
in some other country, and makes his preparations accordingly. From a mob like this
you need not look for either unanimity in counsel or concert in action; but they
will probably one by one come in as they get a fair offer, especially if they are
torn by civil strife as we are told. Moreover, the Siceliots have not so many heavy
infantry as they boast; just as the Hellenes generally did not prove so numerous
as each state reckoned itself, but Hellas greatly over-estimated their numbers,
and has hardly had an adequate force of heavy infantry throughout this war. The
states in Sicily, therefore, from all that I can hear, will be found as I say, and
I have not pointed out all our advantages, for we shall have the help of many barbarians,
who from their hatred of the Syracusans will join us in attacking them; nor will
the powers at home prove any hindrance, if you judge rightly. Our fathers with these
very adversaries, which it is said we shall now leave behind us when we sail, and
the Mede as their enemy as well, were able to win the empire, depending solely on
their superiority at sea. The Peloponnesians had never so little hope against us
as at present; and let them be ever so sanguine, although strong enough to invade
our country even if we stay at home, they can never hurt us with their navy, as
we leave one of our own behind us that is a match for them.
“In this state of things what reason can we give to ourselves for holding back,
or what excuse can we offer to our allies in Sicily for not helping them? They are
our confederates, and we are bound to assist them, without objecting that they have
not assisted us. We did not take them into alliance to have them to help us in Hellas,
but that they might so annoy our enemies in Sicily as to prevent them from coming
over here and attacking us. It is thus that empire has been won, both by us and
by all others that have held it, by a constant readiness to support all, whether
barbarians or Hellenes, that invite assistance; since if all were to keep quiet
or to pick and choose whom they ought to assist, we should make but few new conquests,
and should imperil those we have already won. Men do not rest content with parrying
the attacks of a superior, but often strike the first blow to prevent the attack
being made. And we cannot fix the exact point at which our empire shall stop; we
have reached a position in which we must not be content with retaining but must
scheme to extend it, for, if we cease to rule others, we are in danger of being
ruled ourselves. Nor can you look at inaction from the same point of view as others,
unless you are prepared to change your habits and make them like theirs.
“Be convinced, then, that we shall augment our power at home by this adventure
abroad, and let us make the expedition, and so humble the pride of the Peloponnesians
by sailing off to Sicily, and letting them see how little we care for the peace
that we are now enjoying; and at the same time we shall either become masters, as
we very easily may, of the whole of Hellas through the accession of the Sicilian
Hellenes, or in any case ruin the Syracusans, to the no small advantage of ourselves
and our allies. The faculty of staying if successful, or of returning, will be secured
to us by our navy, as we shall be superior at sea to all the Siceliots put together.
And do not let the do-nothing policy which Nicias advocates, or his setting of the
young against the old, turn you from your purpose, but in the good old fashion by
which our fathers, old and young together, by their united counsels brought our
affairs to their present height, do you endeavour still to advance them; understanding
that neither youth nor old age can do anything the one without the other, but that
levity, sobriety, and deliberate judgment are strongest when united, and that, by
sinking into inaction, the city, like everything else, will wear itself out, and
its skill in everything decay; while each fresh struggle will give it fresh experience,
and make it more used to defend itself not in word but in deed. In short, my conviction
is that a city not inactive by nature could not choose a quicker way to ruin itself
than by suddenly adopting such a policy, and that the safest rule of life is to
take one’s character and institutions for better and for worse, and to live up to
them as closely as one can.”
Such were the words of Alcibiades. After hearing him and the Egestaeans and some
Leontine exiles, who came forward reminding them of their oaths and imploring their
assistance, the Athenians became more eager for the expedition than before. Nicias,
perceiving that it would be now useless to try to deter them by the old line of
argument, but thinking that he might perhaps alter their resolution by the extravagance
of his estimates, came forward a second time and spoke as follows:
“I see, Athenians, that you are thoroughly bent upon the expedition, and therefore
hope that all will turn out as we wish, and proceed to give you my opinion at the
present juncture. From all that I hear we are going against cities that are great
and not subject to one another, or in need of change, so as to be glad to pass from
enforced servitude to an easier condition, or in the least likely to accept our
rule in exchange for freedom; and, to take only the Hellenic towns, they are very
numerous for one island. Besides Naxos and Catana, which I expect to join us from
their connection with Leontini, there are seven others armed at all points just
like our own power, particularly Selinus and Syracuse, the chief objects of our
expedition. These are full of heavy infantry, archers, and darters, have galleys
in abundance and crowds to man them; they have also money, partly in the hands of
private persons, partly in the temples at Selinus, and at Syracuse first-fruits
from some of the barbarians as well. But their chief advantage over us lies in the
number of their horses, and in the fact that they grow their corn at home instead
of importing it.
“Against a power of this kind it will not do to have merely a weak naval armament,
but we shall want also a large land army to sail with us, if we are to do anything
worthy of our ambition, and are not to be shut out from the country by a numerous
cavalry; especially if the cities should take alarm and combine, and we should be
left without friends (except the Egestaeans) to furnish us with horse to defend
ourselves with. It would be disgraceful to have to retire under compulsion, or to
send back for reinforcements, owing to want of reflection at first: we must therefore
start from home with a competent force, seeing that we are going to sail far from
our country, and upon an expedition not like any which you may undertaken undertaken
the quality of allies, among your subject states here in Hellas, where any additional
supplies needed were easily drawn from the friendly territory; but we are cutting
ourselves off, and going to a land entirely strange, from which during four months
in winter it is not even easy for a messenger get to Athens.
“I think, therefore, that we ought to take great numbers of heavy infantry, both
from Athens and from our allies, and not merely from our subjects, but also any
we may be able to get for love or for money in Peloponnese, and great numbers also
of archers and slingers, to make head against the Sicilian horse. Meanwhile we must
have an overwhelming superiority at sea, to enable us the more easily to carry in
what we want; and we must take our own corn in merchant vessels, that is to say,
wheat and parched barley, and bakers from the mills compelled to serve for pay in
the proper proportion; in order that in case of our being weather-bound the armament
may not want provisions, as it is not every city that will be able to entertain
numbers like ours. We must also provide ourselves with everything else as far as
we can, so as not to be dependent upon others; and above all we must take with us
from home as much money as possible, as the sums talked of as ready at Egesta are
readier, you may be sure, in talk than in any other way.
“Indeed, even if we leave Athens with a force not only equal to that of the enemy
except in the number of heavy infantry in the field, but even at all points superior
to him, we shall still find it difficult to conquer Sicily or save ourselves. We
must not disguise from ourselves that we go to found a city among strangers and
enemies, and that he who undertakes such an enterprise should be prepared to become
master of the country the first day he lands, or failing in this to find everything
hostile to him. Fearing this, and knowing that we shall have need of much good counsel
and more good fortune- a hard matter for mortal man to aspire to- I wish as far
as may be to make myself independent of fortune before sailing, and when I do sail,
to be as safe as a strong force can make me. This I believe to be surest for the
country at large, and safest for us who are to go on the expedition. If any one
thinks differently I resign to him my command.”
With this Nicias concluded, thinking that he should either disgust the Athenians
by the magnitude of the undertaking, or, if obliged to sail on the expedition, would
thus do so in the safest way possible. The Athenians, however, far from having their
taste for the voyage taken away by the burdensomeness of the preparations, became
more eager for it than ever; and just the contrary took place of what Nicias had
thought, as it was held that he had given good advice, and that the expedition would
be the safest in the world. All alike fell in love with the enterprise. The older
men thought that they would either subdue the places against which they were to
sail, or at all events, with so large a force, meet with no disaster; those in the
prime of life felt a longing for foreign sights and spectacles, and had no doubt
that they should come safe home again; while the idea of the common people and the
soldiery was to earn wages at the moment, and make conquests that would supply a
never-ending fund of pay for the future. With this enthusiasm of the majority, the
few that liked it not, feared to appear unpatriotic by holding up their hands against
it, and so kept quiet.
At last one of the Athenians came forward and called upon Nicias and told him
that he ought not to make excuses or put them off, but say at once before them all
what forces the Athenians should vote him. Upon this he said, not without reluctance,
that he would advise upon that matter more at leisure with his colleagues; as far
however as he could see at present, they must sail with at least one hundred galleys-
the Athenians providing as many transports as they might determine, and sending
for others from the allies- not less than five thousand heavy infantry in all, Athenian
and allied, and if possible more; and the rest of the armament in proportion; archers
from home and from Crete, and slingers, and whatever else might seem desirable,
being got ready by the generals and taken with them. Upon hearing this the Athenians
at once voted that the generals should have full powers in the matter of the numbers
of the army and of the expedition generally, to do as they judged best for the interests
of Athens. After this the preparations began; messages being sent to the allies
and the rolls drawn up at home. And as the city had just recovered from the plague
and the long war, and a number of young men had grown up and capital had accumulated
by reason of the truce, everything was the more easily provided.
In the midst of these preparations all the stone Hermae in the city of Athens,
that is to say the customary square figures, so common in the doorways of private
houses and temples, had in one night most of them their fares mutilated. No one
knew who had done it, but large public rewards were offered to find the authors;
and it was further voted that any one who knew of any other act of impiety having
been committed should come and give information without fear of consequences, whether
he were citizen, alien, or slave. The matter was taken up the more seriously, as
it was thought to be ominous for the expedition, and part of a conspiracy to bring
about a revolution and to upset the democracy.
Information was given accordingly by some resident aliens and body servants,
not about the Hermae but about some previous mutilations of other images perpetrated
by young men in a drunken frolic, and of mock celebrations of the mysteries, averred
to take place in private houses. Alcibiades being implicated in this charge, it
was taken hold of by those who could least endure him, because he stood in the way
of their obtaining the undisturbed direction of the people, and who thought that
if he were once removed the first place would be theirs. These accordingly magnified
the matter and loudly proclaimed that the affair of the mysteries and the mutilation
of the Hermae were part and parcel of a scheme to overthrow the democracy, and that
nothing of all this had been done without Alcibiades; the proofs alleged being the
general and undemocratic licence of his life and habits.
Alcibiades repelled on the spot the charges in question, and also before going
on the expedition, the preparations for which were now complete, offered to stand
his trial, that it might be seen whether he was guilty of the acts imputed to him;
desiring to be punished if found guilty, but, if acquitted, to take the command.
Meanwhile he protested against their receiving slanders against him in his absence,
and begged them rather to put him to death at once if he were guilty, and pointed
out the imprudence of sending him out at the head of so large an army, with so serious
a charge still undecided. But his enemies feared that he would have the army for
him if he were tried immediately, and that the people might relent in favour of
the man whom they already caressed as the cause of the Argives and some of the Mantineans
joining in the expedition, and did their utmost to get this proposition rejected,
putting forward other orators who said that he ought at present to sail and not
delay the departure of the army, and be tried on his return within a fixed number
of days; their plan being to have him sent for and brought home for trial upon some
graver charge, which they would the more easily get up in his absence. Accordingly
it was decreed that he should sail.
After this the departure for Sicily took place, it being now about midsummer.
Most of the allies, with the corn transports and the smaller craft and the rest
of the expedition, had already received orders to muster at Corcyra, to cross the
Ionian Sea from thence in a body to the Iapygian promontory. But the Athenians themselves,
and such of their allies as happened to be with them, went down to Piraeus upon
a day appointed at daybreak, and began to man the ships for putting out to sea.
With them also went down the whole population, one may say, of the city, both citizens
and foreigners; the inhabitants of the country each escorting those that belonged
to them, their friends, their relatives, or their sons, with hope and lamentation
upon their way, as they thought of the conquests which they hoped to make, or of
the friends whom they might never see again, considering the long voyage which they
were going to make from their country. Indeed, at this moment, when they were now
upon the point of parting from one another, the danger came more home to them than
when they voted for the expedition; although the strength of the armament, and the
profuse provision which they remarked in every department, was a sight that could
not but comfort them. As for the foreigners and the rest of the crowd, they simply
went to see a sight worth looking at and passing all belief.
Indeed this armament that first sailed out was by far the most costly and splendid
Hellenic force that had ever been sent out by a single city up to that time. In
mere number of ships and heavy infantry that against Epidaurus under Pericles, and
the same when going against Potidaea under Hagnon, was not inferior; containing
as it did four thousand Athenian heavy infantry, three hundred horse, and one hundred
galleys accompanied by fifty Lesbian and Chian vessels and many allies besides.
But these were sent upon a short voyage and with a scanty equipment. The present
expedition was formed in contemplation of a long term of service by land and sea
alike, and was furnished with ships and troops so as to be ready for either as required.
The fleet had been elaborately equipped at great cost to the captains and the state;
the treasury giving a drachma a day to each seaman, and providing empty ships, sixty
men-of-war and forty transports, and manning these with the best crews obtainable;
while the captains gave a bounty in addition to the pay from the treasury to the
thranitae and crews generally, besides spending lavishly upon figure-heads and equipments,
and one and all making the utmost exertions to enable their own ships to excel in
beauty and fast sailing. Meanwhile the land forces had been picked from the best
muster-rolls, and vied with each other in paying great attention to their arms and
personal accoutrements. From this resulted not only a rivalry among themselves in
their different departments, but an idea among the rest of the Hellenes that it
was more a display of power and resources than an armament against an enemy. For
if any one had counted up the public expenditure of the state, and the private outlay
of individuals- that is to say, the sums which the state had already spent upon
the expedition and was sending out in the hands of the generals, and those which
individuals had expended upon their personal outfit, or as captains of galleys had
laid out and were still to lay out upon their vessels; and if he had added to this
the journey money which each was likely to have provided himself with, independently
of the pay from the treasury, for a voyage of such length, and what the soldiers
or traders took with them for the purpose of exchange- it would have been found
that many talents in all were being taken out of the city. Indeed the expedition
became not less famous for its wonderful boldness and for the splendour of its appearance,
than for its overwhelming strength as compared with the peoples against whom it
was directed, and for the fact that this was the longest passage from home hitherto
attempted, and the most ambitious in its objects considering the resources of those
who undertook it.
The ships being now manned, and everything put on board with which they meant
to sail, the trumpet commanded silence, and the prayers customary before putting
out to sea were offered, not in each ship by itself, but by all together to the
voice of a herald; and bowls of wine were mixed through all the armament, and libations
made by the soldiers and their officers in gold and silver goblets. In their prayers
joined also the crowds on shore, the citizens and all others that wished them well.
The hymn sung and the libations finished, they put out to sea, and first out in
column then raced each other as far as Aegina, and so hastened to reach Corcyra,
where the rest of the allied forces were also assembling.
Chapter XIX
Seventeenth Year of the War – Parties at Syracuse – Story of Harmodius and Aristogiton
– Disgrace of Alcibiades.
Meanwhile at Syracuse news came in from many quarters of the expedition, but
for a long while met with no credence whatever. Indeed, an assembly was held in
which speeches, as will be seen, were delivered by different orators, believing
or contradicting the report of the Athenian expedition; among whom Hermocrates,
son of Hermon, came forward, being persuaded that he knew the truth of the matter,
and gave the following counsel:
“Although I shall perhaps be no better believed than others have been when I
speak upon the reality of the expedition, and although I know that those who either
make or repeat statements thought not worthy of belief not only gain no converts
but are thought fools for their pains, I shall certainly not be frightened into
holding my tongue when the state is in danger, and when I am persuaded that I can
speak with more authority on the matter than other persons. Much as you wonder at
it, the Athenians nevertheless have set out against us with a large force, naval
and military, professedly to help the Egestaeans and to restore Leontini, but really
to conquer Sicily, and above all our city, which once gained, the rest, they think,
will easily follow. Make up your minds, therefore, to see them speedily here, and
see how you can best repel them with the means under your hand, and do be taken
off your guard through despising the news, or neglect the common weal through disbelieving
it. Meanwhile those who believe me need not be dismayed at the force or daring of
the enemy. They will not be able to do us more hurt than we shall do them; nor is
the greatness of their armament altogether without advantage to us. Indeed, the
greater it is the better, with regard to the rest of the Siceliots, whom dismay
will make more ready to join us; and if we defeat or drive them away, disappointed
of the objects of their ambition (for I do not fear for a moment that they will
get what they want), it will be a most glorious exploit for us, and in my judgment
by no means an unlikely one. Few indeed have been the large armaments, either Hellenic
or barbarian, that have gone far from home and been successful. They cannot be more
numerous than the people of the country and their neighbours, all of whom fear leagues
together; and if they miscarry for want of supplies in a foreign land, to those
against whom their plans were laid none the less they leave renown, although they
may themselves have been the main cause of their own discomfort. Thus these very
Athenians rose by the defeat of the Mede, in a great measure due to accidental causes,
from the mere fact that Athens had been the object of his attack; and this may very
well be the case with us also.
“Let us, therefore, confidently begin preparations here; let us send and confirm
some of the Sicels, and obtain the friendship and alliance of others, and dispatch
envoys to the rest of Sicily to show that the danger is common to all, and to Italy
to get them to become our allies, or at all events to refuse to receive the Athenians.
I also think that it would be best to send to Carthage as well; they are by no means
there without apprehension, but it is their constant fear that the Athenians may
one day attack their city, and they may perhaps think that they might themselves
suffer by letting Sicily be sacrificed, and be willing to help us secretly if not
openly, in one way if not in another. They are the best able to do so, if they will,
of any of the present day, as they possess most gold and silver, by which war, like
everything else, flourishes. Let us also send to Lacedaemon and Corinth, and ask
them to come here and help us as soon as possible, and to keep alive the war in
Hellas. But the true thing of all others, in my opinion, to do at the present moment,
is what you, with your constitutional love of quiet, will be slow to see, and what
I must nevertheless mention. If we Siceliots, all together, or at least as many
as possible besides ourselves, would only launch the whole of our actual navy with
two months’ provisions, and meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the Iapygian promontory,
and show them that before fighting for Sicily they must first fight for their passage
across the Ionian Sea, we should strike dismay into their army, and set them on
thinking that we have a base for our defensive- for Tarentum is ready to receive
us- while they have a wide sea to cross with all their armament, which could with
difficulty keep its order through so long a voyage, and would be easy for us to
attack as it came on slowly and in small detachments. On the other hand, if they
were to lighten their vessels, and draw together their fast sailers and with these
attack us, we could either fall upon them when they were wearied with rowing, or
if we did not choose to do so, we could retire to Tarentum; while they, having crossed
with few provisions just to give battle, would be hard put to it in desolate places,
and would either have to remain and be blockaded, or to try to sail along the coast,
abandoning the rest of their armament, and being further discouraged by not knowing
for certain whether the cities would receive them. In my opinion this consideration
alone would be sufficient to deter them from putting out from Corcyra; and what
with deliberating and reconnoitring our numbers and whereabouts, they would let
the season go on until winter was upon them, or, confounded by so unexpected a circumstance,
would break up the expedition, especially as their most experienced general has,
as I hear, taken the command against his will, and would grasp at the first excuse
offered by any serious demonstration of ours. We should also be reported, I am certain,
as more numerous than we really are, and men’s minds are affected by what they hear,
and besides the first to attack, or to show that they mean to defend themselves
against an attack, inspire greater fear because men see that they are ready for
the emergency. This would just be the case with the Athenians at present. They are
now attacking us in the belief that we shall not resist, having a right to judge
us severely because we did not help the Lacedaemonians in crushing them; but if
they were to see us showing a courage for which they are not prepared, they would
be more dismayed by the surprise than they could ever be by our actual power. I
could wish to persuade you to show this courage; but if this cannot be, at all events
lose not a moment in preparing generally for the war; and remember all of you that
contempt for an assailant is best shown by bravery in action, but that for the present
the best course is to accept the preparations which fear inspires as giving the
surest promise of safety, and to act as if the danger was real. That the Athenians
are coming to attack us, and are already upon the voyage, and all but here- this
is what I am sure of.”
Thus far spoke Hermocrates. Meanwhile the people of Syracuse were at great strife
among themselves; some contending that the Athenians had no idea of coming and that
there was no truth in what he said; some asking if they did come what harm they
could do that would not be repaid them tenfold in return; while others made light
of the whole affair and turned it into ridicule. In short, there were few that believed
Hermocrates and feared for the future. Meanwhile Athenagoras, the leader of the
people and very powerful at that time with the masses, came forward and spoke as
follows:
“For the Athenians, he who does not wish that they may be as misguided as they
are supposed to be, and that they may come here to become our subjects, is either
a coward or a traitor to his country; while as for those who carry such tidings
and fill you with so much alarm, I wonder less at their audacity than at their folly
if they flatter themselves that we do not see through them. The fact is that they
have their private reasons to be afraid, and wish to throw the city into consternation
to have their own terrors cast into the shade by the public alarm. In short, this
is what these reports are worth; they do not arise of themselves, but are concocted
by men who are always causing agitation here in Sicily. However, if you are well
advised, you will not be guided in your calculation of probabilities by what these
persons tell you, but by what shrewd men and of large experience, as I esteem the
Athenians to be, would be likely to do. Now it is not likely that they would leave
the Peloponnesians behind them, and before they have well ended the war in Hellas
wantonly come in quest of a new war quite as arduous in Sicily; indeed, in my judgment,
they are only too glad that we do not go and attack them, being so many and so great
cities as we are.
“However, if they should come as is reported, I consider Sicily better able to
go through with the war than Peloponnese, as being at all points better prepared,
and our city by itself far more than a match for this pretended army of invasion,
even were it twice as large again. I know that they will not have horses with them,
or get any here, except a few perhaps from the Egestaeans; or be able to bring a
force of heavy infantry equal in number to our own, in ships which will already
have enough to do to come all this distance, however lightly laden, not to speak
of the transport of the other stores required against a city of this magnitude,
which will be no slight quantity. In fact, so strong is my opinion upon the subject,
that I do not well see how they could avoid annihilation if they brought with them
another city as large as Syracuse, and settled down and carried on war from our
frontier; much less can they hope to succeed with all Sicily hostile to them, as
all Sicily will be, and with only a camp pitched from the ships, and composed of
tents and bare necessaries, from which they would not be able to stir far for fear
of our cavalry.
“But the Athenians see this as I tell you, and as I have reason to know are looking
after their possessions at home, while persons here invent stories that neither
are true nor ever will be. Nor is this the first time that I see these persons,
when they cannot resort to deeds, trying by such stories and by others even more
abominable to frighten your people and get into their hands the government: it is
what I see always. And I cannot help fearing that trying so often they may one day
succeed, and that we, as long as we do not feel the smart, may prove too weak for
the task of prevention, or, when the offenders are known, of pursuit. The result
is that our city is rarely at rest, but is subject to constant troubles and to contests
as frequent against herself as against the enemy, not to speak of occasional tyrannies
and infamous cabals. However, I will try, if you will support me, to let nothing
of this happen in our time, by gaining you, the many, and by chastising the authors
of such machinations, not merely when they are caught in the act- a difficult feat
to accomplish- but also for what they have the wish though not the power to do;
as it is necessary to punish an enemy not only for what he does, but also beforehand
for what he intends to do, if the first to relax precaution would not be also the
first to suffer. I shall also reprove, watch, and on occasion warn the few- the
most effectual way, in my opinion, of turning them from their evil courses. And
after all, as I have often asked, what would you have, young men? Would you hold
office at once? The law forbids it, a law enacted rather because you are not competent
than to disgrace you when competent. Meanwhile you would not be on a legal equality
with the many! But how can it be right that citizens of the same state should be
held unworthy of the same privileges?
“It will be said, perhaps, that democracy is neither wise nor equitable, but
that the holders of property are also the best fitted to rule. I say, on the contrary,
first, that the word demos, or people, includes the whole state, oligarchy only
a part; next, that if the best guardians of property are the rich, and the best
counsellors the wise, none can hear and decide so well as the many; and that all
these talents, severally and collectively, have their just place in a democracy.
But an oligarchy gives the many their share of the danger, and not content with
the largest part takes and keeps the whole of the profit; and this is what the powerful
and young among you aspire to, but in a great city cannot possibly obtain.
“But even now, foolish men, most senseless of all the Hellenes that I know, if
you have no sense of the wickedness of your designs, or most criminal if you have
that sense and still dare to pursue them- even now, if it is not a case for repentance,
you may still learn wisdom, and thus advance the interest of the country, the common
interest of us all. Reflect that in the country’s prosperity the men of merit in
your ranks will have a share and a larger share than the great mass of your fellow
countrymen, but that if you have other designs you run a risk of being deprived
of all; and desist from reports like these, as the people know your object and will
not put up with it. If the Athenians arrive, this city will repulse them in a manner
worthy of itself; we have moreover, generals who will see to this matter. And if
nothing of this be true, as I incline to believe, the city will not be thrown into
a panic by your intelligence, or impose upon itself a self-chosen servitude by choosing
you for its rulers; the city itself will look into the matter, and will judge your
words as if they were acts, and, instead of allowing itself to be deprived of its
liberty by listening to you, will strive to preserve that liberty, by taking care
to have always at hand the means of making itself respected.”
Such were the words of Athenagoras. One of the generals now stood up and stopped
any other speakers coming forward, adding these words of his own with reference
to the matter in hand: “It is not well for speakers to utter calumnies against one
another, or for their hearers to entertain them; we ought rather to look to the
intelligence that we have received, and see how each man by himself and the city
as a whole may best prepare to repel the invaders. Even if there be no need, there
is no harm in the state being furnished with horses and arms and all other insignia
of war; and we will undertake to see to and order this, and to send round to the
cities to reconnoitre and do all else that may appear desirable. Part of this we
have seen to already, and whatever we discover shall be laid before you.” After
these words from the general, the Syracusans departed from the assembly.
In the meantime the Athenians with all their allies had now arrived at Corcyra.
Here the generals began by again reviewing the armament, and made arrangements as
to the order in which they were to anchor and encamp, and dividing the whole fleet
into three divisions, allotted one to each of their number, to avoid sailing all
together and being thus embarrassed for water, harbourage, or provisions at the
stations which they might touch at, and at the same time to be generally better
ordered and easier to handle, by each squadron having its own commander. Next they
sent on three ships to Italy and Sicily to find out which of the cities would receive
them, with instructions to meet them on the way and let them know before they put
in to land.
After this the Athenians weighed from Corcyra, and proceeded to cross to Sicily
with an armament now consisting of one hundred and thirty-four galleys in all (besides
two Rhodian fifty-oars), of which one hundred were Athenian vessels- sixty men-of-war,
and forty troopships- and the remainder from Chios and the other allies; five thousand
and one hundred heavy infantry in all, that is to say, fifteen hundred Athenian
citizens from the rolls at Athens and seven hundred Thetes shipped as marines, and
the rest allied troops, some of them Athenian subjects, and besides these five hundred
Argives, and two hundred and fifty Mantineans serving for hire; four hundred and
eighty archers in all, eighty of whom were Cretans, seven hundred slingers from
Rhodes, one hundred and twenty light-armed exiles from Megara, and one horse-transport
carrying thirty horses.
Such was the strength of the first armament that sailed over for the war. The
supplies for this force were carried by thirty ships of burden laden with corn,
which conveyed the bakers, stone-masons, and carpenters, and the tools for raising
fortifications, accompanied by one hundred boats, like the former pressed into the
service, besides many other boats and ships of burden which followed the armament
voluntarily for purposes of trade; all of which now left Corcyra and struck across
the Ionian Sea together. The whole force making land at the Iapygian promontory
and Tarentum, with more or less good fortune, coasted along the shores of Italy,
the cities shutting their markets and gates against them, and according them nothing
but water and liberty to anchor, and Tarentum and Locri not even that, until they
arrived at Rhegium, the extreme point of Italy. Here at length they reunited, and
not gaining admission within the walls pitched a camp outside the city in the precinct
of Artemis, where a market was also provided for them, and drew their ships on shore
and kept quiet. Meanwhile they opened negotiations with the Rhegians, and called
upon them as Chalcidians to assist their Leontine kinsmen; to which the Rhegians
replied that they would not side with either party, but should await the decision
of the rest of the Italiots, and do as they did. Upon this the Athenians now began
to consider what would be the best action to take in the affairs of Sicily, and
meanwhile waited for the ships sent on to come back from Egesta, in order to know
whether there was really there the money mentioned by the messengers at Athens.
In the meantime came in from all quarters to the Syracusans, as well as from
their own officers sent to reconnoitre, the positive tidings that the fleet was
at Rhegium; upon which they laid aside their incredulity and threw themselves heart
and soul into the work of preparation. Guards or envoys, as the case might be, were
sent round to the Sicels, garrisons put into the posts of the Peripoli in the country,
horses and arms reviewed in the city to see that nothing was wanting, and all other
steps taken to prepare for a war which might be upon them at any moment.
Meanwhile the three ships that had been sent on came from Egesta to the Athenians
at Rhegium, with the news that so far from there being the sums promised, all that
could be produced was thirty talents. The generals were not a little disheartened
at being thus disappointed at the outset, and by the refusal to join in the expedition
of the Rhegians, the people they had first tried to gain and had had had most reason
to count upon, from their relationship to the Leontines and constant friendship
for Athens. If Nicias was prepared for the news from Egesta, his two colleagues
were taken completely by surprise. The Egestaeans had had recourse to the following
stratagem, when the first envoys from Athens came to inspect their resources. They
took the envoys in question to the temple of Aphrodite at Eryx and showed them the
treasures deposited there: bowls, wine-ladles, censers, and a large number of other
pieces of plate, which from being in silver gave an impression of wealth quite out
of proportion to their really small value. They also privately entertained the ships’
crews, and collected all the cups of gold and silver that they could find in Egesta
itself or could borrow in the neighbouring Phoenician and Hellenic towns, and each
brought them to the banquets as their own; and as all used pretty nearly the same,
and everywhere a great quantity of plate was shown, the effect was most dazzling
upon the Athenian sailors, and made them talk loudly of the riches they had seen
when they got back to Athens. The dupes in question- who had in their turn persuaded
the rest- when the news got abroad that there was not the money supposed at Egesta,
were much blamed by the soldiers.
Meanwhile the generals consulted upon what was to be done. The opinion of Nicias
was to sail with all the armament to Selinus, the main object of the expedition,
and if the Egestaeans could provide money for the whole force, to advise accordingly;
but if they could not, to require them to supply provisions for the sixty ships
that they had asked for, to stay and settle matters between them and the Selinuntines
either by force or by agreement, and then to coast past the other cities, and after
displaying the power of Athens and proving their zeal for their friends and allies,
to sail home again (unless they should have some sudden and unexpected opportunity
of serving the Leontines, or of bringing over some of the other cities), and not
to endanger the state by wasting its home resources.
Alcibiades said that a great expedition like the present must not disgrace itself
by going away without having done anything; heralds must be sent to all the cities
except Selinus and Syracuse, and efforts be made to make some of the Sicels revolt
from the Syracusans, and to obtain the friendship of others, in order to have corn
and troops; and first of all to gain the Messinese, who lay right in the passage
and entrance to Sicily, and would afford an excellent harbour and base for the army.
Thus, after bringing over the towns and knowing who would be their allies in the
war, they might at length attack Syracuse and Selinus; unless the latter came to
terms with Egesta and the former ceased to oppose the restoration of Leontini.
Lamachus, on the other hand, said that they ought to sail straight to Syracuse,
and fight their battle at once under the walls of the town while the people were
still unprepared, and the panic at its height. Every armament was most terrible
at first; if it allowed time to run on without showing itself, men’s courage revived,
and they saw it appear at last almost with indifference. By attacking suddenly,
while Syracuse still trembled at their coming, they would have the best chance of
gaining a victory for themselves and of striking a complete panic into the enemy
by the aspect of their numbers- which would never appear so considerable as at present-
by the anticipation of coming disaster, and above all by the immediate danger of
the engagement. They might also count upon surprising many in the fields outside,
incredulous of their coming; and at the moment that the enemy was carrying in his
property the army would not want for booty if it sat down in force before the city.
The rest of the Siceliots would thus be immediately less disposed to enter into
alliance with the Syracusans, and would join the Athenians, without waiting to see
which were the strongest. They must make Megara their naval station as a place to
retreat to and a base from which to attack: it was an uninhabited place at no great
distance from Syracuse either by land or by sea.
After speaking to this effect, Lamachus nevertheless gave his support to the
opinion of Alcibiades. After this Alcibiades sailed in his own vessel across to
Messina with proposals of alliance, but met with no success, the inhabitants answering
that they could not receive him within their walls, though they would provide him
with a market outside. Upon this he sailed back to Rhegium. Immediately upon his
return the generals manned and victualled sixty ships out of the whole fleet and
coasted along to Naxos, leaving the rest of the armament behind them at Rhegium
with one of their number. Received by the Naxians, they then coasted on to Catana,
and being refused admittance by the inhabitants, there being a Syracusan party in
the town, went on to the river Terias. Here they bivouacked, and the next day sailed
in single file to Syracuse with all their ships except ten which they sent on in
front to sail into the great harbour and see if there was any fleet launched, and
to proclaim by herald from shipboard that the Athenians were come to restore the
Leontines to their country, as being their allies and kinsmen, and that such of
them, therefore, as were in Syracuse should leave it without fear and join their
friends and benefactors the Athenians. After making this proclamation and reconnoitring
the city and the harbours, and the features of the country which they would have
to make their base of operations in the war, they sailed back to Catana.
An assembly being held here, the inhabitants refused to receive the armament,
but invited the generals to come in and say what they desired; and while Alcibiades
was speaking and the citizens were intent on the assembly, the soldiers broke down
an ill-walled-up postern gate without being observed, and getting inside the town,
flocked into the marketplace. The Syracusan party in the town no sooner saw the
army inside than they became frightened and withdrew, not being at all numerous;
while the rest voted for an alliance with the Athenians and invited them to fetch
the rest of their forces from Rhegium. After this the Athenians sailed to Rhegium,
and put off, this time with all the armament, for Catana, and fell to work at their
camp immediately upon their arrival.
Meanwhile word was brought them from Camarina that if they went there the town
would go over to them, and also that the Syracusans were manning a fleet. The Athenians
accordingly sailed alongshore with all their armament, first to Syracuse, where
they found no fleet manning, and so always along the coast to Camarina, where they
brought to at the beach, and sent a herald to the people, who, however, refused
to receive them, saying that their oaths bound them to receive the Athenians only
with a single vessel, unless they themselves sent for more. Disappointed here, the
Athenians now sailed back again, and after landing and plundering on Syracusan territory
and losing some stragglers from their light infantry through the coming up of the
Syracusan horse, so got back to Catana.
There they found the Salaminia come from Athens for Alcibiades, with orders for
him to sail home to answer the charges which the state brought against him, and
for certain others of the soldiers who with him were accused of sacrilege in the
matter of the mysteries and of the Hermae. For the Athenians, after the departure
of the expedition, had continued as active as ever in investigating the facts of
the mysteries and of the Hermae, and, instead of testing the informers, in their
suspicious temper welcomed all indifferently, arresting and imprisoning the best
citizens upon the evidence of rascals, and preferring to sift the matter to the
bottom sooner than to let an accused person of good character pass unquestioned,
owing to the rascality of the informer. The commons had heard how oppressive the
tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons had become before it ended, and further that
that had been put down at last, not by themselves and Harmodius, but by the Lacedaemonians,
and so were always in fear and took everything suspiciously.
Indeed, the daring action of Aristogiton and Harmodius was undertaken in consequence
of a love affair, which I shall relate at some length, to show that the Athenians
are not more accurate than the rest of the world in their accounts of their own
tyrants and of the facts of their own history. Pisistratus dying at an advanced
age in possession of the tyranny, was succeeded by his eldest son, Hippias, and
not Hipparchus, as is vulgarly believed. Harmodius was then in the flower of youthful
beauty, and Aristogiton, a citizen in the middle rank of life, was his lover and
possessed him. Solicited without success by Hipparchus, son of Pisistratus, Harmodius
told Aristogiton, and the enraged lover, afraid that the powerful Hipparchus might
take Harmodius by force, immediately formed a design, such as his condition in life
permitted, for overthrowing the tyranny. In the meantime Hipparchus, after a second
solicitation of Harmodius, attended with no better success, unwilling to use violence,
arranged to insult him in some covert way. Indeed, generally their government was
not grievous to the multitude, or in any way odious in practice; and these tyrants
cultivated wisdom and virtue as much as any, and without exacting from the Athenians
more than a twentieth of their income, splendidly adorned their city, and carried
on their wars, and provided sacrifices for the temples. For the rest, the city was
left in full enjoyment of its existing laws, except that care was always taken to
have the offices in the hands of some one of the family. Among those of them that
held the yearly archonship at Athens was Pisistratus, son of the tyrant Hippias,
and named after his grandfather, who dedicated during his term of office the altar
to the twelve gods in the market-place, and that of Apollo in the Pythian precinct.
The Athenian people afterwards built on to and lengthened the altar in the market-place,
and obliterated the inscription; but that in the Pythian precinct can still be seen,
though in faded letters, and is to the following effect:
Pisistratus, the son of Hippias,
Sent up this record of his archonship
In precinct of Apollo Pythias.
That Hippias was the eldest son and succeeded to the government, is what I positively
assert as a fact upon which I have had more exact accounts than others, and may
be also ascertained by the following circumstance. He is the only one of the legitimate
brothers that appears to have had children; as the altar shows, and the pillar placed
in the Athenian Acropolis, commemorating the crime of the tyrants, which mentions
no child of Thessalus or of Hipparchus, but five of Hippias, which he had by Myrrhine,
daughter of Callias, son of Hyperechides; and naturally the eldest would have married
first. Again, his name comes first on the pillar after that of his father; and this
too is quite natural, as he was the eldest after him, and the reigning tyrant. Nor
can I ever believe that Hippias would have obtained the tyranny so easily, if Hipparchus
had been in power when he was killed, and he, Hippias, had had to establish himself
upon the same day; but he had no doubt been long accustomed to overawe the citizens,
and to be obeyed by his mercenaries, and thus not only conquered, but conquered
with ease, without experiencing any of the embarrassment of a younger brother unused
to the exercise of authority. It was the sad fate which made Hipparchus famous that
got him also the credit with posterity of having been tyrant.
To return to Harmodius; Hipparchus having been repulsed in his solicitations
insulted him as he had resolved, by first inviting a sister of his, a young girl,
to come and bear a basket in a certain procession, and then rejecting her, on the
plea that she had never been invited at all owing to her unworthiness. If Harmodius
was indignant at this, Aristogiton for his sake now became more exasperated than
ever; and having arranged everything with those who were to join them in the enterprise,
they only waited for the great feast of the Panathenaea, the sole day upon which
the citizens forming part of the procession could meet together in arms without
suspicion. Aristogiton and Harmodius were to begin, but were to be supported immediately
by their accomplices against the bodyguard. The conspirators were not many, for
better security, besides which they hoped that those not in the plot would be carried
away by the example of a few daring spirits, and use the arms in their hands to
recover their liberty.
At last the festival arrived; and Hippias with his bodyguard was outside the
city in the Ceramicus, arranging how the different parts of the procession were
to proceed. Harmodius and Aristogiton had already their daggers and were getting
ready to act, when seeing one of their accomplices talking familiarly with Hippias,
who was easy of access to every one, they took fright, and concluded that they were
discovered and on the point of being taken; and eager if possible to be revenged
first upon the man who had wronged them and for whom they had undertaken all this
risk, they rushed, as they were, within the gates, and meeting with Hipparchus by
the Leocorium recklessly fell upon him at once, infuriated, Aristogiton by love,
and Harmodius by insult, and smote him and slew him. Aristogiton escaped the guards
at the moment, through the crowd running up, but was afterwards taken and dispatched
in no merciful way: Harmodius was killed on the spot.
When the news was brought to Hippias in the Ceramicus, he at once proceeded not
to the scene of action, but to the armed men in the procession, before they, being
some distance away, knew anything of the matter, and composing his features for
the occasion, so as not to betray himself, pointed to a certain spot, and bade them
repair thither without their arms. They withdrew accordingly, fancying he had something
to say; upon which he told the mercenaries to remove the arms, and there and then
picked out the men he thought guilty and all found with daggers, the shield and
spear being the usual weapons for a procession.
In this way offended love first led Harmodius and Aristogiton to conspire, and
the alarm of the moment to commit the rash action recounted. After this the tyranny
pressed harder on the Athenians, and Hippias, now grown more fearful, put to death
many of the citizens, and at the same time began to turn his eyes abroad for a refuge
in case of revolution. Thus, although an Athenian, he gave his daughter, Archedice,
to a Lampsacene, Aeantides, son of the tyrant of Lampsacus, seeing that they had
great influence with Darius. And there is her tomb in Lampsacus with this inscription:
Hippias, after reigning three years longer over the Athenians, was deposed in
the fourth by the Lacedaemonians and the banished Alcmaeonidae, and went with a
safe conduct to Sigeum, and to Aeantides at Lampsacus, and from thence to King Darius;
from whose court he set out twenty years after, in his old age, and came with the
Medes to Marathon.
With these events in their minds, and recalling everything they knew by hearsay
on the subject, the Athenian people grow difficult of humour and suspicious of the
persons charged in the affair of the mysteries, and persuaded that all that had
taken place was part of an oligarchical and monarchical conspiracy. In the state
of irritation thus produced, many persons of consideration had been already thrown
into prison, and far from showing any signs of abating, public feeling grew daily
more savage, and more arrests were made; until at last one of those in custody,
thought to be the most guilty of all, was induced by a fellow prisoner to make a
revelation, whether true or not is a matter on which there are two opinions, no
one having been able, either then or since, to say for certain who did the deed.
However this may be, the other found arguments to persuade him, that even if he
had not done it, he ought to save himself by gaining a promise of impunity, and
free the state of its present suspicions; as he would be surer of safety if he confessed
after promise of impunity than if he denied and were brought to trial. He accordingly
made a revelation, affecting himself and others in the affair of the Hermae; and
the Athenian people, glad at last, as they supposed, to get at the truth, and furious
until then at not being able to discover those who had conspired against the commons,
at once let go the informer and all the rest whom he had not denounced, and bringing
the accused to trial executed as many as were apprehended, and condemned to death
such as had fled and set a price upon their heads. In this it was, after all, not
clear whether the sufferers had been punished unjustly, while in any case the rest
of the city received immediate and manifest relief.
To return to Alcibiades: public feeling was very hostile to him, being worked
on by the same enemies who had attacked him before he went out; and now that the
Athenians fancied that they had got at the truth of the matter of the Hermae, they
believed more firmly than ever that the affair of the mysteries also, in which he
was implicated, had been contrived by him in the same intention and was connected
with the plot against the democracy. Meanwhile it so happened that, just at the
time of this agitation, a small force of Lacedaemonians had advanced as far as the
Isthmus, in pursuance of some scheme with the Boeotians. It was now thought that
this had come by appointment, at his instigation, and not on account of the Boeotians,
and that, if the citizens had not acted on the information received, and forestalled
them by arresting the prisoners, the city would have been betrayed. The citizens
went so far as to sleep one night armed in the temple of Theseus within the walls.
The friends also of Alcibiades at Argos were just at this time suspected of a design
to attack the commons; and the Argive hostages deposited in the islands were given
up by the Athenians to the Argive people to be put to death upon that account: in
short, everywhere something was found to create suspicion against Alcibiades. It
was therefore decided to bring him to trial and execute him, and the Salaminia was
sent to Sicily for him and the others named in the information, with instructions
to order him to come and answer the charges against him, but not to arrest him,
because they wished to avoid causing any agitation in the army or among the enemy
in Sicily, and above all to retain the services of the Mantineans and Argives, who,
it was thought, had been induced to join by his influence. Alcibiades, with his
own ship and his fellow accused, accordingly sailed off with the Salaminia from
Sicily, as though to return to Athens, and went with her as far as Thurii, and there
they left the ship and disappeared, being afraid to go home for trial with such
a prejudice existing against them. The crew of the Salaminia stayed some time looking
for Alcibiades and his companions, and at length, as they were nowhere to be found,
set sail and departed. Alcibiades, now an outlaw, crossed in a boat not long after
from Thurii to Peloponnese; and the Athenians passed sentence of death by default
upon him and those in his company.
Chapter XX.
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Years of the War – Inaction of the Athenian Army –
Alcibiades at Sparta – Investment of Syracuse.
THE Athenian generals left in Sicily now divided the armament into two parts,
and, each taking one by lot, sailed with the whole for Selinus and Egesta, wishing
to know whether he Egestaeans would give the money, and to look into the question
of Selinus and ascertain the state of the quarrel between her and Egesta. Coasting
along Sicily, with the shore on their left, on the side towads the Tyrrhene Gulf
they touched at Himera, the only Hellenic city in that part of the island, and being
refused admission resumed their voyage. On their way they took Hyccara, a petty
Sicanian seaport, neverheless at war with Egesta, and making slaves of the inhabitants
gave up the town to the Egestaeans, some of whose horse had joined them; after which
the army proceeded through the territory of the Sicels untilit reached Catana, while
the fleet sailed along the coast with the slaves on board. Meanwhile Nicias sailed
straight from Hyccara along the coast and went to Egesta and, after transacting
his other business an receiving thirty talents, rejoined the forces. They now sold
their slaves for the sum of one hundred and twenty talents, and sailed round to
their Sicel allies to urge them to send troops; and meanwhile wentwith half their
own force to the hostile town of Hybla in the territory of Gela, but did not succeed
in taking it.
Summer was now over. The winter following, the Athenians at once began to prepare
for moving on Syracuse, and the Syracusans on their side for marching against them.
From the moment when the Athenian failed to attack them instantly as they at first
feared and expected, every day that passed did something to revive their courage;
and when they saw them sailing far away from them on the other side of Sicil, and
going to Hybla only to fail in their attempts to storm it, they thought less of
them than ever, and called upon their generals, as the multitude is apt to do in
its moments of confidence, to lead them toCatana, since the enemy would not come
to them. Parties also of the Syracusan horse employed in reconnoitring constantly
rode up to the Athenian armament, and among other insults asked them whether they
had not really com to settle with the Syracusans in a foreign country rather than
to resettle the Leontines in their own.
Aware of this, the Athenian generals determined to draw them out in mass as far
as possible from the ciy, and themselves in the meantime to sail by night alongshore,
and take up at their leisure a convenient position. This they knew they could not
so well do, if they had to disembark from their ships in front of a force prepared
for them, or to go by land openly. The numerous cavalry of the Syracusans (a force
which they were themselves without) would then be able to do the greatest mischief
to their light troops and the crowd that followed them; but this plan would enable
them to take up a position in which the horse could do them no hurt worth speaking
of, some Syracusan exiles with the army having told them of the spot near the Olympieum,
which they afterwards occupied. In pursuance of their idea, the generals imagined
the following stratagem. They sent to Syracuse a man devoted to them, and by the
Syracusan generals thought to be no less in their interest; he was a native of Catana,
and said he came from persons in that place, whose names the Syracusan generals
were acquainted with, and whom they knew to be among the members of their party
still left in the city. He told them that the Athenians passed the night in the
town, at some distance from their arms, and that if the Syracusans would name a
day and come with all their people at daybreak to attack the armament, they, their
friends, would close the gates upon the troops in the city, and set fire to the
vessels, while the Syracusans would easily take the camp by an attack upon the stockade.
In this they would be aided by many of the Catanians, who were already prepared
to act, and from whom he himself came.
The generals of the Syracusans, who did not want confidence, and who had intended
even without this to march on Catana, believed the man without any sufficient inquiry,
fixed at once a day upon which they would be there, and dismissed him, and the Selinuntines
and others of their allies having now arrived, gave orders for all the Syracusans
to march out in mass. Their preparations completed, and the time fixed for their
arrival being at hand, they set out for Catana, and passed the night upon the river
Symaethus, in the Leontine territory. Meanwhile the Athenians no sooner knew of
their approach than they took all their forces and such of the Sicels or others
as had joined them, put them on board their ships and boats, and sailed by night
to Syracuse. Thus, when morning broke the Athenians were landing opposite the Olympieum
ready to seize their camping ground, and the Syracusan horse having ridden up first
to Catana and found that all the armament had put to sea, turned back and told the
infantry, and then all turned back together, and went to the relief of the city.
In the meantime, as the march before the Syracusans was a long one, the Athenians
quietly sat down their army in a convenient position, where they could begin an
engagement when they pleased, and where the Syracusan cavalry would have least opportunity
of annoying them, either before or during the action, being fenced off on one side
by walls, houses, trees, and by a marsh, and on the other by cliffs. They also felled
the neighbouring trees and carried them down to the sea, and formed a palisade alongside
of their ships, and with stones which they picked up and wood hastily raised a fort
at Daskon, the most vulnerable point of their position, and broke down the bridge
over the Anapus. These preparations were allowed to go on without any interruption
from the city, the first hostile force to appear being the Syracusan cavalry, followed
afterwards by all the foot together. At first they came close up to the Athenian
army, and then, finding that they did not offer to engage, crossed the Helorine
road and encamped for the night.
The next day the Athenians and their allies prepared for battle, their dispositions
being as follows: Their right wing was occupied by the Argives and Mantineans, the
centre by the Athenians, and the rest of the field by the other allies. Half their
army was drawn up eight deep in advance, half close to their tents in a hollow square,
formed also eight deep, which had orders to look out and be ready to go to the support
of the troops hardest pressed. The camp followers were placed inside this reserve.
The Syracusans, meanwhile, formed their heavy infantry sixteen deep, consisting
of the mass levy of their own people, and such allies as had joined them, the strongest
contingent being that of the Selinuntines; next to them the cavalry of the Geloans,
numbering two hundred in all, with about twenty horse and fifty archers from Camarina.
The cavalry was posted on their right, full twelve hundred strong, and next to it
the darters. As the Athenians were about to begin the attack, Nicias went along
the lines, and addressed these words of encouragement to the army and the nations
composing it:
“Soldiers, a long exhortation is little needed by men like ourselves, who are
here to fight in the same battle, the force itself being, to my thinking, more fit
to inspire confidence than a fine speech with a weak army. Where we have Argives,
Mantineans, Athenians, and the first of the islanders in the ranks together, it
were strange indeed, with so many and so brave companions in arms, if we did not
feel confident of victory; especially when we have mass levies opposed to our picked
troops, and what is more, Siceliots, who may disdain us but will not stand against
us, their skill not being at all commensurate to their rashness. You may also remember
that we are far from home and have no friendly land near, except what your own swords
shall win you; and here I put before you a motive just the reverse of that which
the enemy are appealing to; their cry being that they shall fight for their country,
mine that we shall fight for a country that is not ours, where we must conquer or
hardly get away, as we shall have their horse upon us in great numbers. Remember,
therefore, your renown, and go boldly against the enemy, thinking the present strait
and necessity more terrible than they.”
After this address Nicias at once led on the army. The Syracusans were not at
that moment expecting an immediate engagement, and some had even gone away to the
town, which was close by; these now ran up as hard as they could and, though behind
time, took their places here or there in the main body as fast as they joined it.
Want of zeal or daring was certainly not the fault of the Syracusans, either in
this or the other battles, but although not inferior in courage, so far as their
military science might carry them, when this failed them they were compelled to
give up their resolution also. On the present occasion, although they had not supposed
that the Athenians would begin the attack, and although constrained to stand upon
their defence at short notice, they at once took up their arms and advanced to meet
them. First, the stone-throwers, slingers, and archers of either army began skirmishing,
and routed or were routed by one another, as might be expected between light troops;
next, soothsayers brought forward the usual victims, and trumpeters urged on the
heavy infantry to the charge; and thus they advanced, the Syracusans to fight for
their country, and each individual for his safety that day and liberty hereafter;
in the enemy’s army, the Athenians to make another’s country theirs and to save
their own from suffering by their defeat; the Argives and independent allies to
help them in getting what they came for, and to earn by victory another sight of
the country they had left behind; while the subject allies owed most of their ardour
to the desire of self-preservation, which they could only hope for if victorious;
next to which, as a secondary motive, came the chance of serving on easier terms,
after helping the Athenians to a fresh conquest.
The armies now came to close quarters, and for a long while fought without either
giving ground. Meanwhile there occurred some claps of thunder with lightning and
heavy rain, which did not fail to add to the fears of the party fighting for the
first time, and very little acquainted with war; while to their more experienced
adversaries these phenomena appeared to be produced by the time of year, and much
more alarm was felt at the continued resistance of the enemy. At last the Argives
drove in the Syracusan left, and after them the Athenians routed the troops opposed
to them, and the Syracusan army was thus cut in two and betook itself to flight.
The Athenians did not pursue far, being held in check by the numerous and undefeated
Syracusan horse, who attacked and drove back any of their heavy infantry whom they
saw pursuing in advance of the rest; in spite of which the victors followed so far
as was safe in a body, and then went back and set up a trophy. Meanwhile the Syracusans
rallied at the Helorine road, where they re-formed as well as they could under the
circumstances, and even sent a garrison of their own citizens to the Olympieum,
fearing that the Athenians might lay hands on some of the treasures there. The rest
returned to the town.
The Athenians, however, did not go to the temple, but collected their dead and
laid them upon a pyre, and passed the night upon the field. The next day they gave
the enemy back their dead under truce, to the number of about two hundred and sixty,
Syracusans and allies, and gathered together the bones of their own, some fifty,
Athenians and allies, and taking the spoils of the enemy, sailed back to Catana.
It was now winter; and it did not seem possible for the moment to carry on the war
before Syracuse, until horse should have been sent for from Athens and levied among
the allies in Sicily- to do away with their utter inferiority in cavalry- and money
should have been collected in the country and received from Athens, and until some
of the cities, which they hoped would be now more disposed to listen to them after
the battle, should have been brought over, and corn and all other necessaries provided,
for a campaign in the spring against Syracuse.
With this intention they sailed off to Naxos and Catana for the winter. Meanwhile
the Syracusans burned their dead and then held an assembly, in which Hermocrates,
son of Hermon, a man who with a general ability of the first order had given proofs
of military capacity and brilliant courage in the war, came forward and encouraged
them, and told them not to let what had occurred make them give way, since their
spirit had not been conquered, but their want of discipline had done the mischief.
Still they had not been beaten by so much as might have been expected, especially
as they were, one might say, novices in the art of war, an army of artisans opposed
to the most practised soldiers in Hellas. What had also done great mischief was
the number of the generals (there were fifteen of them) and the quantity of orders
given, combined with the disorder and insubordination of the troops. But if they
were to have a few skilful generals, and used this winter in preparing their heavy
infantry, finding arms for such as had not got any, so as to make them as numerous
as possible, and forcing them to attend to their training generally, they would
have every chance of beating their adversaries, courage being already theirs and
discipline in the field having thus been added to it. Indeed, both these qualities
would improve, since danger would exercise them in discipline, while their courage
would be led to surpass itself by the confidence which skill inspires. The generals
should be few and elected with full powers, and an oath should be taken to leave
them entire discretion in their command: if they adopted this plan, their secrets
would be better kept, all preparations would be properly made, and there would be
no room for excuses.
The Syracusans heard him, and voted everything as he advised, and elected three
generals, Hermocrates himself, Heraclides, son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus, son of
Execestes. They also sent envoys to Corinth and Lacedaemon to procure a force of
allies to join them, and to induce the Lacedaemonians for their sakes openly to
address themselves in real earnest to the war against the Athenians, that they might
either have to leave Sicily or be less able to send reinforcements to their army
there.
The Athenian forces at Catana now at once sailed against Messina, in the expectation
of its being betrayed to them. The intrigue, however, after all came to nothing:
Alcibiades, who was in the secret, when he left his command upon the summons from
home, foreseeing that he would be outlawed, gave information of the plot to the
friends of the Syracusans in Messina, who had at once put to death its authors,
and now rose in arms against the opposite faction with those of their way of thinking,
and succeeded in preventing the admission of the Athenians. The latter waited for
thirteen days, and then, as they were exposed to the weather and without provisions,
and met with no success, went back to Naxos, where they made places for their ships
to lie in, erected a palisade round their camp, and retired into winter quarters;
meanwhile they sent a galley to Athens for money and cavalry to join them in the
spring. During the winter the Syracusans built a wall on to the city, so as to take
in the statue of Apollo Temenites, all along the side looking towards Epipolae,
to make the task of circumvallation longer and more difficult, in case of their
being defeated, and also erected a fort at Megara and another in the Olympieum,
and stuck palisades along the sea wherever there was a landing Place. Meanwhile,
as they knew that the Athenians were wintering at Naxos, they marched with all their
people to Catana, and ravaged the land and set fire to the tents and encampment
of the Athenians, and so returned home. Learning also that the Athenians were sending
an embassy to Camarina, on the strength of the alliance concluded in the time of
Laches, to gain, if possible, that city, they sent another from Syracuse to oppose
them. They had a shrewd suspicion that the Camarinaeans had not sent what they did
send for the first battle very willingly; and they now feared that they would refuse
to assist them at all in future, after seeing the success of the Athenians in the
action, and would join the latter on the strength of their old friendship. Hermocrates,
with some others, accordingly arrived at Camarina from Syracuse, and Euphemus and
others from the Athenians; and an assembly of the Camarinaeans having been convened,
Hermocrates spoke as follows, in the hope of prejudicing them against the Athenians:
“Camarinaeans, we did not come on this embassy because we were afraid of your
being frightened by the actual forces of the Athenians, but rather of your being
gained by what they would say to you before you heard anything from us. They are
come to Sicily with the pretext that you know, and the intention which we all suspect,
in my opinion less to restore the Leontines to their homes than to oust us from
ours; as it is out of all reason that they should restore in Sicily the cities that
they lay waste in Hellas, or should cherish the Leontine Chalcidians because of
their Ionian blood and keep in servitude the Euboean Chalcidians, of whom the Leontines
are a colony. No; but the same policy which has proved so successful in Hellas is
now being tried in Sicily. After being chosen as the leaders of the Ionians and
of the other allies of Athenian origin, to punish the Mede, the Athenians accused
some of failure in military service, some of fighting against each other, and others,
as the case might be, upon any colourable pretext that could be found, until they
thus subdued them all. In fine, in the struggle against the Medes, the Athenians
did not fight for the liberty of the Hellenes, or the Hellenes for their own liberty,
but the former to make their countrymen serve them instead of him, the latter to
change one master for another, wiser indeed than the first, but wiser for evil.
“But we are not now come to declare to an audience familiar with them the misdeeds
of a state so open to accusation as is the Athenian, but much rather to blame ourselves,
who, with the warnings we possess in the Hellenes in those parts that have been
enslaved through not supporting each other, and seeing the same sophisms being now
tried upon ourselves- such as restorations of Leontine kinsfolk and support of Egestaean
allies- do not stand together and resolutely show them that here are no Ionians,
or Hellespontines, or islanders, who change continually, but always serve a master,
sometimes the Mede and sometimes some other, but free Dorians from independent Peloponnese,
dwelling in Sicily. Or, are we waiting until we be taken in detail, one city after
another; knowing as we do that in no other way can we be conquered, and seeing that
they turn to this plan, so as to divide some of us by words, to draw some by the
bait of an alliance into open war with each other, and to ruin others by such flattery
as different circumstances may render acceptable? And do we fancy when destruction
first overtakes a distant fellow countryman that the danger will not come to each
of us also, or that he who suffers before us will suffer in himself alone?
“As for the Camarinaean who says that it is the Syracusan, not he, that is the
enemy of the Athenian, and who thinks it hard to have to encounter risk in behalf
of my country, I would have him bear in mind that he will fight in my country, not
more for mine than for his own, and by so much the more safely in that he will enter
on the struggle not alone, after the way has been cleared by my ruin, but with me
as his ally, and that the object of the Athenian is not so much to punish the enmity
of the Syracusan as to use me as a blind to secure the friendship of the Camarinaean.
As for him who envies or even fears us (and envied and feared great powers must
always be), and who on this account wishes Syracuse to be humbled to teach us a
lesson, but would still have her survive, in the interest of his own security the
wish that he indulges is not humanly possible. A man can control his own desires,
but he cannot likewise control circumstances; and in the event of his calculations
proving mistaken, he may live to bewail his own misfortune, and wish to be again
envying my prosperity. An idle wish, if he now sacrifice us and refuse to take his
share of perils which are the same, in reality though not in name, for him as for
us; what is nominally the preservation of our power being really his own salvation.
It was to be expected that you, of all people in the world, Camarinaeans, being
our immediate neighbours and the next in danger, would have foreseen this, and instead
of supporting us in the lukewarm way that you are now doing, would rather come to
us of your own accord, and be now offering at Syracuse the aid which you would have
asked for at Camarina, if to Camarina the Athenians had first come, to encourage
us to resist the invader. Neither you, however, nor the rest have as yet bestirred
yourselves in this direction.
“Fear perhaps will make you study to do right both by us and by the invaders,
and plead that you have an alliance with the Athenians. But you made that alliance,
not against your friends, but against the enemies that might attack you, and to
help the Athenians when they were wronged by others, not when as now they are wronging
their neighbours. Even the Rhegians, Chalcidians though they be, refuse to help
to restore the Chalcidian Leontines; and it would be strange if, while they suspect
the gist of this fine pretence and are wise without reason, you, with every reason
on your side, should yet choose to assist your natural enemies, and should join
with their direst foes in undoing those whom nature has made your own kinsfolk.
This is not to do right; but you should help us without fear of their armament,
which has no terrors if we hold together, but only if we let them succeed in their
endeavours to separate us; since even after attacking us by ourselves and being
victorious in battle, they had to go off without effecting their purpose.
“United, therefore, we have no cause to despair, but rather new encouragement
to league together; especially as succour will come to us from the Peloponnesians,
in military matters the undoubted superiors of the Athenians. And you need not think
that your prudent policy of taking sides with neither, because allies of both, is
either safe for you or fair to us. Practically it is not as fair as it pretends
to be. If the vanquished be defeated, and the victor conquer, through your refusing
to join, what is the effect of your abstention but to leave the former to perish
unaided, and to allow the latter to offend unhindered? And yet it were more honourable
to join those who are not only the injured party, but your own kindred, and by so
doing to defend the common interests of Sicily and save your friends the Athenians
from doing wrong.
“In conclusion, we Syracusans say that it is useless for us to demonstrate either
to you or to the rest what you know already as well as we do; but we entreat, and
if our entreaty fail, we protest that we are menaced by our eternal enemies the
Ionians, and are betrayed by you our fellow Dorians. If the Athenians reduce us,
they will owe their victory to your decision, but in their own name will reap the
honour, and will receive as the prize of their triumph the very men who enabled
them to gain it. On the other hand, if we are the conquerors, you will have to pay
for having been the cause of our danger. Consider, therefore; and now make your
choice between the security which present servitude offers and the prospect of conquering
with us and so escaping disgraceful submission to an Athenian master and avoiding
the lasting enmity of Syracuse.”
Such were the words of Hermocrates; after whom Euphemus, the Athenian ambassador,
spoke as follows:
“Although we came here only to renew the former alliance, the attack of the Syracusans
compels us to speak of our empire and of the good right we have to it. The best
proof of this the speaker himself furnished, when he called the Ionians eternal
enemies of the Dorians. It is the fact; and the Peloponnesian Dorians being our
superiors in numbers and next neighbours, we Ionians looked out for the best means
of escaping their domination. After the Median War we had a fleet, and so got rid
of the empire and supremacy of the Lacedaemonians, who had no right to give orders
to us more than we to them, except that of being the strongest at that moment; and
being appointed leaders of the King’s former subjects, we continue to be so, thinking
that we are least likely to fall under the dominion of the Peloponnesians, if we
have a force to defend ourselves with, and in strict truth having done nothing unfair
in reducing to subjection the Ionians and islanders, the kinsfolk whom the Syracusans
say we have enslaved. They, our kinsfolk, came against their mother country, that
is to say against us, together with the Mede, and, instead of having the courage
to revolt and sacrifice their property as we did when we abandoned our city, chose
to be slaves themselves, and to try to make us so.
“We, therefore, deserve to rule because we placed the largest fleet and an unflinching
patriotism at the service of the Hellenes, and because these, our subjects, did
us mischief by their ready subservience to the Medes; and, desert apart, we seek
to strengthen ourselves against the Peloponnesians. We make no fine profession of
having a right to rule because we overthrew the barbarian single-handed, or because
we risked what we did risk for the freedom of the subjects in question any more
than for that of all, and for our own: no one can be quarrelled with for providing
for his proper safety. If we are now here in Sicily, it is equally in the interest
of our security, with which we perceive that your interest also coincides. We prove
this from the conduct which the Syracusans cast against us and which you somewhat
too timorously suspect; knowing that those whom fear has made suspicious may be
carried away by the charm of eloquence for the moment, but when they come to act
follow their interests.
“Now, as we have said, fear makes us hold our empire in Hellas, and fear makes
us now come, with the help of our friends, to order safely matters in Sicily, and
not to enslave any but rather to prevent any from being enslaved. Meanwhile, let
no one imagine that we are interesting ourselves in you without your having anything
to do with us, seeing that, if you are preserved and able to make head against the
Syracusans, they will be less likely to harm us by sending troops to the Peloponnesians.
In this way you have everything to do with us, and on this account it is perfectly
reasonable for us to restore the Leontines, and to make them, not subjects like
their kinsmen in Euboea, but as powerful as possible, to help us by annoying the
Syracusans from their frontier. In Hellas we are alone a match for our enemies;
and as for the assertion that it is out of all reason that we should free the Sicilian,
while we enslave the Chalcidian, the fact is that the latter is useful to us by
being without arms and contributing money only; while the former, the Leontines
and our other friends, cannot be too independent.
“Besides, for tyrants and imperial cities nothing is unreasonable if expedient,
no one a kinsman unless sure; but friendship or enmity is everywhere an affair of
time and circumstance. Here, in Sicily, our interest is not to weaken our friends,
but by means of their strength to cripple our enemies. Why doubt this? In Hellas
we treat our allies as we find them useful. The Chians and Methymnians govern themselves
and furnish ships; most of the rest have harder terms and pay tribute in money;
while others, although islanders and easy for us to take, are free altogether, because
they occupy convenient positions round Peloponnese. In our settlement of the states
here in Sicily, we should therefore; naturally be guided by our interest, and by
fear, as we say, of the Syracusans. Their ambition is to rule you, their object
to use the suspicions that we excite to unite you, and then, when we have gone away
without effecting anything, by force or through your isolation, to become the masters
of Sicily. And masters they must become, if you unite with them; as a force of that
magnitude would be no longer easy for us to deal with united, and they would be
more than a match for you as soon as we were away.
“Any other view of the case is condemned by the facts. When you first asked us
over, the fear which you held out was that of danger to Athens if we let you come
under the dominion of Syracuse; and it is not right now to mistrust the very same
argument by which you claimed to convince us, or to give way to suspicion because
we are come with a larger force against the power of that city. Those whom you should
really distrust are the Syracusans. We are not able to stay here without you, and
if we proved perfidious enough to bring you into subjection, we should be unable
to keep you in bondage, owing to the length of the voyage and the difficulty of
guarding large, and in a military sense continental, towns: they, the Syracusans,
live close to you, not in a camp, but in a city greater than the force we have with
us, plot always against you, never let slip an opportunity once offered, as they
have shown in the case of the Leontines and others, and now have the face, just
as if you were fools, to invite you to aid them against the power that hinders this,
and that has thus far maintained Sicily independent. We, as against them, invite
you to a much more real safety, when we beg you not to betray that common safety
which we each have in the other, and to reflect that they, even without allies,
will, by their numbers, have always the way open to you, while you will not often
have the opportunity of defending yourselves with such numerous auxiliaries; if,
through your suspicions, you once let these go away unsuccessful or defeated, you
will wish to see if only a handful of them back again, when the day is past in which
their presence could do anything for you.
“But we hope, Camarinaeans, that the calumnies of the Syracusans will not be
allowed to succeed either with you or with the rest: we have told you the whole
truth upon the things we are suspected of, and will now briefly recapitulate, in
the hope of convincing you. We assert that we are rulers in Hellas in order not
to be subjects; liberators in Sicily that we may not be harmed by the Sicilians;
that we are compelled to interfere in many things, because we have many things to
guard against; and that now, as before, we are come as allies to those of you who
suffer wrong in this island, not without invitation but upon invitation. Accordingly,
instead of making yourselves judges or censors of our conduct, and trying to turn
us, which it were now difficult to do, so far as there is anything in our interfering
policy or in our character that chimes in with your interest, this take and make
use of; and be sure that, far from being injurious to all alike, to most of the
Hellenes that policy is even beneficial. Thanks to it, all men in all places, even
where we are not, who either apprehend or meditate aggression, from the near prospect
before them, in the one case, of obtaining our intervention in their favour, in
the other, of our arrival making the venture dangerous, find themselves constrained,
respectively, to be moderate against their will, and to be preserved without trouble
of their own. Do not you reject this security that is open to all who desire it,
and is now offered to you; but do like others, and instead of being always on the
defensive against the Syracusans, unite with us, and in your turn at last threaten
them.”
Such were the words of Euphemus. What the Camarinaeans felt was this. Sympathizing
with the Athenians, except in so far as they might be afraid of their subjugating
Sicily, they had always been at enmity with their neighbour Syracuse. From the very
fact, however, that they were their neighbours, they feared the Syracusans most
of the two, and being apprehensive of their conquering even without them, both sent
them in the first instance the few horsemen mentioned, and for the future determined
to support them most in fact, although as sparingly as possible; but for the moment
in order not to seem to slight the Athenians, especially as they had been successful
in the engagement, to answer both alike. Agreeably to this resolution they answered
that as both the contending parties happened to be allies of theirs, they thought
it most consistent with their oaths at present to side with neither; with which
answer the ambassadors of either party departed.
In the meantime, while Syracuse pursued her preparations for war, the Athenians
were encamped at Naxos, and tried by negotiation to gain as many of the Sicels as
possible. Those more in the low lands, and subjects of Syracuse, mostly held aloof;
but the peoples of the interior who had never been otherwise than independent, with
few exceptions, at once joined the Athenians, and brought down corn to the army,
and in some cases even money. The Athenians marched against those who refused to
join, and forced some of them to do so; in the case of others they were stopped
by the Syracusans sending garrisons and reinforcements. Meanwhile the Athenians
moved their winter quarters from Naxos to Catana, and reconstructed the camp burnt
by the Syracusans, and stayed there the rest of the winter. They also sent a galley
to Carthage, with proffers of friendship, on the chance of obtaining assistance,
and another to Tyrrhenia; some of the cities there having spontaneously offered
to join them in the war. They also sent round to the Sicels and to Egesta, desiring
them to send them as many horses as possible, and meanwhile prepared bricks, iron,
and all other things necessary for the work of circumvallation, intending by the
spring to begin hostilities.
In the meantime the Syracusan envoys dispatched to Corinth and Lacedaemon tried
as they passed along the coast to persuade the Italiots to interfere with the proceedings
of the Athenians, which threatened Italy quite as much as Syracuse, and having arrived
at Corinth made a speech calling on the Corinthians to assist them on the ground
of their common origin. The Corinthians voted at once to aid them heart and soul
themselves, and then sent on envoys with them to Lacedaemon, to help them to persuade
her also to prosecute the war with the Athenians more openly at home and to send
succours to Sicily. The envoys from Corinth having reached Lacedaemon found there
Alcibiades with his fellow refugees, who had at once crossed over in a trading vessel
from Thurii, first to Cyllene in Elis, and afterwards from thence to Lacedaemon;
upon the Lacedaemonians’ own invitation, after first obtaining a safe conduct, as
he feared them for the part he had taken in the affair of Mantinea. The result was
that the Corinthians, Syracusans, and Alcibiades, pressing all the same request
in the assembly of the Lacedaemonians, succeeded in persuading them; but as the
ephors and the authorities, although resolved to send envoys to Syracuse to prevent
their surrendering to the Athenians, showed no disposition to send them any assistance,
Alcibiades now came forward and inflamed and stirred the Lacedaemonians by speaking
as follows:
“I am forced first to speak to you of the prejudice with which I am regarded,
in order that suspicion may not make you disinclined to listen to me upon public
matters. The connection, with you as your proxeni, which the ancestors of our family
by reason of some discontent renounced, I personally tried to renew by my good offices
towards you, in particular upon the occasion of the disaster at Pylos. But although
I maintained this friendly attitude, you yet chose to negotiate the peace with the
Athenians through my enemies, and thus to strengthen them and to discredit me. You
had therefore no right to complain if I turned to the Mantineans and Argives, and
seized other occasions of thwarting and injuring you; and the time has now come
when those among you, who in the bitterness of the moment may have been then unfairly
angry with me, should look at the matter in its true light, and take a different
view. Those again who judged me unfavourably, because I leaned rather to the side
of the commons, must not think that their dislike is any better founded. We have
always been hostile to tyrants, and all who oppose arbitrary power are called commons;
hence we continued to act as leaders of the multitude; besides which, as democracy
was the government of the city, it was necessary in most things to conform to established
conditions. However, we endeavoured to be more moderate than the licentious temper
of the times; and while there were others, formerly as now, who tried to lead the
multitude astray- the same who banished me- our party was that of the whole people,
our creed being to do our part in preserving the form of government under which
the city enjoyed the utmost greatness and freedom, and which we had found existing.
As for democracy, the men of sense among us knew what it was, and I perhaps as well
as any, as I have the more cause to complain of it; but there is nothing new to
be said of a patent absurdity; meanwhile we did not think it safe to alter it under
the pressure of your hostility.
“So much then for the prejudices with which I am regarded: I now can call your
attention to the questions you must consider, and upon which superior knowledge
perhaps permits me to speak. We sailed to Sicily first to conquer, if possible,
the Siceliots, and after them the Italiots also, and finally to assail the empire
and city of Carthage. In the event of all or most of these schemes succeeding, we
were then to attack Peloponnese, bringing with us the entire force of the Hellenes
lately acquired in those parts, and taking a number of barbarians into our pay,
such as the Iberians and others in those countries, confessedly the most warlike
known, and building numerous galleys in addition to those which we had already,
timber being plentiful in Italy; and with this fleet blockading Peloponnese from
the sea and assailing it with our armies by land, taking some of the cities by storm,
drawing works of circumvallation round others, we hoped without difficulty to effect
its reduction, and after this to rule the whole of the Hellenic name. Money and
corn meanwhile for the better execution of these plans were to be supplied in sufficient
quantities by the newly acquired places in those countries, independently of our
revenues here at home.
“You have thus heard the history of the present expedition from the man who most
exactly knows what our objects were; and the remaining generals will, if they can,
carry these out just the same. But that the states in Sicily must succumb if you
do not help them, I will now show. Although the Siceliots, with all their inexperience,
might even now be saved if their forces were united, the Syracusans alone, beaten
already in one battle with all their people and blockaded from the sea, will be
unable to withstand the Athenian armament that is now there. But if Syracuse falls,
all Sicily falls also, and Italy immediately afterwards; and the danger which I
just now spoke of from that quarter will before long be upon you. None need therefore
fancy that Sicily only is in question; Peloponnese will be so also, unless you speedily
do as I tell you, and send on board ship to Syracuse troops that shall able to row
their ships themselves, and serve as heavy infantry the moment that they land; and
what I consider even more important than the troops, a Spartan as commanding officer
to discipline the forces already on foot and to compel recusants to serve. The friends
that you have already will thus become more confident, and the waverers will be
encouraged to join you. Meanwhile you must carry on the war here more openly, that
the Syracusans, seeing that you do not forget them, may put heart into their resistance,
and that the Athenians may be less able to reinforce their armament. You must fortify
Decelea in Attica, the blow of which the Athenians are always most afraid and the
only one that they think they have not experienced in the present war; the surest
method of harming an enemy being to find out what he most fears, and to choose this
means of attacking him, since every one naturally knows best his own weak points
and fears accordingly. The fortification in question, while it benefits you, will
create difficulties for your adversaries, of which I shall pass over many, and shall
only mention the chief. Whatever property there is in the country will most of it
become yours, either by capture or surrender; and the Athenians will at once be
deprived of their revenues from the silver mines at Laurium, of their present gains
from their land and from the law courts, and above all of the revenue from their
allies, which will be paid less regularly, as they lose their awe of Athens and
see you addressing yourselves with vigour to the war. The zeal and speed with which
all this shall be done depends, Lacedaemonians, upon yourselves; as to its possibility,
I am quite confident, and I have little fear of being mistaken.
“Meanwhile I hope that none of you will think any the worse of me if, after having
hitherto passed as a lover of my country, I now actively join its worst enemies
in attacking it, or will suspect what I say as the fruit of an outlaw’s enthusiasm.
I am an outlaw from the iniquity of those who drove me forth, not, if you will be
guided by me, from your service; my worst enemies are not you who only harmed your
foes, but they who forced their friends to become enemies; and love of country is
what I do not feel when I am wronged, but what I felt when secure in my rights as
a citizen. Indeed I do not consider that I am now attacking a country that is still
mine; I am rather trying to recover one that is mine no longer; and the true lover
of his country is not he who consents to lose it unjustly rather than attack it,
but he who longs for it so much that he will go all lengths to recover it. For myself,
therefore, Lacedaemonians, I beg you to use me without scruple for danger and trouble
of every kind, and to remember the argument in every one’s mouth, that if I did
you great harm as an enemy, I could likewise do you good service as a friend, inasmuch
as I know the plans of the Athenians, while I only guessed yours. For yourselves
I entreat you to believe that your most capital interests are now under deliberation;
and I urge you to send without hesitation the expeditions to Sicily and Attica;
by the presence of a small part of your forces you will save important cities in
that island, and you will destroy the power of Athens both present and prospective;
after this you will dwell in security and enjoy the supremacy over all Hellas, resting
not on force but upon consent and affection.”
Such were the words of Alcibiades. The Lacedaemonians, who had themselves before
intended to march against Athens, but were still waiting and looking about them,
at once became much more in earnest when they received this particular information
from Alcibiades, and considered that they had heard it from the man who best knew
the truth of the matter. Accordingly they now turned their attention to the fortifying
of Decelea and sending immediate aid to the Sicilians; and naming Gylippus, son
of Cleandridas, to the command of the Syracusans, bade him consult with that people
and with the Corinthians and arrange for succours reaching the island, in the best
and speediest way possible under the circumstances. Gylippus desired the Corinthians
to send him at once two ships to Asine, and to prepare the rest that they intended
to send, and to have them ready to sail at the proper time. Having settled this,
the envoys departed from Lacedaemon.
In the meantime arrived the Athenian galley from Sicily sent by the generals
for money and cavalry; and the Athenians, after hearing what they wanted, voted
to send the supplies for the armament and the cavalry. And the winter ended, and
with it ended the seventeenth year of the present war of which Thucydides is the
historian.
The next summer, at the very beginning of the season, the Athenians in Sicily
put out from Catana, and sailed along shore to Megara in Sicily, from which, as
I have mentioned above, the Syracusans expelled the inhabitants in the time of their
tyrant Gelo, themselves occupying the territory. Here the Athenians landed and laid
waste the country, and after an unsuccessful attack upon a fort of the Syracusans,
went on with the fleet and army to the river Terias, and advancing inland laid waste
the plain and set fire to the corn; and after killing some of a small Syracusan
party which they encountered, and setting up a trophy, went back again to their
ships. They now sailed to Catana and took in provisions there, and going with their
whole force against Centoripa, a town of the Sicels, acquired it by capitulation,
and departed, after also burning the corn of the Inessaeans and Hybleans. Upon their
return to Catana they found the horsemen arrived from Athens, to the number of two
hundred and fifty (with their equipments, but without their horses which were to
be procured upon the spot), and thirty mounted archers and three hundred talents
of silver.
The same spring the Lacedaemonians marched against Argos, and went as far as
Cleonae, when an earthquake occurred and caused them to return. After this the Argives
invaded the Thyreatid, which is on their border, and took much booty from the Lacedaemonians,
which was sold for no less than twenty-five talents. The same summer, not long after,
the Thespian commons made an attack upon the party in office, which was not successful,
but succours arrived from Thebes, and some were caught, while others took refuge
at Athens.
The same summer the Syracusans learned that the Athenians had been joined by
their cavalry, and were on the point of marching against them; and seeing that without
becoming masters of Epipolae, a precipitous spot situated exactly over the town,
the Athenians could not, even if victorious in battle, easily invest them, they
determined to guard its approaches, in order that the enemy might not ascend unobserved
by this, the sole way by which ascent was possible, as the remainder is lofty ground,
and falls right down to the city, and can all be seen from inside; and as it lies
above the rest the place is called by the Syracusans Epipolae or Overtown. They
accordingly went out in mass at daybreak into the meadow along the river Anapus,
their new generals, Hermocrates and his colleagues, having just come into office,
and held a review of their heavy infantry, from whom they first selected a picked
body of six hundred, under the command of Diomilus, an exile from Andros, to guard
Epipolae, and to be ready to muster at a moment’s notice to help wherever help should
be required.
Meanwhile the Athenians, the very same morning, were holding a review, having
already made land unobserved with all the armament from Catana, opposite a place
called Leon, not much more than half a mile from Epipolae, where they disembarked
their army, bringing the fleet to anchor at Thapsus, a peninsula running out into
the sea, with a narrow isthmus, and not far from the city of Syracuse either by
land or water. While the naval force of the Athenians threw a stockade across the
isthmus and remained quiet at Thapsus, the land army immediately went on at a run
to Epipolae, and succeeded in getting up by Euryelus before the Syracusans perceived
them, or could come up from the meadow and the review. Diomilus with his six hundred
and the rest advanced as quickly as they could, but they had nearly three miles
to go from the meadow before reaching them. Attacking in this way in considerable
disorder, the Syracusans were defeated in battle at Epipolae and retired to the
town, with a loss of about three hundred killed, and Diomilus among the number.
After this the Athenians set up a trophy and restored to the Syracusans their dead
under truce, and next day descended to Syracuse itself; and no one coming out to
meet them, reascended and built a fort at Labdalum, upon the edge of the cliffs
of Epipolae, looking towards Megara, to serve as a magazine for their baggage and
money, whenever they advanced to battle or to work at the lines.
Not long afterwards three hundred cavalry came to them from Egesta, and about
a hundred from the Sicels, Naxians, and others; and thus, with the two hundred and
fifty from Athens, for whom they had got horses from the Egestaeans and Catanians,
besides others that they bought, they now mustered six hundred and fifty cavalry
in all. After posting a garrison in Labdalum, they advanced to Syca, where they
sat down and quickly built the Circle or centre of their wall of circumvallation.
The Syracusans, appalled at the rapidity with which the work advanced, determined
to go out against them and give battle and interrupt it; and the two armies were
already in battle array, when the Syracusan generals observed that their troops
found such difficulty in getting into line, and were in such disorder, that they
led them back into the town, except part of the cavalry. These remained and hindered
the Athenians from carrying stones or dispersing to any great distance, until a
tribe of the Athenian heavy infantry, with all the cavalry, charged and routed the
Syracusan horse with some loss; after which they set up a trophy for the cavalry
action.
The next day the Athenians began building the wall to the north of the Circle,
at the same time collecting stone and timber, which they kept laying down towards
Trogilus along the shortest line for their works from the great harbour to the sea;
while the Syracusans, guided by their generals, and above all by Hermocrates, instead
of risking any more general engagements, determined to build a counterwork in the
direction in which the Athenians were going to carry their wall. If this could be
completed in time, the enemy’s lines would be cut; and meanwhile, if he were to
attempt to interrupt them by an attack, they would send a part of their forces against
him, and would secure the approaches beforehand with their stockade, while the Athenians
would have to leave off working with their whole force in order to attend to them.
They accordingly sallied forth and began to build, starting from their city, running
a cross wall below the Athenian Circle, cutting down the olives and erecting wooden
towers. As the Athenian fleet had not yet sailed round into the great harbour, the
Syracusans still commanded the seacoast, and the Athenians brought their provisions
by land from Thapsus.
The Syracusans now thought the stockades and stonework of their counterwall sufficiently
far advanced; and as the Athenians, afraid of being divided and so fighting at a
disadvantage, and intent upon their own wall, did not come out to interrupt them,
they left one tribe to guard the new work and went back into the city. Meanwhile
the Athenians destroyed their pipes of drinking-water carried underground into the
city; and watching until the rest of the Syracusans were in their tents at midday,
and some even gone away into the city, and those in the stockade keeping but indifferent
guard, appointed three hundred picked men of their own, and some men picked from
the light troops and armed for the purpose, to run suddenly as fast as they could
to the counterwork, while the rest of the army advanced in two divisions, the one
with one of the generals to the city in case of a sortie, the other with the other
general to the stockade by the postern gate. The three hundred attacked and took
the stockade, abandoned by its garrison, who took refuge in the outworks round the
statue of Apollo Temenites. Here the pursuers burst in with them, and after getting
in were beaten out by the Syracusans, and some few of the Argives and Athenians
slain; after which the whole army retired, and having demolished the counterwork
and pulled up the stockade, carried away the stakes to their own lines, and set
up a trophy.
The next day the Athenians from the Circle proceeded to fortify the cliff above
the marsh which on this side of Epipolae looks towards the great harbour; this being
also the shortest line for their work to go down across the plain and the marsh
to the harbour. Meanwhile the Syracusans marched out and began a second stockade,
starting from the city, across the middle of the marsh, digging a trench alongside
to make it impossible for the Athenians to carry their wall down to the sea. As
soon as the Athenians had finished their work at the cliff they again attacked the
stockade and ditch of the Syracusans. Ordering the fleet to sail round from Thapsus
into the great harbour of Syracuse, they descended at about dawn from Epipolae into
the plain, and laying doors and planks over the marsh, where it was muddy and firmest,
crossed over on these, and by daybreak took the ditch and the stockade, except a
small portion which they captured afterwards. A battle now ensued, in which the
Athenians were victorious, the right wing of the Syracusans flying to the town and
the left to the river. The three hundred picked Athenians, wishing to cut off their
passage, pressed on at a run to the bridge, when the alarmed Syracusans, who had
with them most of their cavalry, closed and routed them, hurling them back upon
the Athenian right wing, the first tribe of which was thrown into a panic by the
shock. Seeing this, Lamachus came to their aid from the Athenian left with a few
archers and with the Argives, and crossing a ditch, was left alone with a few that
had crossed with him, and was killed with five or six of his men. These the Syracusans
managed immediately to snatch up in haste and get across the river into a place
of security, themselves retreating as the rest of the Athenian army now came up.
Meanwhile those who had at first fled for refuge to the city, seeing the turn
affairs were taking, now rallied from the town and formed against the Athenians
in front of them, sending also a part of their number to the Circle on Epipolae,
which they hoped to take while denuded of its defenders. These took and destroyed
the Athenian outwork of a thousand feet, the Circle itself being saved by Nicias,
who happened to have been left in it through illness, and who now ordered the servants
to set fire to the engines and timber thrown down before the wall; want of men,
as he was aware, rendering all other means of escape impossible. This step was justified
by the result, the Syracusans not coming any further on account of the fire, but
retreating. Meanwhile succours were coming up from the Athenians below, who had
put to flight the troops opposed to them; and the fleet also, according to orders,
was sailing from Thapsus into the great harbour. Seeing this, the troops on the
heights retired in haste, and the whole army of the Syracusans re-entered the city,
thinking that with their present force they would no longer be able to hinder the
wall reaching the sea.
After this the Athenians set up a trophy and restored to the Syracusans their
dead under truce, receiving in return Lamachus and those who had fallen with him.
The whole of their forces, naval and military, being now with them, they began from
Epipolae and the cliffs and enclosed the Syracusans with a double wall down to the
sea. Provisions were now brought in for the armament from all parts of Italy; and
many of the Sicels, who had hitherto been looking to see how things went, came as
allies to the Athenians: there also arrived three ships of fifty oars from Tyrrhenia.
Meanwhile everything else progressed favourably for their hopes. The Syracusans
began to despair of finding safety in arms, no relief having reached them from Peloponnese,
and were now proposing terms of capitulation among themselves and to Nicias, who
after the death of Lamachus was left sole commander. No decision was come to, but,
as was natural with men in difficulties and besieged more straitly than before,
there was much discussion with Nicias and still more in the town. Their present
misfortunes had also made them suspicious of one another; and the blame of their
disasters was thrown upon the ill-fortune or treachery of the generals under whose
command they had happened; and these were deposed and others, Heraclides, Eucles,
and Tellias, elected in their stead.
Meanwhile the Lacedaemonian, Gylippus, and the ships from Corinth were now off
Leucas, intent upon going with all haste to the relief of Sicily. The reports that
reached them being of an alarming kind, and all agreeing in the falsehood that Syracuse
was already completely invested, Gylippus abandoned all hope of Sicily, and wishing
to save Italy, rapidly crossed the Ionian Sea to Tarentum with the Corinthian, Pythen,
two Laconian, and two Corinthian vessels, leaving the Corinthians to follow him
after manning, in addition to their own ten, two Leucadian and two Ambraciot ships.
From Tarentum Gylippus first went on an embassy to Thurii, and claimed anew the
rights of citizenship which his father had enjoyed; failing to bring over the townspeople,
he weighed anchor and coasted along Italy. Opposite the Terinaean Gulf he was caught
by the wind which blows violently and steadily from the north in that quarter, and
was carried out to sea; and after experiencing very rough weather, remade Tarentum,
where he hauled ashore and refitted such of his ships as had suffered most from
the tempest. Nicias heard of his approach, but, like the Thurians, despised the
scanty number of his ships, and set down piracy as the only probable object of the
voyage, and so took no precautions for the present.
About the same time in this summer, the Lacedaemonians invaded Argos with their
allies, and laid waste most of the country. The Athenians went with thirty ships
to the relief of the Argives, thus breaking their treaty with the Lacedaemonians
in the most overt manner. Up to this time incursions from Pylos, descents on the
coast of the rest of Peloponnese, instead of on the Laconian, had been the extent
of their co-operation with the Argives and Mantineans; and although the Argives
had often begged them to land, if only for a moment, with their heavy infantry in
Laconia, lay waste ever so little of it with them, and depart, they had always refused
to do so. Now, however, under the command of Phytodorus, Laespodius, and Demaratus,
they landed at Epidaurus Limera, Prasiae, and other places, and plundered the country;
and thus furnished the Lacedaemonians with a better pretext for hostilities against
Athens. After the Athenians had retired from Argos with their fleet, and the Lacedaemonians
also, the Argives made an incursion into the Phlisaid, and returned home after ravaging
their land and killing some of the inhabitants.

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