The History of the Peloponnesian War
By Thucydides
Written about 431 BC
Translated by Richard Crawley
London 1910.
The Seventh Book
Chapter XXI
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Years of the War – Arrival of Gylippus at Syracuse
– Fortification of Decelea – Successes of the Syracusans.
After refitting their ships, Gylippus and Pythen coasted along from Tarentum
to Epizephyrian Locris. They now received the more correct information that Syracuse
was not yet completely invested, but that it was still possible for an army arriving
at Epipolae to effect an entrance; and they consulted, accordingly, whether they
should keep Sicily on their right and risk sailing in by sea, or, leaving it on
their left, should first sail to Himera and, taking with them the Himeraeans and
any others that might agree to join them, go to Syracuse by land. Finally they determined
to sail for Himera, especially as the four Athenian ships which Nicias had at length
sent off, on hearing that they were at Locris, had not yet arrived at Rhegium. Accordingly,
before these reached their post, the Peloponnesians crossed the strait and, after
touching at Rhegium and Messina, came to Himera. Arrived there, they persuaded the
Himeraeans to join in the war, and not only to go with them themselves but to provide
arms for the seamen from their vessels which they had drawn ashore at Himera; and
they sent and appointed a place for the Selinuntines to meet them with all their
forces. A few troops were also promised by the Geloans and some of the Sicels, who
were now ready to join them with much greater alacrity, owing to the recent death
of Archonidas, a powerful Sicel king in that neighbourhood and friendly to Athens,
and owing also to the vigour shown by Gylippus in coming from Lacedaemon. Gylippus
now took with him about seven hundred of his sailors and marines, that number only
having arms, a thousand heavy infantry and light troops from Himera with a body
of a hundred horse, some light troops and cavalry from Selinus, a few Geloans, and
Sicels numbering a thousand in all, and set out on his march for Syracuse.
Meanwhile the Corinthian fleet from Leucas made all haste to arrive; and one
of their commanders, Gongylus, starting last with a single ship, was the first to
reach Syracuse, a little before Gylippus. Gongylus found the Syracusans on the point
of holding an assembly to consider whether they should put an end to the war. This
he prevented, and reassured them by telling them that more vessels were still to
arrive, and that Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, had been dispatched by the Lacedaemonians
to take the command. Upon this the Syracusans took courage, and immediately marched
out with all their forces to meet Gylippus, who they found was now close at hand.
Meanwhile Gylippus, after taking Ietae, a fort of the Sicels, on his way, formed
his army in order of battle, and so arrived at Epipolae, and ascending by Euryelus,
as the Athenians had done at first, now advanced with the Syracusans against the
Athenian lines. His arrival chanced at a critical moment. The Athenians had already
finished a double wall of six or seven furlongs to the great harbour, with the exception
of a small portion next the sea, which they were still engaged upon; and in the
remainder of the circle towards Trogilus on the other sea, stones had been laid
ready for building for the greater part of the distance, and some points had been
left half finished, while others were entirely completed. The danger of Syracuse
had indeed been great.
Meanwhile the Athenians, recovering from the confusion into which they had been
first thrown by the sudden approach of Gylippus and the Syracusans, formed in order
of battle. Gylippus halted at a short distance off and sent on a herald to tell
them that, if they would evacuate Sicily with bag and baggage within five days’
time, he was willing to make a truce accordingly. The Athenians treated this proposition
with contempt, and dismissed the herald without an answer. After this both sides
began to prepare for action. Gylippus, observing that the Syracusans were in disorder
and did not easily fall into line, drew off his troops more into the open ground,
while Nicias did not lead on the Athenians but lay still by his own wall. When Gylippus
saw that they did not come on, he led off his army to the citadel of the quarter
of Apollo Temenites, and passed the night there. On the following day he led out
the main body of his army, and, drawing them up in order of battle before the walls
of the Athenians to prevent their going to the relief of any other quarter, dispatched
a strong force against Fort Labdalum, and took it, and put all whom he found in
it to the sword, the place not being within sight of the Athenians. On the same
day an Athenian galley that lay moored off the harbour was captured by the Syracusans.
After this the Syracusans and their allies began to carry a single wall, starting
from the city, in a slanting direction up Epipolae, in order that the Athenians,
unless they could hinder the work, might be no longer able to invest them. Meanwhile
the Athenians, having now finished their wall down to the sea, had come up to the
heights; and part of their wall being weak, Gylippus drew out his army by night
and attacked it. However, the Athenians who happened to be bivouacking outside took
the alarm and came out to meet him, upon seeing which he quickly led his men back
again. The Athenians now built their wall higher, and in future kept guard at this
point themselves, disposing their confederates along the remainder of the works,
at the stations assigned to them. Nicias also determined to fortify Plemmyrium,
a promontory over against the city, which juts out and narrows the mouth of the
Great Harbour. He thought that the fortification of this place would make it easier
to bring in supplies, as they would be able to carry on their blockade from a less
distance, near to the port occupied by the Syracusans; instead of being obliged,
upon every movement of the enemy’s navy, to put out against them from the bottom
of the great harbour. Besides this, he now began to pay more attention to the war
by sea, seeing that the coming of Gylippus had diminished their hopes by land. Accordingly,
he conveyed over his ships and some troops, and built three forts in which he placed
most of his baggage, and moored there for the future the larger craft and men-of-war.
This was the first and chief occasion of the losses which the crews experienced.
The water which they used was scarce and had to be fetched from far, and the sailors
could not go out for firewood without being cut off by the Syracusan horse, who
were masters of the country; a third of the enemy’s cavalry being stationed at the
little town of Olympieum, to prevent plundering incursions on the part of the Athenians
at Plemmyrium. Meanwhile Nicias learned that the rest of the Corinthian fleet was
approaching, and sent twenty ships to watch for them, with orders to be on the look-out
for them about Locris and Rhegium and the approach to Sicily.
Gylippus, meanwhile, went on with the wall across Epipolae, using the stones
which the Athenians had laid down for their own wall, and at the same time constantly
led out the Syracusans and their allies, and formed them in order of battle in front
of the lines, the Athenians forming against him. At last he thought that the moment
was come, and began the attack; and a hand-to-hand fight ensued between the lines,
where the Syracusan cavalry could be of no use; and the Syracusans and their allies
were defeated and took up their dead under truce, while the Athenians erected a
trophy. After this Gylippus called the soldiers together, and said that the fault
was not theirs but his; he had kept their lines too much within the works, and had
thus deprived them of the services of their cavalry and darters. He would now, therefore,
lead them on a second time. He begged them to remember that in material force they
would be fully a match for their opponents, while, with respect to moral advantages,
it were intolerable if Peloponnesians and Dorians should not feel confident of overcoming
Ionians and islanders with the motley rabble that accompanied them, and of driving
them out of the country.
After this he embraced the first opportunity that offered of again leading them
against the enemy. Now Nicias and the Athenians held the opinion that even if the
Syracusans should not wish to offer battle, it was necessary for them to prevent
the building of the cross wall, as it already almost overlapped the extreme point
of their own, and if it went any further it would from that moment make no difference
whether they fought ever so many successful actions, or never fought at all. They
accordingly came out to meet the Syracusans. Gylippus led out his heavy infantry
further from the fortifications than on the former occasion, and so joined battle;
posting his horse and darters upon the flank of the Athenians in the open space,
where the works of the two walls terminated. During the engagement the cavalry attacked
and routed the left wing of the Athenians, which was opposed to them; and the rest
of the Athenian army was in consequence defeated by the Syracusans and driven headlong
within their lines. The night following the Syracusans carried their wall up to
the Athenian works and passed them, thus putting it out of their power any longer
to stop them, and depriving them, even if victorious in the field, of all chance
of investing the city for the future.
After this the remaining twelve vessels of the Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Leucadians
sailed into the harbour under the command of Erasinides, a Corinthian, having eluded
the Athenian ships on guard, and helped the Syracusans in completing the remainder
of the cross wall. Meanwhile Gylippus went into the rest of Sicily to raise land
and naval forces, and also to bring over any of the cities that either were lukewarm
in the cause or had hitherto kept out of the war altogether. Syracusan and Corinthian
envoys were also dispatched to Lacedaemon and Corinth to get a fresh force sent
over, in any way that might offer, either in merchant vessels or transports, or
in any other manner likely to prove successful, as the Athenians too were sending
for reinforcements; while the Syracusans proceeded to man a fleet and to exercise,
meaning to try their fortune in this way also, and generally became exceedingly
confident.
Nicias perceiving this, and seeing the strength of the enemy and his own difficulties
daily increasing, himself also sent to Athens. He had before sent frequent reports
of events as they occurred, and felt it especially incumbent upon him to do so now,
as he thought that they were in a critical position, and that, unless speedily recalled
or strongly reinforced from home, they had no hope of safety. He feared, however,
that the messengers, either through inability to speak, or through failure of memory,
or from a wish to please the multitude, might not report the truth, and so thought
it best to write a letter, to ensure that the Athenians should know his own opinion
without its being lost in transmission, and be able to decide upon the real facts
of the case. His emissaries, accordingly, departed with the letter and the requisite
verbal instructions; and he attended to the affairs of the army, making it his aim
now to keep on the defensive and to avoid any unnecessary danger.
At the close of the same summer the Athenian general Euetion marched in concert
with Perdiccas with a large body of Thracians against Amphipolis, and failing to
take it brought some galleys round into the Strymon, and blockaded the town from
the river, having his base at Himeraeum.
Summer was now over. The winter ensuing, the persons sent by Nicias, reaching
Athens, gave the verbal messages which had been entrusted to them, and answered
any questions that were asked them, and delivered the letter. The clerk of the city
now came forward and read out to the Athenians the letter, which was as follows:
“Our past operations, Athenians, have been made known to you by many other letters;
it is now time for you to become equally familiar with our present condition, and
to take your measures accordingly. We had defeated in most of our engagements with
them the Syracusans, against whom we were sent, and we had built the works which
we now occupy, when Gylippus arrived from Lacedaemon with an army obtained from
Peloponnese and from some of the cities in Sicily. In our first battle with him
we were victorious; in the battle on the following day we were overpowered by a
multitude of cavalry and darters, and compelled to retire within our lines. We have
now, therefore, been forced by the numbers of those opposed to us to discontinue
the work of circumvallation, and to remain inactive; being unable to make use even
of all the force we have, since a large portion of our heavy infantry is absorbed
in the defence of our lines. Meanwhile the enemy have carried a single wall past
our lines, thus making it impossible for us to invest them in future, until this
cross wall be attacked by a strong force and captured. So that the besieger in name
has become, at least from the land side, the besieged in reality; as we are prevented
by their cavalry from even going for any distance into the country.
“Besides this, an embassy has been dispatched to Peloponnese to procure reinforcements,
and Gylippus has gone to the cities in Sicily, partly in the hope of inducing those
that are at present neutral to join him in the war, partly of bringing from his
allies additional contingents for the land forces and material for the navy. For
I understand that they contemplate a combined attack, upon our lines with their
land forces and with their fleet by sea. You must none of you be surprised that
I say by sea also. They have discovered that the length of the time we have now
been in commission has rotted our ships and wasted our crews, and that with the
entireness of our crews and the soundness of our ships the pristine efficiency of
our navy has departed. For it is impossible for us to haul our ships ashore and
careen them, because, the enemy’s vessels being as many or more than our own, we
are constantly anticipating an attack. Indeed, they may be seen exercising, and
it lies with them to take the initiative; and not having to maintain a blockade,
they have greater facilities for drying their ships.
“This we should scarcely be able to do, even if we had plenty of ships to spare,
and were freed from our present necessity of exhausting all our strength upon the
blockade. For it is already difficult to carry in supplies past Syracuse; and were
we to relax our vigilance in the slightest degree it would become impossible. The
losses which our crews have suffered and still continue to suffer arise from the
following causes. Expeditions for fuel and for forage, and the distance from which
water has to be fetched, cause our sailors to be cut off by the Syracusan cavalry;
the loss of our previous superiority emboldens our slaves to desert; our foreign
seamen are impressed by the unexpected appearance of a navy against us, and the
strength of the enemy’s resistance; such of them as were pressed into the service
take the first opportunity of departing to their respective cities; such as were
originally seduced by the temptation of high pay, and expected little fighting and
large gains, leave us either by desertion to the enemy or by availing themselves
of one or other of the various facilities of escape which the magnitude of Sicily
affords them. Some even engage in trade themselves and prevail upon the captains
to take Hyccaric slaves on board in their place; thus they have ruined the efficiency
of our navy.
“Now I need not remind you that the time during which a crew is in its prime
is short, and that the number of sailors who can start a ship on her way and keep
the rowing in time is small. But by far my greatest trouble is, that holding the
post which I do, I am prevented by the natural indocility of the Athenian seaman
from putting a stop to these evils; and that meanwhile we have no source from which
to recruit our crews, which the enemy can do from many quarters, but are compelled
to depend both for supplying the crews in service and for making good our losses
upon the men whom we brought with us. For our present confederates, Naxos and Catana,
are incapable of supplying us. There is only one thing more wanting to our opponents,
I mean the defection of our Italian markets. If they were to see you neglect to
relieve us from our present condition, and were to go over to the enemy, famine
would compel us to evacuate, and Syracuse would finish the war without a blow.
“I might, it is true, have written to you something different and more agreeable
than this, but nothing certainly more useful, if it is desirable for you to know
the real state of things here before taking your measures. Besides I know that it
is your nature to love to be told the best side of things, and then to blame the
teller if the expectations which he has raised in your minds are not answered by
the result; and I therefore thought it safest to declare to you the truth.
“Now you are not to think that either your generals or your soldiers have ceased
to be a match for the forces originally opposed to them. But you are to reflect
that a general Sicilian coalition is being formed against us; that a fresh army
is expected from Peloponnese, while the force we have here is unable to cope even
with our present antagonists; and you must promptly decide either to recall us or
to send out to us another fleet and army as numerous again, with a large sum of
money, and someone to succeed me, as a disease in the kidneys unfits me for retaining
my post. I have, I think, some claim on your indulgence, as while I was in my prime
I did you much good service in my commands. But whatever you mean to do, do it at
the commencement of spring and without delay, as the enemy will obtain his Sicilian
reinforcements shortly, those from Peloponnese after a longer interval; and unless
you attend to the matter the former will be here before you, while the latter will
elude you as they have done before.”
Such were the contents of Nicias’s letter. When the Athenians had heard it they
refused to accept his resignation, but chose him two colleagues, naming Menander
and Euthydemus, two of the officers at the seat of war, to fill their places until
their arrival, that Nicias might not be left alone in his sickness to bear the whole
weight of affairs. They also voted to send out another army and navy, drawn partly
from the Athenians on the muster-roll, partly from the allies. The colleagues chosen
for Nicias were Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon, son of Thucles.
Eurymedon was sent off at once, about the time of the winter solstice, with ten
ships, a hundred and twenty talents of silver, and instructions to tell the army
that reinforcements would arrive, and that care would be taken of them; but Demosthenes
stayed behind to organize the expedition, meaning to start as soon as it was spring,
and sent for troops to the allies, and meanwhile got together money, ships, and
heavy infantry at home.
The Athenians also sent twenty vessels round Peloponnese to prevent any one crossing
over to Sicily from Corinth or Peloponnese. For the Corinthians, filled with confidence
by the favourable alteration in Sicilian affairs which had been reported by the
envoys upon their arrival, and convinced that the fleet which they had before sent
out had not been without its use, were now preparing to dispatch a force of heavy
infantry in merchant vessels to Sicily, while the Lacedaemonians did the like for
the rest of Peloponnese. The Corinthians also manned a fleet of twenty-five vessels,
intending to try the result of a battle with the squadron on guard at Naupactus,
and meanwhile to make it less easy for the Athenians there to hinder the departure
of their merchantmen, by obliging them to keep an eye upon the galleys thus arrayed
against them.
In the meantime the Lacedaemonians prepared for their invasion of Attica, in
accordance with their own previous resolve, and at the instigation of the Syracusans
and Corinthians, who wished for an invasion to arrest the reinforcements which they
heard that Athens was about to send to Sicily. Alcibiades also urgently advised
the fortification of Decelea, and a vigorous prosecution of the war. But the Lacedaemonians
derived most encouragement from the belief that Athens, with two wars on her hands,
against themselves and against the Siceliots, would be more easy to subdue, and
from the conviction that she had been the first to infringe the truce. In the former
war, they considered, the offence had been more on their own side, both on account
of the entrance of the Thebans into Plataea in time of peace, and also of their
own refusal to listen to the Athenian offer of arbitration, in spite of the clause
in the former treaty that where arbitration should be offered there should be no
appeal to arms. For this reason they thought that they deserved their misfortunes,
and took to heart seriously the disaster at Pylos and whatever else had befallen
them. But when, besides the ravages from Pylos, which went on without any intermission,
the thirty Athenian ships came out from Argos and wasted part of Epidaurus, Prasiae,
and other places; when upon every dispute that arose as to the interpretation of
any doubtful point in the treaty, their own offers of arbitration were always rejected
by the Athenians, the Lacedaemonians at length decided that Athens had now committed
the very same offence as they had before done, and had become the guilty party;
and they began to be full of ardour for the war. They spent this winter in sending
round to their allies for iron, and in getting ready the other implements for building
their fort; and meanwhile began raising at home, and also by forced requisitions
in the rest of Peloponnese, a force to be sent out in the merchantmen to their allies
in Sicily. Winter thus ended, and with it the eighteenth year of this war of which
Thucydides is the historian.
In the first days of the spring following, at an earlier period than usual, the
Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Attica, under the command of Agis, son of
Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. They began by devastating the parts bordering
upon the plain, and next proceeded to fortify Decelea, dividing the work among the
different cities. Decelea is about thirteen or fourteen miles from the city of Athens,
and the same distance or not much further from Boeotia; and the fort was meant to
annoy the plain and the richest parts of the country, being in sight of Athens.
While the Peloponnesians and their allies in Attica were engaged in the work of
fortification, their countrymen at home sent off, at about the same time, the heavy
infantry in the merchant vessels to Sicily; the Lacedaemonians furnishing a picked
force of Helots and Neodamodes (or freedmen), six hundred heavy infantry in all,
under the command of Eccritus, a Spartan; and the Boeotians three hundred heavy
infantry, commanded by two Thebans, Xenon and Nicon, and by Hegesander, a Thespian.
These were among the first to put out into the open sea, starting from Taenarus
in Laconia. Not long after their departure the Corinthians sent off a force of five
hundred heavy infantry, consisting partly of men from Corinth itself, and partly
of Arcadian mercenaries, placed under the command of Alexarchus, a Corinthian. The
Sicyonians also sent off two hundred heavy infantry at same time as the Corinthians,
under the command of Sargeus, a Sicyonian. Meantime the five-and-twenty vessels
manned by Corinth during the winter lay confronting the twenty Athenian ships at
Naupactus until the heavy infantry in the merchantmen were fairly on their way from
Peloponnese; thus fulfilling the object for which they had been manned originally,
which was to divert the attention of the Athenians from the merchantmen to the galleys.
During this time the Athenians were not idle. Simultaneously with the fortification
of Decelea, at the very beginning of spring, they sent thirty ships round Peloponnese,
under Charicles, son of Apollodorus, with instructions to call at Argos and demand
a force of their heavy infantry for the fleet, agreeably to the alliance. At the
same time they dispatched Demosthenes to Sicily, as they had intended, with sixty
Athenian and five Chian vessels, twelve hundred Athenian heavy infantry from the
muster-roll, and as many of the islanders as could be raised in the different quarters,
drawing upon the other subject allies for whatever they could supply that would
be of use for the war. Demosthenes was instructed first to sail round with Charicles
and to operate with him upon the coasts of Laconia, and accordingly sailed to Aegina
and there waited for the remainder of his armament, and for Charicles to fetch the
Argive troops.
In Sicily, about the same time in this spring, Gylippus came to Syracuse with
as many troops as he could bring from the cities which he had persuaded to join.
Calling the Syracusans together, he told them that they must man as many ships as
possible, and try their hand at a sea-fight, by which he hoped to achieve an advantage
in the war not unworthy of the risk. With him Hermocrates actively joined in trying
to encourage his countrymen to attack the Athenians at sea, saying that the latter
had not inherited their naval prowess nor would they retain it for ever; they had
been landsmen even to a greater degree than the Syracusans, and had only become
a maritime power when obliged by the Mede. Besides, to daring spirits like the Athenians,
a daring adversary would seem the most formidable; and the Athenian plan of paralysing
by the boldness of their attack a neighbour often not their inferior in strength
could now be used against them with as good effect by the Syracusans. He was convinced
also that the unlooked-for spectacle of Syracusans daring to face the Athenian navy
would cause a terror to the enemy, the advantages of which would far outweigh any
loss that Athenian science might inflict upon their inexperience. He accordingly
urged them to throw aside their fears and to try their fortune at sea; and the Syracusans,
under the influence of Gylippus and Hermocrates, and perhaps some others, made up
their minds for the sea-fight and began to man their vessels.
When the fleet was ready, Gylippus led out the whole army by night; his plan
being to assault in person the forts on Plemmyrium by land, while thirty-five Syracusan
galleys sailed according to appointment against the enemy from the great harbour,
and the forty-five remaining came round from the lesser harbour, where they had
their arsenal, in order to effect a junction with those inside and simultaneously
to attack Plemmyrium, and thus to distract the Athenians by assaulting them on two
sides at once. The Athenians quickly manned sixty ships, and with twenty-five of
these engaged the thirty-five of the Syracusans in the great harbour, sending the
rest to meet those sailing round from the arsenal; and an action now ensued directly
in front of the mouth of the great harbour, maintained with equal tenacity on both
sides; the one wishing to force the passage, the other to prevent them.
In the meantime, while the Athenians in Plemmyrium were down at the sea, attending
to the engagement, Gylippus made a sudden attack on the forts in the early morning
and took the largest first, and afterwards the two smaller, whose garrisons did
not wait for him, seeing the largest so easily taken. At the fall of the first fort,
the men from it who succeeded in taking refuge in their boats and merchantmen, found
great difficulty in reaching the camp, as the Syracusans were having the best of
it in the engagement in the great harbour, and sent a fast-sailing galley to pursue
them. But when the two others fell, the Syracusans were now being defeated; and
the fugitives from these sailed alongshore with more ease. The Syracusan ships fighting
off the mouth of the harbour forced their way through the Athenian vessels and sailing
in without any order fell foul of one another, and transferred the victory to the
Athenians; who not only routed the squadron in question, but also that by which
they were at first being defeated in the harbour, sinking eleven of the Syracusan
vessels and killing most of the men, except the crews of three ships whom they made
prisoners. Their own loss was confined to three vessels; and after hauling ashore
the Syracusan wrecks and setting up a trophy upon the islet in front of Plemmyrium,
they retired to their own camp.
Unsuccessful at sea, the Syracusans had nevertheless the forts in Plemmyrium,
for which they set up three trophies. One of the two last taken they razed, but
put in order and garrisoned the two others. In the capture of the forts a great
many men were killed and made prisoners, and a great quantity of property was taken
in all. As the Athenians had used them as a magazine, there was a large stock of
goods and corn of the merchants inside, and also a large stock belonging to the
captains; the masts and other furniture of forty galleys being taken, besides three
galleys which had been drawn up on shore. Indeed the first and chiefest cause of
the ruin of the Athenian army was the capture of Plemmyrium; even the entrance of
the harbour being now no longer safe for carrying in provisions, as the Syracusan
vessels were stationed there to prevent it, and nothing could be brought in without
fighting; besides the general impression of dismay and discouragement produced upon
the army.
After this the Syracusans sent out twelve ships under the command of Agatharchus,
a Syracusan. One of these went to Peloponnese with ambassadors to describe the hopeful
state of their affairs, and to incite the Peloponnesians to prosecute the war there
even more actively than they were now doing, while the eleven others sailed to Italy,
hearing that vessels laden with stores were on their way to the Athenians. After
falling in with and destroying most of the vessels in question, and burning in the
Caulonian territory a quantity of timber for shipbuilding, which had been got ready
for the Athenians, the Syracusan squadron went to Locri, and one of the merchantmen
from Peloponnese coming in, while they were at anchor there, carrying Thespian heavy
infantry, took these on board and sailed alongshore towards home. The Athenians
were on the look-out for them with twenty ships at Megara, but were only able to
take one vessel with its crew; the rest getting clear off to Syracuse. There was
also some skirmishing in the harbour about the piles which the Syracusans had driven
in the sea in front of the old docks, to allow their ships to lie at anchor inside,
without being hurt by the Athenians sailing up and running them down. The Athenians
brought up to them a ship of ten thousand talents burden furnished with wooden turrets
and screens, and fastened ropes round the piles from their boats, wrenched them
up and broke them, or dived down and sawed them in two. Meanwhile the Syracusans
plied them with missiles from the docks, to which they replied from their large
vessel; until at last most of the piles were removed by the Athenians. But the most
awkward part of the stockade was the part out of sight: some of the piles which
had been driven in did not appear above water, so that it was dangerous to sail
up, for fear of running the ships upon them, just as upon a reef, through not seeing
them. However divers went down and sawed off even these for reward; although the
Syracusans drove in others. Indeed there was no end to the contrivances to which
they resorted against each other, as might be expected between two hostile armies
confronting each other at such a short distance: and skirmishes and all kinds of
other attempts were of constant occurrence. Meanwhile the Syracusans sent embassies
to the cities, composed of Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Lacedaemonians, to tell
them of the capture of Plemmyrium, and that their defeat in the sea-fight was due
less to the strength of the enemy than to their own disorder; and generally, to
let them know that they were full of hope, and to desire them to come to their help
with ships and troops, as the Athenians were expected with a fresh army, and if
the one already there could be destroyed before the other arrived, the war would
be at an end.
While the contending parties in Sicily were thus engaged, Demosthenes, having
now got together the armament with which he was to go to the island, put out from
Aegina, and making sail for Peloponnese, joined Charicles and the thirty ships of
the Athenians. Taking on board the heavy infantry from Argos they sailed to Laconia,
and, after first plundering part of Epidaurus Limera, landed on the coast of Laconia,
opposite Cythera, where the temple of Apollo stands, and, laying waste part of the
country, fortified a sort of isthmus, to which the Helots of the Lacedaemonians
might desert, and from whence plundering incursions might be made as from Pylos.
Demosthenes helped to occupy this place, and then immediately sailed on to Corcyra
to take up some of the allies in that island, and so to proceed without delay to
Sicily; while Charicles waited until he had completed the fortification of the place
and, leaving a garrison there, returned home subsequently with his thirty ships
and the Argives also.
This same summer arrived at Athens thirteen hundred targeteers, Thracian swordsmen
of the tribe of the Dii, who were to have sailed to Sicily with Demosthenes. Since
they had come too late, the Athenians determined to send them back to Thrace, whence
they had come; to keep them for the Decelean war appearing too expensive, as the
pay of each man was a drachma a day. Indeed since Decelea had been first fortified
by the whole Peloponnesian army during this summer, and then occupied for the annoyance
of the country by the garrisons from the cities relieving each other at stated intervals,
it had been doing great mischief to the Athenians; in fact this occupation, by the
destruction of property and loss of men which resulted from it, was one of the principal
causes of their ruin. Previously the invasions were short, and did not prevent their
enjoying their land during the rest of the time: the enemy was now permanently fixed
in Attica; at one time it was an attack in force, at another it was the regular
garrison overrunning the country and making forays for its subsistence, and the
Lacedaemonian king, Agis, was in the field and diligently prosecuting the war; great
mischief was therefore done to the Athenians. They were deprived of their whole
country: more than twenty thousand slaves had deserted, a great part of them artisans,
and all their sheep and beasts of burden were lost; and as the cavalry rode out
daily upon excursions to Decelea and to guard the country, their horses were either
lamed by being constantly worked upon rocky ground, or wounded by the enemy.
Besides, the transport of provisions from Euboea, which had before been carried
on so much more quickly overland by Decelea from Oropus, was now effected at great
cost by sea round Sunium; everything the city required had to be imported from abroad,
and instead of a city it became a fortress. Summer and winter the Athenians were
worn out by having to keep guard on the fortifications, during the day by turns,
by night all together, the cavalry excepted, at the different military posts or
upon the wall. But what most oppressed them was that they had two wars at once,
and had thus reached a pitch of frenzy which no one would have believed possible
if he had heard of it before it had come to pass. For could any one have imagined
that even when besieged by the Peloponnesians entrenched in Attica, they would still,
instead of withdrawing from Sicily, stay on there besieging in like manner Syracuse,
a town (taken as a town) in no way inferior to Athens, or would so thoroughly upset
the Hellenic estimate of their strength and audacity, as to give the spectacle of
a people which, at the beginning of the war, some thought might hold out one year,
some two, none more than three, if the Peloponnesians invaded their country, now
seventeen years after the first invasion, after having already suffered from all
the evils of war, going to Sicily and undertaking a new war nothing inferior to
that which they already had with the Peloponnesians? These causes, the great losses
from Decelea, and the other heavy charges that fell upon them, produced their financial
embarrassment; and it was at this time that they imposed upon their subjects, instead
of the tribute, the tax of a twentieth upon all imports and exports by sea, which
they thought would bring them in more money; their expenditure being now not the
same as at first, but having grown with the war while their revenues decayed.
Accordingly, not wishing to incur expense in their present want of money, they
sent back at once the Thracians who came too late for Demosthenes, under the conduct
of Diitrephes, who was instructed, as they were to pass through the Euripus, to
make use of them if possible in the voyage alongshore to injure the enemy. Diitrephes
first landed them at Tanagra and hastily snatched some booty; he then sailed across
the Euripus in the evening from Chalcis in Euboea and disembarking in Boeotia led
them against Mycalessus. The night he passed unobserved near the temple of Hermes,
not quite two miles from Mycalessus, and at daybreak assaulted and took the town,
which is not a large one; the inhabitants being off their guard and not expecting
that any one would ever come up so far from the sea to molest them, the wall too
being weak, and in some places having tumbled down, while in others it had not been
built to any height, and the gates also being left open through their feeling of
security. The Thracians bursting into Mycalessus sacked the houses and temples,
and butchered the inhabitants, sparing neither youth nor age, but killing all they
fell in with, one after the other, children and women, and even beasts of burden,
and whatever other living creatures they saw; the Thracian race, like the bloodiest
of the barbarians, being even more so when it has nothing to fear. Everywhere confusion
reigned and death in all its shapes; and in particular they attacked a boys’ school,
the largest that there was in the place, into which the children had just gone,
and massacred them all. In short, the disaster falling upon the whole town was unsurpassed
in magnitude, and unapproached by any in suddenness and in horror.
Meanwhile the Thebans heard of it and marched to the rescue, and overtaking the
Thracians before they had gone far, recovered the plunder and drove them in panic
to the Euripus and the sea, where the vessels which brought them were lying. The
greatest slaughter took place while they were embarking, as they did not know how
to swim, and those in the vessels on seeing what was going on on on shore moored
them out of bowshot: in the rest of the retreat the Thracians made a very respectable
defence against the Theban horse, by which they were first attacked, dashing out
and closing their ranks according to the tactics of their country, and lost only
a few men in that part of the affair. A good number who were after plunder were
actually caught in the town and put to death. Altogether the Thracians had two hundred
and fifty killed out of thirteen hundred, the Thebans and the rest who came to the
rescue about twenty, troopers and heavy infantry, with Scirphondas, one of the Boeotarchs.
The Mycalessians lost a large proportion of their population.
While Mycalessus thus experienced a calamity for its extent as lamentable as
any that happened in the war, Demosthenes, whom we left sailing to Corcyra, after
the building of the fort in Laconia, found a merchantman lying at Phea in Elis,
in which the Corinthian heavy infantry were to cross to Sicily. The ship he destroyed,
but the men escaped, and subsequently got another in which they pursued their voyage.
After this, arriving at Zacynthus and Cephallenia, he took a body of heavy infantry
on board, and sending for some of the Messenians from Naupactus, crossed over to
the opposite coast of Acarnania, to Alyzia, and to Anactorium which was held by
the Athenians. While he was in these parts he was met by Eurymedon returning from
Sicily, where he had been sent, as has been mentioned, during the winter, with the
money for the army, who told him the news, and also that he had heard, while at
sea, that the Syracusans had taken Plemmyrium. Here, also, Conon came to them, the
commander at Naupactus, with news that the twenty-five Corinthian ships stationed
opposite to him, far from giving over the war, were meditating an engagement; and
he therefore begged them to send him some ships, as his own eighteen were not a
match for the enemy’s twenty-five. Demosthenes and Eurymedon, accordingly, sent
ten of their best sailers with Conon to reinforce the squadron at Naupactus, and
meanwhile prepared for the muster of their forces; Eurymedon, who was now the colleague
of Demosthenes, and had turned back in consequence of his appointment, sailing to
Corcyra to tell them to man fifteen ships and to enlist heavy infantry; while Demosthenes
raised slingers and darters from the parts about Acarnania.
Meanwhile the envoys, already mentioned, who had gone from Syracuse to the cities
after the capture of Plemmyrium, had succeeded in their mission, and were about
to bring the army that they had collected, when Nicias got scent of it, and sent
to the Centoripae and Alicyaeans and other of the friendly Sicels, who held the
passes, not to let the enemy through, but to combine to prevent their passing, there
being no other way by which they could even attempt it, as the Agrigentines would
not give them a passage through their country. Agreeably to this request the Sicels
laid a triple ambuscade for the Siceliots upon their march, and attacking them suddenly,
while off their guard, killed about eight hundred of them and all the envoys, the
Corinthian only excepted, by whom fifteen hundred who escaped were conducted to
Syracuse.
About the same time the Camarinaeans also came to the assistance of Syracuse
with five hundred heavy infantry, three hundred darters, and as many archers, while
the Geloans sent crews for five ships, four hundred darters, and two hundred horse.
Indeed almost the whole of Sicily, except the Agrigentines, who were neutral, now
ceased merely to watch events as it had hitherto done, and actively joined Syracuse
against the Athenians.
While the Syracusans after the Sicel disaster put off any immediate attack upon
the Athenians, Demosthenes and Eurymedon, whose forces from Corcyra and the continent
were now ready, crossed the Ionian Gulf with all their armament to the Iapygian
promontory, and starting from thence touched at the Choerades Isles lying off Iapygia,
where they took on board a hundred and fifty Iapygian darters of the Messapian tribe,
and after renewing an old friendship with Artas the chief, who had furnished them
with the darters, arrived at Metapontium in Italy. Here they persuaded their allies
the Metapontines to send with them three hundred darters and two galleys, and with
this reinforcement coasted on to Thurii, where they found the party hostile to Athens
recently expelled by a revolution, and accordingly remained there to muster and
review the whole army, to see if any had been left behind, and to prevail upon the
Thurians resolutely to join them in their expedition, and in the circumstances in
which they found themselves to conclude a defensive and offensive alliance with
the Athenians.
About the same time the Peloponnesians in the twenty-five ships stationed opposite
to the squadron at Naupactus to protect the passage of the transports to Sicily
had got ready for engaging, and manning some additional vessels, so as to be numerically
little inferior to the Athenians, anchored off Erineus in Achaia in the Rhypic country.
The place off which they lay being in the form of a crescent, the land forces furnished
by the Corinthians and their allies on the spot came up and ranged themselves upon
the projecting headlands on either side, while the fleet, under the command of Polyanthes,
a Corinthian, held the intervening space and blocked up the entrance. The Athenians
under Diphilus now sailed out against them with thirty-three ships from Naupactus,
and the Corinthians, at first not moving, at length thought they saw their opportunity,
raised the signal, and advanced and engaged the Athenians. After an obstinate struggle,
the Corinthians lost three ships, and without sinking any altogether, disabled seven
of the enemy, which were struck prow to prow and had their foreships stove in by
the Corinthian vessels, whose cheeks had been strengthened for this very purpose.
After an action of this even character, in which either party could claim the victory
(although the Athenians became masters of the wrecks through the wind driving them
out to sea, the Corinthians not putting out again to meet them), the two combatants
parted. No pursuit took place, and no prisoners were made on either side; the Corinthians
and Peloponnesians who were fighting near the shore escaping with ease, and none
of the Athenian vessels having been sunk. The Athenians now sailed back to Naupactus,
and the Corinthians immediately set up a trophy as victors, because they had disabled
a greater number of the enemy’s ships. Moreover they held that they had not been
worsted, for the very same reason that their opponent held that he had not been
victorious; the Corinthians considering that they were conquerors, if not decidedly
conquered, and the Athenians thinking themselves vanquished, because not decidedly
victorious. However, when the Peloponnesians sailed off and their land forces had
dispersed, the Athenians also set up a trophy as victors in Achaia, about two miles
and a quarter from Erineus, the Corinthian station.
This was the termination of the action at Naupactus. To return to Demosthenes
and Eurymedon: the Thurians having now got ready to join in the expedition with
seven hundred heavy infantry and three hundred darters, the two generals ordered
the ships to sail along the coast to the Crotonian territory, and meanwhile held
a review of all the land forces upon the river Sybaris, and then led them through
the Thurian country. Arrived at the river Hylias, they here received a message from
the Crotonians, saying that they would not allow the army to pass through their
country; upon which the Athenians descended towards the shore, and bivouacked near
the sea and the mouth of the Hylias, where the fleet also met them, and the next
day embarked and sailed along the coast touching at all the cities except Locri,
until they came to Petra in the Rhegian territory.
Meanwhile the Syracusans hearing of their approach resolved to make a second
attempt with their fleet and their other forces on shore, which they had been collecting
for this very purpose in order to do something before their arrival. In addition
to other improvements suggested by the former sea-fight which they now adopted in
the equipment of their navy, they cut down their prows to a smaller compass to make
them more solid and made their cheeks stouter, and from these let stays into the
vessels’ sides for a length of six cubits within and without, in the same way as
the Corinthians had altered their prows before engaging the squadron at Naupactus.
The Syracusans thought that they would thus have an advantage over the Athenian
vessels, which were not constructed with equal strength, but were slight in the
bows, from their being more used to sail round and charge the enemy’s side than
to meet him prow to prow, and that the battle being in the great harbour, with a
great many ships in not much room, was also a fact in their favour. Charging prow
to prow, they would stave in the enemy’s bows, by striking with solid and stout
beaks against hollow and weak ones; and secondly, the Athenians for want of room
would be unable to use their favourite manoeuvre of breaking the line or of sailing
round, as the Syracusans would do their best not to let them do the one, and want
of room would prevent their doing the other. This charging prow to prow, which had
hitherto been thought want of skill in a helmsman, would be the Syracusans’ chief
manoeuvre, as being that which they should find most useful, since the Athenians,
if repulsed, would not be able to back water in any direction except towards the
shore, and that only for a little way, and in the little space in front of their
own camp. The rest of the harbour would be commanded by the Syracusans; and the
Athenians, if hard pressed, by crowding together in a small space and all to the
same point, would run foul of one another and fall into disorder, which was, in
fact, the thing that did the Athenians most harm in all the sea-fights, they not
having, like the Syracusans, the whole harbour to retreat over. As to their sailing
round into the open sea, this would be impossible, with the Syracusans in possession
of the way out and in, especially as Plemmyrium would be hostile to them, and the
mouth of the harbour was not large.
With these contrivances to suit their skill and ability, and now more confident
after the previous sea-fight, the Syracusans attacked by land and sea at once. The
town force Gylippus led out a little the first and brought them up to the wall of
the Athenians, where it looked towards the city, while the force from the Olympieum,
that is to say, the heavy infantry that were there with the horse and the light
troops of the Syracusans, advanced against the wall from the opposite side; the
ships of the Syracusans and allies sailing out immediately afterwards. The Athenians
at first fancied that they were to be attacked by land only, and it was not without
alarm that they saw the fleet suddenly approaching as well; and while some were
forming upon the walls and in front of them against the advancing enemy, and some
marching out in haste against the numbers of horse and darters coming from the Olympieum
and from outside, others manned the ships or rushed down to the beach to oppose
the enemy, and when the ships were manned put out with seventy-five sail against
about eighty of the Syracusans.
After spending a great part of the day in advancing and retreating and skirmishing
with each other, without either being able to gain any advantage worth speaking
of, except that the Syracusans sank one or two of the Athenian vessels, they parted,
the land force at the same time retiring from the lines. The next day the Syracusans
remained quiet, and gave no signs of what they were going to do; but Nicias, seeing
that the battle had been a drawn one, and expecting that they would attack again,
compelled the captains to refit any of the ships that had suffered, and moored merchant
vessels before the stockade which they had driven into the sea in front of their
ships, to serve instead of an enclosed harbour, at about two hundred feet from each
other, in order that any ship that was hard pressed might be able to retreat in
safety and sail out again at leisure. These preparations occupied the Athenians
all day until nightfall.
The next day the Syracusans began operations at an earlier hour, but with the
same plan of attack by land and sea. A great part of the day the rivals spent as
before, confronting and skirmishing with each other; until at last Ariston, son
of Pyrrhicus, a Corinthian, the ablest helmsman in the Syracusan service, persuaded
their naval commanders to send to the officials in the city, and tell them to move
the sale market as quickly as they could down to the sea, and oblige every one to
bring whatever eatables he had and sell them there, thus enabling the commanders
to land the crews and dine at once close to the ships, and shortly afterwards, the
selfsame day, to attack the Athenians again when they were not expecting it.
In compliance with this advice a messenger was sent and the market got ready,
upon which the Syracusans suddenly backed water and withdrew to the town, and at
once landed and took their dinner upon the spot; while the Athenians, supposing
that they had returned to the town because they felt they were beaten, disembarked
at their leisure and set about getting their dinners and about their other occupations,
under the idea that they done with fighting for that day. Suddenly the Syracusans
had manned their ships and again sailed against them; and the Athenians, in great
confusion and most of them fasting, got on board, and with great difficulty put
out to meet them. For some time both parties remained on the defensive without engaging,
until the Athenians at last resolved not to let themselves be worn out by waiting
where they were, but to attack without delay, and giving a cheer, went into action.
The Syracusans received them, and charging prow to prow as they had intended, stove
in a great part of the Athenian foreships by the strength of their beaks; the darters
on the decks also did great damage to the Athenians, but still greater damage was
done by the Syracusans who went about in small boats, ran in upon the oars of the
Athenian galleys, and sailed against their sides, and discharged from thence their
darts upon the sailors.
At last, fighting hard in this fashion, the Syracusans gained the victory, and
the Athenians turned and fled between the merchantmen to their own station. The
Syracusan ships pursued them as far as the merchantmen, where they were stopped
by the beams armed with dolphins suspended from those vessels over the passage.
Two of the Syracusan vessels went too near in the excitement of victory and were
destroyed, one of them being taken with its crew. After sinking seven of the Athenian
vessels and disabling many, and taking most of the men prisoners and killing others,
the Syracusans retired and set up trophies for both the engagements, being now confident
of having a decided superiority by sea, and by no means despairing of equal success
by land.
Chapter XXII
Nineteenth Year of the War – Arrival of Demosthenes – Defeat of the Athenians
at Epipolae – Folly and Obstinancy of Nicias.
In the meantime, while the Syracusans were preparing for a second attack upon
both elements, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the succours from Athens,
consisting of about seventy-three ships, including the foreigners; nearly five thousand
heavy infantry, Athenian and allied; a large number of darters, Hellenic and barbarian,
and slingers and archers and everything else upon a corresponding scale. The Syracusans
and their allies were for the moment not a little dismayed at the idea that there
was to be no term or ending to their dangers, seeing, in spite of the fortification
of Decelea, a new army arrive nearly equal to the former, and the power of Athens
proving so great in every quarter. On the other hand, the first Athenian armament
regained a certain confidence in the midst of its misfortunes. Demosthenes, seeing
how matters stood, felt that he could not drag on and fare as Nicias had done, who
by wintering in Catana instead of at once attacking Syracuse had allowed the terror
of his first arrival to evaporate in contempt, and had given time to Gylippus to
arrive with a force from Peloponnese, which the Syracusans would never have sent
for if he had attacked immediately; for they fancied that they were a match for
him by themselves, and would not have discovered their inferiority until they were
already invested, and even if they then sent for succours, they would no longer
have been equally able to profit by their arrival. Recollecting this, and well aware
that it was now on the first day after his arrival that he like Nicias was most
formidable to the enemy, Demosthenes determined to lose no time in drawing the utmost
profit from the consternation at the moment inspired by his army; and seeing that
the counterwall of the Syracusans, which hindered the Athenians from investing them,
was a single one, and that he who should become master of the way up to Epipolae,
and afterwards of the camp there, would find no difficulty in taking it, as no one
would even wait for his attack, made all haste to attempt the enterprise. This he
took to be the shortest way of ending the war, as he would either succeed and take
Syracuse, or would lead back the armament instead of frittering away the lives of
the Athenians engaged in the expedition and the resources of the country at large.
First therefore the Athenians went out and laid waste the lands of the Syracusans
about the Anapus and carried all before them as at first by land and by sea, the
Syracusans not offering to oppose them upon either element, unless it were with
their cavalry and darters from the Olympieum. Next Demosthenes resolved to attempt
the counterwall first by means of engines. As however the engines that he brought
up were burnt by the enemy fighting from the wall, and the rest of the forces repulsed
after attacking at many different points, he determined to delay no longer, and
having obtained the consent of Nicias and his fellow commanders, proceeded to put
in execution his plan of attacking Epipolae. As by day it seemed impossible to approach
and get up without being observed, he ordered provisions for five days, took all
the masons and carpenters, and other things, such as arrows, and everything else
that they could want for the work of fortification if successful, and, after the
first watch, set out with Eurymedon and Menander and the whole army for Epipolae,
Nicias being left behind in the lines. Having come up by the hill of Euryelus (where
the former army had ascended at first) unobserved by the enemy’s guards, they went
up to the fort which the Syracusans had there, and took it, and put to the sword
part of the garrison. The greater number, however, escaped at once and gave the
alarm to the camps, of which there were three upon Epipolae, defended by outworks,
one of the Syracusans, one of the other Siceliots, and one of the allies; and also
to the six hundred Syracusans forming the original garrison for this part of Epipolae.
These at once advanced against the assailants and, falling in with Demosthenes and
the Athenians, were routed by them after a sharp resistance, the victors immediately
pushing on, eager to achieve the objects of the attack without giving time for their
ardour to cool; meanwhile others from the very beginning were taking the counterwall
of the Syracusans, which was abandoned by its garrison, and pulling down the battlements.
The Syracusans and the allies, and Gylippus with the troops under his command, advanced
to the rescue from the outworks, but engaged in some consternation (a night attack
being a piece of audacity which they had never expected), and were at first compelled
to retreat. But while the Athenians, flushed with their victory, now advanced with
less order, wishing to make their way as quickly as possible through the whole force
of the enemy not yet engaged, without relaxing their attack or giving them time
to rally, the Boeotians made the first stand against them, attacked them, routed
them, and put them to flight.
The Athenians now fell into great disorder and perplexity, so that it was not
easy to get from one side or the other any detailed account of the affair. By day
certainly the combatants have a clearer notion, though even then by no means of
all that takes place, no one knowing much of anything that does not go on in his
own immediate neighbourhood; but in a night engagement (and this was the only one
that occurred between great armies during the war) how could any one know anything
for certain? Although there was a bright moon they saw each other only as men do
by moonlight, that is to say, they could distinguish the form of the body, but could
not tell for certain whether it was a friend or an enemy. Both had great numbers
of heavy infantry moving about in a small space. Some of the Athenians were already
defeated, while others were coming up yet unconquered for their first attack. A
large part also of the rest of their forces either had only just got up, or were
still ascending, so that they did not know which way to march. Owing to the rout
that had taken place all in front was now in confusion, and the noise made it difficult
to distinguish anything. The victorious Syracusans and allies were cheering each
other on with loud cries, by night the only possible means of communication, and
meanwhile receiving all who came against them; while the Athenians were seeking
for one another, taking all in front of them for enemies, even although they might
be some of their now flying friends; and by constantly asking for the watchword,
which was their only means of recognition, not only caused great confusion among
themselves by asking all at once, but also made it known to the enemy, whose own
they did not so readily discover, as the Syracusans were victorious and not scattered,
and thus less easily mistaken. The result was that if the Athenians fell in with
a party of the enemy that was weaker than they, it escaped them through knowing
their watchword; while if they themselves failed to answer they were put to the
sword. But what hurt them as much, or indeed more than anything else, was the singing
of the paean, from the perplexity which it caused by being nearly the same on either
side; the Argives and Corcyraeans and any other Dorian peoples in the army, struck
terror into the Athenians whenever they raised their paean, no less than did the
enemy. Thus, after being once thrown into disorder, they ended by coming into collision
with each other in many parts of the field, friends with friends, and citizens with
citizens, and not only terrified one another, but even came to blows and could only
be parted with difficulty. In the pursuit many perished by throwing themselves down
the cliffs, the way down from Epipolae being narrow; and of those who got down safely
into the plain, although many, especially those who belonged to the first armament,
escaped through their better acquaintance with the locality, some of the newcomers
lost their way and wandered over the country, and were cut off in the morning by
the Syracusan cavalry and killed.
The next day the Syracusans set up two trophies, one upon Epipolae where the
ascent had been made, and the other on the spot where the first check was given
by the Boeotians; and the Athenians took back their dead under truce. A great many
of the Athenians and allies were killed, although still more arms were taken than
could be accounted for by the number of the dead, as some of those who were obliged
to leap down from the cliffs without their shields escaped with their lives and
did not perish like the rest.
After this the Syracusans, recovering their old confidence at such an unexpected
stroke of good fortune, dispatched Sicanus with fifteen ships to Agrigentum where
there was a revolution, to induce if possible the city to join them; while Gylippus
again went by land into the rest of Sicily to bring up reinforcements, being now
in hope of taking the Athenian lines by storm, after the result of the affair on
Epipolae.
In the meantime the Athenian generals consulted upon the disaster which had happened,
and upon the general weakness of the army. They saw themselves unsuccessful in their
enterprises, and the soldiers disgusted with their stay; disease being rife among
them owing to its being the sickly season of the year, and to the marshy and unhealthy
nature of the spot in which they were encamped; and the state of their affairs generally
being thought desperate. Accordingly, Demosthenes was of opinion that they ought
not to stay any longer; but agreeably to his original idea in risking the attempt
upon Epipolae, now that this had failed, he gave his vote for going away without
further loss of time, while the sea might yet be crossed, and their late reinforcement
might give them the superiority at all events on that element. He also said that
it would be more profitable for the state to carry on the war against those who
were building fortifications in Attica, than against the Syracusans whom it was
no longer easy to subdue; besides which it was not right to squander large sums
of money to no purpose by going on with the siege.
This was the opinion of Demosthenes. Nicias, without denying the bad state of
their affairs, was unwilling to avow their weakness, or to have it reported to the
enemy that the Athenians in full council were openly voting for retreat; for in
that case they would be much less likely to effect it when they wanted without discovery.
Moreover, his own particular information still gave him reason to hope that the
affairs of the enemy would soon be in a worse state than their own, if the Athenians
persevered in the siege; as they would wear out the Syracusans by want of money,
especially with the more extensive command of the sea now given them by their present
navy. Besides this, there was a party in Syracuse who wished to betray the city
to the Athenians, and kept sending him messages and telling him not to raise the
siege. Accordingly, knowing this and really waiting because he hesitated between
the two courses and wished to see his way more clearly, in his public speech on
this occasion he refused to lead off the army, saying he was sure the Athenians
would never approve of their returning without a vote of theirs. Those who would
vote upon their conduct, instead of judging the facts as eye-witnesses like themselves
and not from what they might hear from hostile critics, would simply be guided by
the calumnies of the first clever speaker; while many, indeed most, of the soldiers
on the spot, who now so loudly proclaimed the danger of their position, when they
reached Athens would proclaim just as loudly the opposite, and would say that their
generals had been bribed to betray them and return. For himself, therefore, who
knew the Athenian temper, sooner than perish under a dishonourable charge and by
an unjust sentence at the hands of the Athenians, he would rather take his chance
and die, if die he must, a soldier’s death at the hand of the enemy. Besides, after
all, the Syracusans were in a worse case than themselves. What with paying mercenaries,
spending upon fortified posts, and now for a full year maintaining a large navy,
they were already at a loss and would soon be at a standstill: they had already
spent two thousand talents and incurred heavy debts besides, and could not lose
even ever so small a fraction of their present force through not paying it, without
ruin to their cause; depending as they did more upon mercenaries than upon soldiers
obliged to serve, like their own. He therefore said that they ought to stay and
carry on the siege, and not depart defeated in point of money, in which they were
much superior.
Nicias spoke positively because he had exact information of the financial distress
at Syracuse, and also because of the strength of the Athenian party there which
kept sending him messages not to raise the siege; besides which he had more confidence
than before in his fleet, and felt sure at least of its success. Demosthenes, however,
would not hear for a moment of continuing the siege, but said that if they could
not lead off the army without a decree from Athens, and if they were obliged to
stay on, they ought to remove to Thapsus or Catana; where their land forces would
have a wide extent of country to overrun, and could live by plundering the enemy,
and would thus do them damage; while the fleet would have the open sea to fight
in, that is to say, instead of a narrow space which was all in the enemy’s favour,
a wide sea-room where their science would be of use, and where they could retreat
or advance without being confined or circumscribed either when they put out or put
in. In any case he was altogether opposed to their staying on where they were, and
insisted on removing at once, as quickly and with as little delay as possible; and
in this judgment Eurymedon agreed. Nicias however still objecting, a certain diffidence
and hesitation came over them, with a suspicion that Nicias might have some further
information to make him so positive.
Chapter XXIII
Nineteenth Year of the War – Battles in the Great Harbour – Retreat and Annihilation
of the Athenian Army.
While the Athenians lingered on in this way without moving from where they were,
Gylippus and Sicanus now arrived at Syracuse. Sicanus had failed to gain Agrigentum,
the party friendly to the Syracusans having been driven out while he was still at
Gela; but Gylippus was accompanied not only by a large number of troops raised in
Sicily, but by the heavy infantry sent off in the spring from Peloponnese in the
merchantmen, who had arrived at Selinus from Libya. They had been carried to Libya
by a storm, and having obtained two galleys and pilots from the Cyrenians, on their
voyage alongshore had taken sides with the Euesperitae and had defeated the Libyans
who were besieging them, and from thence coasting on to Neapolis, a Carthaginian
mart, and the nearest point to Sicily, from which it is only two days’ and a night’s
voyage, there crossed over and came to Selinus. Immediately upon their arrival the
Syracusans prepared to attack the Athenians again by land and sea at once. The Athenian
generals seeing a fresh army come to the aid of the enemy, and that their own circumstances,
far from improving, were becoming daily worse, and above all distressed by the sickness
of the soldiers, now began to repent of not having removed before; and Nicias no
longer offering the same opposition, except by urging that there should be no open
voting, they gave orders as secretly as possible for all to be prepared to sail
out from the camp at a given signal. All was at last ready, and they were on the
point of sailing away, when an eclipse of the moon, which was then at the full,
took place. Most of the Athenians, deeply impressed by this occurrence, now urged
the generals to wait; and Nicias, who was somewhat over-addicted to divination and
practices of that kind, refused from that moment even to take the question of departure
into consideration, until they had waited the thrice nine days prescribed by the
soothsayers.
The besiegers were thus condemned to stay in the country; and the Syracusans,
getting wind of what had happened, became more eager than ever to press the Athenians,
who had now themselves acknowledged that they were no longer their superiors either
by sea or by land, as otherwise they would never have planned to sail away. Besides
which the Syracusans did not wish them to settle in any other part of Sicily, where
they would be more difficult to deal with, but desired to force them to fight at
sea as quickly as possible, in a position favourable to themselves. Accordingly
they manned their ships and practised for as many days as they thought sufficient.
When the moment arrived they assaulted on the first day the Athenian lines, and
upon a small force of heavy infantry and horse sallying out against them by certain
gates, cut off some of the former and routed and pursued them to the lines, where,
as the entrance was narrow, the Athenians lost seventy horses and some few of the
heavy infantry.
Drawing off their troops for this day, on the next the Syracusans went out with
a fleet of seventy-six sail, and at the same time advanced with their land forces
against the lines. The Athenians put out to meet them with eighty-six ships, came
to close quarters, and engaged. The Syracusans and their allies first defeated the
Athenian centre, and then caught Eurymedon, the commander of the right wing, who
was sailing out from the line more towards the land in order to surround the enemy,
in the hollow and recess of the harbour, and killed him and destroyed the ships
accompanying him; after which they now chased the whole Athenian fleet before them
and drove them ashore.
Gylippus seeing the enemy’s fleet defeated and carried ashore beyond their stockades
and camp, ran down to the breakwater with some of his troops, in order to cut off
the men as they landed and make it easier for the Syracusans to tow off the vessels
by the shore being friendly ground. The Tyrrhenians who guarded this point for the
Athenians, seeing them come on in disorder, advanced out against them and attacked
and routed their van, hurling it into the marsh of Lysimeleia. Afterwards the Syracusan
and allied troops arrived in greater numbers, and the Athenians fearing for their
ships came up also to the rescue and engaged them, and defeated and pursued them
to some distance and killed a few of their heavy infantry. They succeeded in rescuing
most of their ships and brought them down by their camp; eighteen however were taken
by the Syracusans and their allies, and all the men killed. The rest the enemy tried
to burn by means of an old merchantman which they filled with faggots and pine-wood,
set on fire, and let drift down the wind which blew full on the Athenians. The Athenians,
however, alarmed for their ships, contrived means for stopping it and putting it
out, and checking the flames and the nearer approach of the merchantman, thus escaped
the danger.
After this the Syracusans set up a trophy for the sea-fight and for the heavy
infantry whom they had cut off up at the lines, where they took the horses; and
the Athenians for the rout of the foot driven by the Tyrrhenians into the marsh,
and for their own victory with the rest of the army.
The Syracusans had now gained a decisive victory at sea, where until now they
had feared the reinforcement brought by Demosthenes, and deep, in consequence, was
the despondency of the Athenians, and great their disappointment, and greater still
their regret for having come on the expedition. These were the only cities that
they had yet encountered, similar to their own in character, under democracies like
themselves, which had ships and horses, and were of considerable magnitude. They
had been unable to divide and bring them over by holding out the prospect of changes
in their governments, or to crush them by their great superiority in force, but
had failed in most of their attempts, and being already in perplexity, had now been
defeated at sea, where defeat could never have been expected, and were thus plunged
deeper in embarrassment than ever.
Meanwhile the Syracusans immediately began to sail freely along the harbour,
and determined to close up its mouth, so that the Athenians might not be able to
steal out in future, even if they wished. Indeed, the Syracusans no longer thought
only of saving themselves, but also how to hinder the escape of the enemy; thinking,
and thinking rightly, that they were now much the stronger, and that to conquer
the Athenians and their allies by land and sea would win them great glory in Hellas.
The rest of the Hellenes would thus immediately be either freed or released from
apprehension, as the remaining forces of Athens would be henceforth unable to sustain
the war that would be waged against her; while they, the Syracusans, would be regarded
as the authors of this deliverance, and would be held in high admiration, not only
with all men now living but also with posterity. Nor were these the only considerations
that gave dignity to the struggle. They would thus conquer not only the Athenians
but also their numerous allies, and conquer not alone, but with their companions
in arms, commanding side by side with the Corinthians and Lacedaemonians, having
offered their city to stand in the van of danger, and having been in a great measure
the pioneers of naval success.
Indeed, there were never so many peoples assembled before a single city, if we
except the grand total gathered together in this war under Athens and Lacedaemon.
The following were the states on either side who came to Syracuse to fight for or
against Sicily, to help to conquer or defend the island. Right or community of blood
was not the bond of union between them, so much as interest or compulsion as the
case might be. The Athenians themselves being Ionians went against the Dorians of
Syracuse of their own free will; and the peoples still speaking Attic and using
the Athenian laws, the Lemnians, Imbrians, and Aeginetans, that is to say the then
occupants of Aegina, being their colonists, went with them. To these must be also
added the Hestiaeans dwelling at Hestiaea in Euboea. Of the rest some joined in
the expedition as subjects of the Athenians, others as independent allies, others
as mercenaries. To the number of the subjects paying tribute belonged the Eretrians,
Chalcidians, Styrians, and Carystians from Euboea; the Ceans, Andrians, and Tenians
from the islands; and the Milesians, Samians, and Chians from Ionia. The Chians,
however, joined as independent allies, paying no tribute, but furnishing ships.
Most of these were Ionians and descended from the Athenians, except the Carystians,
who are Dryopes, and although subjects and obliged to serve, were still Ionians
fighting against Dorians. Besides these there were men of Aeolic race, the Methymnians,
subjects who provided ships, not tribute, and the Tenedians and Aenians who paid
tribute. These Aeolians fought against their Aeolian founders, the Boeotians in
the Syracusan army, because they were obliged, while the Plataeans, the only native
Boeotians opposed to Boeotians, did so upon a just quarrel. Of the Rhodians and
Cytherians, both Dorians, the latter, Lacedaemonian colonists, fought in the Athenian
ranks against their Lacedaemonian countrymen with Gylippus; while the Rhodians,
Argives by race, were compelled to bear arms against the Dorian Syracusans and their
own colonists, the Geloans, serving with the Syracusans. Of the islanders round
Peloponnese, the Cephallenians and Zacynthians accompanied the Athenians as independent
allies, although their insular position really left them little choice in the matter,
owing to the maritime supremacy of Athens, while the Corcyraeans, who were not only
Dorians but Corinthians, were openly serving against Corinthians and Syracusans,
although colonists of the former and of the same race as the latter, under colour
of compulsion, but really out of free will through hatred of Corinth. The Messenians,
as they are now called in Naupactus and from Pylos, then held by the Athenians,
were taken with them to the war. There were also a few Megarian exiles, whose fate
it was to be now fighting against the Megarian Selinuntines.
The engagement of the rest was more of a voluntary nature. It was less the league
than hatred of the Lacedaemonians and the immediate private advantage of each individual
that persuaded the Dorian Argives to join the Ionian Athenians in a war against
Dorians; while the Mantineans and other Arcadian mercenaries, accustomed to go against
the enemy pointed out to them at the moment, were led by interest to regard the
Arcadians serving with the Corinthians as just as much their enemies as any others.
The Cretans and Aetolians also served for hire, and the Cretans who had joined the
Rhodians in founding Gela, thus came to consent to fight for pay against, instead
of for, their colonists. There were also some Acarnanians paid to serve, although
they came chiefly for love of Demosthenes and out of goodwill to the Athenians whose
allies they were. These all lived on the Hellenic side of the Ionian Gulf. Of the
Italiots, there were the Thurians and Metapontines, dragged into the quarrel by
the stern necessities of a time of revolution; of the Siceliots, the Naxians and
the Catanians; and of the barbarians, the Egestaeans, who called in the Athenians,
most of the Sicels, and outside Sicily some Tyrrhenian enemies of Syracuse and Iapygian
mercenaries.
Such were the peoples serving with the Athenians. Against these the Syracusans
had the Camarinaeans their neighbours, the Geloans who live next to them; then passing
over the neutral Agrigentines, the Selinuntines settled on the farther side of the
island. These inhabit the part of Sicily looking towards Libya; the Himeraeans came
from the side towards the Tyrrhenian Sea, being the only Hellenic inhabitants in
that quarter, and the only people that came from thence to the aid of the Syracusans.
Of the Hellenes in Sicily the above peoples joined in the war, all Dorians and independent,
and of the barbarians the Sicels only, that is to say, such as did not go over to
the Athenians. Of the Hellenes outside Sicily there were the Lacedaemonians, who
provided a Spartan to take the command, and a force of Neodamodes or Freedmen, and
of Helots; the Corinthians, who alone joined with naval and land forces, with their
Leucadian and Ambraciot kinsmen; some mercenaries sent by Corinth from Arcadia;
some Sicyonians forced to serve, and from outside Peloponnese the Boeotians. In
comparison, however, with these foreign auxiliaries, the great Siceliot cities furnished
more in every department- numbers of heavy infantry, ships, and horses, and an immense
multitude besides having been brought together; while in comparison, again, one
may say, with all the rest put together, more was provided by the Syracusans themselves,
both from the greatness of the city and from the fact that they were in the greatest
danger.
Such were the auxiliaries brought together on either side, all of which had by
this time joined, neither party experiencing any subsequent accession. It was no
wonder, therefore, if the Syracusans and their allies thought that it would win
them great glory if they could follow up their recent victory in the sea-fight by
the capture of the whole Athenian armada, without letting it escape either by sea
or by land. They began at once to close up the Great Harbour by means of boats,
merchant vessels, and galleys moored broadside across its mouth, which is nearly
a mile wide, and made all their other arrangements for the event of the Athenians
again venturing to fight at sea. There was, in fact, nothing little either in their
plans or their ideas.
The Athenians, seeing them closing up the harbour and informed of their further
designs, called a council of war. The generals and colonels assembled and discussed
the difficulties of the situation; the point which pressed most being that they
no longer had provisions for immediate use (having sent on to Catana to tell them
not to send any, in the belief that they were going away), and that they would not
have any in future unless they could command the sea. They therefore determined
to evacuate their upper lines, to enclose with a cross wall and garrison a small
space close to the ships, only just sufficient to hold their stores and sick, and
manning all the ships, seaworthy or not, with every man that could be spared from
the rest of their land forces, to fight it out at sea, and, if victorious, to go
to Catana, if not, to burn their vessels, form in close order, and retreat by land
for the nearest friendly place they could reach, Hellenic or barbarian. This was
no sooner settled than carried into effect; they descended gradually from the upper
lines and manned all their vessels, compelling all to go on board who were of age
to be in any way of use. They thus succeeded in manning about one hundred and ten
ships in all, on board of which they embarked a number of archers and darters taken
from the Acarnanians and from the other foreigners, making all other provisions
allowed by the nature of their plan and by the necessities which imposed it. All
was now nearly ready, and Nicias, seeing the soldiery disheartened by their unprecedented
and decided defeat at sea, and by reason of the scarcity of provisions eager to
fight it out as soon as possible, called them all together, and first addressed
them, speaking as follows:
“Soldiers of the Athenians and of the allies, we have all an equal interest in
the coming struggle, in which life and country are at stake for us quite as much
as they can be for the enemy; since if our fleet wins the day, each can see his
native city again, wherever that city may be. You must not lose heart, or be like
men without any experience, who fail in a first essay and ever afterwards fearfully
forebode a future as disastrous. But let the Athenians among you who have already
had experience of many wars, and the allies who have joined us in so many expeditions,
remember the surprises of war, and with the hope that fortune will not be always
against us, prepare to fight again in a manner worthy of the number which you see
yourselves to be.
“Now, whatever we thought would be of service against the crush of vessels in
such a narrow harbour, and against the force upon the decks of the enemy, from which
we suffered before, has all been considered with the helmsmen, and, as far as our
means allowed, provided. A number of archers and darters will go on board, and a
multitude that we should not have employed in an action in the open sea, where our
science would be crippled by the weight of the vessels; but in the present land-fight
that we are forced to make from shipboard all this will be useful. We have also
discovered the changes in construction that we must make to meet theirs; and against
the thickness of their cheeks, which did us the greatest mischief, we have provided
grappling-irons, which will prevent an assailant backing water after charging, if
the soldiers on deck here do their duty; since we are absolutely compelled to fight
a land battle from the fleet, and it seems to be our interest neither to back water
ourselves, nor to let the enemy do so, especially as the shore, except so much of
it as may be held by our troops, is hostile ground.
“You must remember this and fight on as long as you can, and must not let yourselves
be driven ashore, but once alongside must make up your minds not to part company
until you have swept the heavy infantry from the enemy’s deck. I say this more for
the heavy infantry than for the seamen, as it is more the business of the men on
deck; and our land forces are even now on the whole the strongest. The sailors I
advise, and at the same time implore, not to be too much daunted by their misfortunes,
now that we have our decks better armed and greater number of vessels. Bear in mind
how well worth preserving is the pleasure felt by those of you who through your
knowledge of our language and imitation of our manners were always considered Athenians,
even though not so in reality, and as such were honoured throughout Hellas, and
had your full share of the advantages of our empire, and more than your share in
the respect of our subjects and in protection from ill treatment. You, therefore,
with whom alone we freely share our empire, we now justly require not to betray
that empire in its extremity, and in scorn of Corinthians, whom you have often conquered,
and of Siceliots, none of whom so much as presumed to stand against us when our
navy was in its prime, we ask you to repel them, and to show that even in sickness
and disaster your skill is more than a match for the fortune and vigour of any other.
“For the Athenians among you I add once more this reflection: You left behind
you no more such ships in your docks as these, no more heavy infantry in their flower;
if you do aught but conquer, our enemies here will immediately sail thither, and
those that are left of us at Athens will become unable to repel their home assailants,
reinforced by these new allies. Here you will fall at once into the hands of the
Syracusans- I need not remind you of the intentions with which you attacked them-
and your countrymen at home will fall into those of the Lacedaemonians. Since the
fate of both thus hangs upon this single battle, now, if ever, stand firm, and remember,
each and all, that you who are now going on board are the army and navy of the Athenians,
and all that is left of the state and the great name of Athens, in whose defence
if any man has any advantage in skill or courage, now is the time for him to show
it, and thus serve himself and save all.”
After this address Nicias at once gave orders to man the ships. Meanwhile Gylippus
and the Syracusans could perceive by the preparations which they saw going on that
the Athenians meant to fight at sea. They had also notice of the grappling-irons,
against which they specially provided by stretching hides over the prows and much
of the upper part of their vessels, in order that the irons when thrown might slip
off without taking hold. All being now ready, the generals and Gylippus addressed
them in the following terms:
“Syracusans and allies, the glorious character of our past achievements and the
no less glorious results at issue in the coming battle are, we think, understood
by most of you, or you would never have thrown yourselves with such ardour into
the struggle; and if there be any one not as fully aware of the facts as he ought
to be, we will declare them to him. The Athenians came to this country first to
effect the conquest of Sicily, and after that, if successful, of Peloponnese and
the rest of Hellas, possessing already the greatest empire yet known, of present
or former times, among the Hellenes. Here for the first time they found in you men
who faced their navy which made them masters everywhere; you have already defeated
them in the previous sea-fights, and will in all likelihood defeat them again now.
When men are once checked in what they consider their special excellence, their
whole opinion of themselves suffers more than if they had not at first believed
in their superiority, the unexpected shock to their pride causing them to give way
more than their real strength warrants; and this is probably now the case with the
Athenians.
“With us it is different. The original estimate of ourselves which gave us courage
in the days of our unskilfulness has been strengthened, while the conviction superadded
to it that we must be the best seamen of the time, if we have conquered the best,
has given a double measure of hope to every man among us; and, for the most part,
where there is the greatest hope, there is also the greatest ardour for action.
The means to combat us which they have tried to find in copying our armament are
familiar to our warfare, and will be met by proper provisions; while they will never
be able to have a number of heavy infantry on their decks, contrary to their custom,
and a number of darters (born landsmen, one may say, Acarnanians and others, embarked
afloat, who will not know how to discharge their weapons when they have to keep
still), without hampering their vessels and falling all into confusion among themselves
through fighting not according to their own tactics. For they will gain nothing
by the number of their ships- I say this to those of you who may be alarmed by having
to fight against odds- as a quantity of ships in a confined space will only be slower
in executing the movements required, and most exposed to injury from our means of
offence. Indeed, if you would know the plain truth, as we are credibly informed,
the excess of their sufferings and the necessities of their present distress have
made them desperate; they have no confidence in their force, but wish to try their
fortune in the only way they can, and either to force their passage and sail out,
or after this to retreat by land, it being impossible for them to be worse off than
they are.
“The fortune of our greatest enemies having thus betrayed itself, and their disorder
being what I have described, let us engage in anger, convinced that, as between
adversaries, nothing is more legitimate than to claim to sate the whole wrath of
one’s soul in punishing the aggressor, and nothing more sweet, as the proverb has
it, than the vengeance upon an enemy, which it will now be ours to take. That enemies
they are and mortal enemies you all know, since they came here to enslave our country,
and if successful had in reserve for our men all that is most dreadful, and for
our children and wives all that is most dishonourable, and for the whole city the
name which conveys the greatest reproach. None should therefore relent or think
it gain if they go away without further danger to us. This they will do just the
same, even if they get the victory; while if we succeed, as we may expect, in chastising
them, and in handing down to all Sicily her ancient freedom strengthened and confirmed,
we shall have achieved no mean triumph. And the rarest dangers are those in which
failure brings little loss and success the greatest advantage.”
After the above address to the soldiers on their side, the Syracusan generals
and Gylippus now perceived that the Athenians were manning their ships, and immediately
proceeded to man their own also. Meanwhile Nicias, appalled by the position of affairs,
realizing the greatness and the nearness of the danger now that they were on the
point of putting out from shore, and thinking, as men are apt to think in great
crises, that when all has been done they have still something left to do, and when
all has been said that they have not yet said enough, again called on the captains
one by one, addressing each by his father’s name and by his own, and by that of
his tribe, and adjured them not to belie their own personal renown, or to obscure
the hereditary virtues for which their ancestors were illustrious: he reminded them
of their country, the freest of the free, and of the unfettered discretion allowed
in it to all to live as they pleased; and added other arguments such as men would
use at such a crisis, and which, with little alteration, are made to serve on all
occasions alike- appeals to wives, children, and national gods- without caring whether
they are thought commonplace, but loudly invoking them in the belief that they will
be of use in the consternation of the moment. Having thus admonished them, not,
he felt, as he would, but as he could, Nicias withdrew and led the troops to the
sea, and ranged them in as long a line as he was able, in order to aid as far as
possible in sustaining the courage of the men afloat; while Demosthenes, Menander,
and Euthydemus, who took the command on board, put out from their own camp and sailed
straight to the barrier across the mouth of the harbour and to the passage left
open, to try to force their way out.
The Syracusans and their allies had already put out with about the same number
of ships as before, a part of which kept guard at the outlet, and the remainder
all round the rest of the harbour, in order to attack the Athenians on all sides
at once; while the land forces held themselves in readiness at the points at which
the vessels might put into the shore. The Syracusan fleet was commanded by Sicanus
and Agatharchus, who had each a wing of the whole force, with Pythen and the Corinthians
in the centre. When the rest of the Athenians came up to the barrier, with the first
shock of their charge they overpowered the ships stationed there, and tried to undo
the fastenings; after this, as the Syracusans and allies bore down upon them from
all quarters, the action spread from the barrier over the whole harbour, and was
more obstinately disputed than any of the preceding ones. On either side the rowers
showed great zeal in bringing up their vessels at the boatswains’ orders, and the
helmsmen great skill in manoeuvring, and great emulation one with another; while
the ships once alongside, the soldiers on board did their best not to let the service
on deck be outdone by the others; in short, every man strove to prove himself the
first in his particular department. And as many ships were engaged in a small compass
(for these were the largest fleets fighting in the narrowest space ever known, being
together little short of two hundred), the regular attacks with the beak were few,
there being no opportunity of backing water or of breaking the line; while the collisions
caused by one ship chancing to run foul of another, either in flying from or attacking
a third, were more frequent. So long as a vessel was coming up to the charge the
men on the decks rained darts and arrows and stones upon her; but once alongside,
the heavy infantry tried to board each other’s vessel, fighting hand to hand. In
many quarters it happened, by reason of the narrow room, that a vessel was charging
an enemy on one side and being charged herself on another, and that two or sometimes
more ships had perforce got entangled round one, obliging the helmsmen to attend
to defence here, offence there, not to one thing at once, but to many on all sides;
while the huge din caused by the number of ships crashing together not only spread
terror, but made the orders of the boatswains inaudible. The boatswains on either
side in the discharge of their duty and in the heat of the conflict shouted incessantly
orders and appeals to their men; the Athenians they urged to force the passage out,
and now if ever to show their mettle and lay hold of a safe return to their country;
to the Syracusans and their allies they cried that it would be glorious to prevent
the escape of the enemy, and, conquering, to exalt the countries that were theirs.
The generals, moreover, on either side, if they saw any in any part of the battle
backing ashore without being forced to do so, called out to the captain by name
and asked him- the Athenians, whether they were retreating because they thought
the thrice hostile shore more their own than that sea which had cost them so much
labour to win; the Syracusans, whether they were flying from the flying Athenians,
whom they well knew to be eager to escape in whatever way they could.
Meanwhile the two armies on shore, while victory hung in the balance, were a
prey to the most agonizing and conflicting emotions; the natives thirsting for more
glory than they had already won, while the invaders feared to find themselves in
even worse plight than before. The all of the Athenians being set upon their fleet,
their fear for the event was like nothing they had ever felt; while their view of
the struggle was necessarily as chequered as the battle itself. Close to the scene
of action and not all looking at the same point at once, some saw their friends
victorious and took courage and fell to calling upon heaven not to deprive them
of salvation, while others who had their eyes turned upon the losers, wailed and
cried aloud, and, although spectators, were more overcome than the actual combatants.
Others, again, were gazing at some spot where the battle was evenly disputed; as
the strife was protracted without decision, their swaying bodies reflected the agitation
of their minds, and they suffered the worst agony of all, ever just within reach
of safety or just on the point of destruction. In short, in that one Athenian army
as long as the sea-fight remained doubtful there was every sound to be heard at
once, shrieks, cheers, “We win,” “We lose,” and all the other manifold exclamations
that a great host would necessarily utter in great peril; and with the men in the
fleet it was nearly the same; until at last the Syracusans and their allies, after
the battle had lasted a long while, put the Athenians to flight, and with much shouting
and cheering chased them in open rout to the shore. The naval force, one one way,
one another, as many as were not taken afloat now ran ashore and rushed from on
board their ships to their camp; while the army, no more divided, but carried away
by one impulse, all with shrieks and groans deplored the event, and ran down, some
to help the ships, others to guard what was left of their wall, while the remaining
and most numerous part already began to consider how they should save themselves.
Indeed, the panic of the present moment had never been surpassed. They now suffered
very nearly what they had inflicted at Pylos; as then the Lacedaemonians with the
loss of their fleet lost also the men who had crossed over to the island, so now
the Athenians had no hope of escaping by land, without the help of some extraordinary
accident.
The sea-fight having been a severe one, and many ships and lives having been
lost on both sides, the victorious Syracusans and their allies now picked up their
wrecks and dead, and sailed off to the city and set up a trophy. The Athenians,
overwhelmed by their misfortune, never even thought. of asking leave to take up
their dead or wrecks, but wished to retreat that very night. Demosthenes, however,
went to Nicias and gave it as his opinion that they should man the ships they had
left and make another effort to force their passage out next morning; saying that
they had still left more ships fit for service than the enemy, the Athenians having
about sixty remaining as against less than fifty of their opponents. Nicias was
quite of his mind; but when they wished to man the vessels, the sailors refused
to go on board, being so utterly overcome by their defeat as no longer to believe
in the possibility of success.
Accordingly they all now made up their minds to retreat by land. Meanwhile the
Syracusan Hermocrates- suspecting their intention, and impressed by the danger of
allowing a force of that magnitude to retire by land, establish itself in some other
part of Sicily, and from thence renew the war- went and stated his views to the
authorities, and pointed out to them that they ought not to let the enemy get away
by night, but that all the Syracusans and their allies should at once march out
and block up the roads and seize and guard the passes. The authorities were entirely
of his opinion, and thought that it ought to be done, but on the other hand felt
sure that the people, who had given themselves over to rejoicing, and were taking
their ease after a great battle at sea, would not be easily brought to obey; besides,
they were celebrating a festival, having on that day a sacrifice to Heracles, and
most of them in their rapture at the victory had fallen to drinking at the festival,
and would probably consent to anything sooner than to take up their arms and march
out at that moment. For these reasons the thing appeared impracticable to the magistrates;
and Hermocrates, finding himself unable to do anything further with them, had now
recourse to the following stratagem of his own. What he feared was that the Athenians
might quietly get the start of them by passing the most difficult places during
the night; and he therefore sent, as soon as it was dusk, some friends of his own
to the camp with some horsemen who rode up within earshot and called out to some
of the men, as though they were well-wishers of the Athenians, and told them to
tell Nicias (who had in fact some correspondents who informed him of what went on
inside the town) not to lead off the army by night as the Syracusans were guarding
the roads, but to make his preparations at his leisure and to retreat by day. After
saying this they departed; and their hearers informed the Athenian generals, who
put off going for that night on the strength of this message, not doubting its sincerity.
Since after all they had not set out at once, they now determined to stay also
the following day to give time to the soldiers to pack up as well as they could
the most useful articles, and, leaving everything else behind, to start only with
what was strictly necessary for their personal subsistence. Meanwhile the Syracusans
and Gylippus marched out and blocked up the roads through the country by which the
Athenians were likely to pass, and kept guard at the fords of the streams and rivers,
posting themselves so as to receive them and stop the army where they thought best;
while their fleet sailed up to the beach and towed off the ships of the Athenians.
Some few were burned by the Athenians themselves as they had intended; the rest
the Syracusans lashed on to their own at their leisure as they had been thrown up
on shore, without any one trying to stop them, and conveyed to the town.
After this, Nicias and Demosthenes now thinking that enough had been done in
the way of preparation, the removal of the army took place upon the second day after
the sea-fight. It was a lamentable scene, not merely from the single circumstance
that they were retreating after having lost all their ships, their great hopes gone,
and themselves and the state in peril; but also in leaving the camp there were things
most grievous for every eye and heart to contemplate. The dead lay unburied, and
each man as he recognized a friend among them shuddered with grief and horror; while
the living whom they were leaving behind, wounded or sick, were to the living far
more shocking than the dead, and more to be pitied than those who had perished.
These fell to entreating and bewailing until their friends knew not what to do,
begging them to take them and loudly calling to each individual comrade or relative
whom they could see, hanging upon the necks of their tent-fellows in the act of
departure, and following as far as they could, and, when their bodily strength failed
them, calling again and again upon heaven and shrieking aloud as they were left
behind. So that the whole army being filled with tears and distracted after this
fashion found it not easy to go, even from an enemy’s land, where they had already
suffered evils too great for tears and in the unknown future before them feared
to suffer more. Dejection and self-condemnation were also rife among them. Indeed
they could only be compared to a starved-out town, and that no small one, escaping;
the whole multitude upon the march being not less than forty thousand men. All carried
anything they could which might be of use, and the heavy infantry and troopers,
contrary to their wont, while under arms carried their own victuals, in some cases
for want of servants, in others through not trusting them; as they had long been
deserting and now did so in greater numbers than ever. Yet even thus they did not
carry enough, as there was no longer food in the camp. Moreover their disgrace generally,
and the universality of their sufferings, however to a certain extent alleviated
by being borne in company, were still felt at the moment a heavy burden, especially
when they contrasted the splendour and glory of their setting out with the humiliation
in which it had ended. For this was by far the greatest reverse that ever befell
an Hellenic army. They had come to enslave others, and were departing in fear of
being enslaved themselves: they had sailed out with prayer and paeans, and now started
to go back with omens directly contrary; travelling by land instead of by sea, and
trusting not in their fleet but in their heavy infantry. Nevertheless the greatness
of the danger still impending made all this appear tolerable.
Nicias seeing the army dejected and greatly altered, passed along the ranks and
encouraged and comforted them as far as was possible under the circumstances, raising
his voice still higher and higher as he went from one company to another in his
earnestness, and in his anxiety that the benefit of his words might reach as many
as possible:
“Athenians and allies, even in our present position we must still hope on, since
men have ere now been saved from worse straits than this; and you must not condemn
yourselves too severely either because of your disasters or because of your present
unmerited sufferings. I myself who am not superior to any of you in strength- indeed
you see how I am in my sickness- and who in the gifts of fortune am, I think, whether
in private life or otherwise, the equal of any, am now exposed to the same danger
as the meanest among you; and yet my life has been one of much devotion toward the
gods, and of much justice and without offence toward men. I have, therefore, still
a strong hope for the future, and our misfortunes do not terrify me as much as they
might. Indeed we may hope that they will be lightened: our enemies have had good
fortune enough; and if any of the gods was offended at our expedition, we have been
already amply punished. Others before us have attacked their neighbours and have
done what men will do without suffering more than they could bear; and we may now
justly expect to find the gods more kind, for we have become fitter objects for
their pity than their jealousy. And then look at yourselves, mark the numbers and
efficiency of the heavy infantry marching in your ranks, and do not give way too
much to despondency, but reflect that you are yourselves at once a city wherever
you sit down, and that there is no other in Sicily that could easily resist your
attack, or expel you when once established. The safety and order of the march is
for yourselves to look to; the one thought of each man being that the spot on which
he may be forced to fight must be conquered and held as his country and stronghold.
Meanwhile we shall hasten on our way night and day alike, as our provisions are
scanty; and if we can reach some friendly place of the Sicels, whom fear of the
Syracusans still keeps true to us, you may forthwith consider yourselves safe. A
message has been sent on to them with directions to meet us with supplies of food.
To sum up, be convinced, soldiers, that you must be brave, as there is no place
near for your cowardice to take refuge in, and that if you now escape from the enemy,
you may all see again what your hearts desire, while those of you who are Athenians
will raise up again the great power of the state, fallen though it be. Men make
the city and not walls or ships without men in them.”
As he made this address, Nicias went along the ranks, and brought back to their
place any of the troops that he saw straggling out of the line; while Demosthenes
did as much for his part of the army, addressing them in words very similar. The
army marched in a hollow square, the division under Nicias leading, and that of
Demosthenes following, the heavy infantry being outside and the baggage-carriers
and the bulk of the army in the middle. When they arrived at the ford of the river
Anapus there they found drawn up a body of the Syracusans and allies, and routing
these, made good their passage and pushed on, harassed by the charges of the Syracusan
horse and by the missiles of their light troops. On that day they advanced about
four miles and a half, halting for the night upon a certain hill. On the next they
started early and got on about two miles further, and descended into a place in
the plain and there encamped, in order to procure some eatables from the houses,
as the place was inhabited, and to carry on with them water from thence, as for
many furlongs in front, in the direction in which they were going, it was not plentiful.
The Syracusans meanwhile went on and fortified the pass in front, where there was
a steep hill with a rocky ravine on each side of it, called the Acraean cliff. The
next day the Athenians advancing found themselves impeded by the missiles and charges
of the horse and darters, both very numerous, of the Syracusans and allies; and
after fighting for a long while, at length retired to the same camp, where they
had no longer provisions as before, it being impossible to leave their position
by reason of the cavalry.
Early next morning they started afresh and forced their way to the hill, which
had been fortified, where they found before them the enemy’s infantry drawn up many
shields deep to defend the fortification, the pass being narrow. The Athenians assaulted
the work, but were greeted by a storm of missiles from the hill, which told with
the greater effect through its being a steep one, and unable to force the passage,
retreated again and rested. Meanwhile occurred some claps of thunder and rain, as
often happens towards autumn, which still further disheartened the Athenians, who
thought all these things to be omens of their approaching ruin. While they were
resting, Gylippus and the Syracusans sent a part of their army to throw up works
in their rear on the way by which they had advanced; however, the Athenians immediately
sent some of their men and prevented them; after which they retreated more towards
the plain and halted for the night. When they advanced the next day the Syracusans
surrounded and attacked them on every side, and disabled many of them, falling back
if the Athenians advanced and coming on if they retired, and in particular assaulting
their rear, in the hope of routing them in detail, and thus striking a panic into
the whole army. For a long while the Athenians persevered in this fashion, but after
advancing for four or five furlongs halted to rest in the plain, the Syracusans
also withdrawing to their own camp.
During the night Nicias and Demosthenes, seeing the wretched condition of their
troops, now in want of every kind of necessary, and numbers of them disabled in
the numerous attacks of the enemy, determined to light as many fires as possible,
and to lead off the army, no longer by the same route as they had intended, but
towards the sea in the opposite direction to that guarded by the Syracusans. The
whole of this route was leading the army not to Catana but to the other side of
Sicily, towards Camarina, Gela, and the other Hellenic and barbarian towns in that
quarter. They accordingly lit a number of fires and set out by night. Now all armies,
and the greatest most of all, are liable to fears and alarms, especially when they
are marching by night through an enemy’s country and with the enemy near; and the
Athenians falling into one of these panics, the leading division, that of Nicias,
kept together and got on a good way in front, while that of Demosthenes, comprising
rather more than half the army, got separated and marched on in some disorder. By
morning, however, they reached the sea, and getting into the Helorine road, pushed
on in order to reach the river Cacyparis, and to follow the stream up through the
interior, where they hoped to be met by the Sicels whom they had sent for. Arrived
at the river, they found there also a Syracusan party engaged in barring the passage
of the ford with a wall and a palisade, and forcing this guard, crossed the river
and went on to another called the Erineus, according to the advice of their guides.
Meanwhile, when day came and the Syracusans and allies found that the Athenians
were gone, most of them accused Gylippus of having let them escape on purpose, and
hastily pursuing by the road which they had no difficulty in finding that they had
taken, overtook them about dinner-time. They first came up with the troops under
Demosthenes, who were behind and marching somewhat slowly and in disorder, owing
to the night panic above referred to, and at once attacked and engaged them, the
Syracusan horse surrounding them with more ease now that they were separated from
the rest and hemming them in on one spot. The division of Nicias was five or six
miles on in front, as he led them more rapidly, thinking that under the circumstances
their safety lay not in staying and fighting, unless obliged, but in retreating
as fast as possible, and only fighting when forced to do so. On the other hand,
Demosthenes was, generally speaking, harassed more incessantly, as his post in the
rear left him the first exposed to the attacks of the enemy; and now, finding that
the Syracusans were in pursuit, he omitted to push on, in order to form his men
for battle, and so lingered until he was surrounded by his pursuers and himself
and the Athenians with him placed in the most distressing position, being huddled
into an enclosure with a wall all round it, a road on this side and on that, and
olive-trees in great number, where missiles were showered in upon them from every
quarter. This mode of attack the Syracusans had with good reason adopted in preference
to fighting at close quarters, as to risk a struggle with desperate men was now
more for the advantage of the Athenians than for their own; besides, their success
had now become so certain that they began to spare themselves a little in order
not to be cut off in the moment of victory, thinking too that, as it was, they would
be able in this way to subdue and capture the enemy.
In fact, after plying the Athenians and allies all day long from every side with
missiles, they at length saw that they were worn out with their wounds and other
sufferings; and Gylippus and the Syracusans and their allies made a proclamation,
offering their liberty to any of the islanders who chose to come over to them; and
some few cities went over. Afterwards a capitulation was agreed upon for all the
rest with Demosthenes, to lay down their arms on condition that no one was to be
put to death either by violence or imprisonment or want of the necessaries of life.
Upon this they surrendered to the number of six thousand in all, laying down all
the money in their possession, which filled the hollows of four shields, and were
immediately conveyed by the Syracusans to the town.
Meanwhile Nicias with his division arrived that day at the river Erineus, crossed
over, and posted his army upon some high ground upon the other side. The next day
the Syracusans overtook him and told him that the troops under Demosthenes had surrendered,
and invited him to follow their example. Incredulous of the fact, Nicias asked for
a truce to send a horseman to see, and upon the return of the messenger with the
tidings that they had surrendered, sent a herald to Gylippus and the Syracusans,
saying that he was ready to agree with them on behalf of the Athenians to repay
whatever money the Syracusans had spent upon the war if they would let his army
go; and offered until the money was paid to give Athenians as hostages, one for
every talent. The Syracusans and Gylippus rejected this proposition, and attacked
this division as they had the other, standing all round and plying them with missiles
until the evening. Food and necessaries were as miserably wanting to the troops
of Nicias as they had been to their comrades; nevertheless they watched for the
quiet of the night to resume their march. But as they were taking up their arms
the Syracusans perceived it and raised their paean, upon which the Athenians, finding
that they were discovered, laid them down again, except about three hundred men
who forced their way through the guards and went on during the night as they were
able.
As soon as it was day Nicias put his army in motion, pressed, as before, by the
Syracusans and their allies, pelted from every side by their missiles, and struck
down by their javelins. The Athenians pushed on for the Assinarus, impelled by the
attacks made upon them from every side by a numerous cavalry and the swarm of other
arms, fancying that they should breathe more freely if once across the river, and
driven on also by their exhaustion and craving for water. Once there they rushed
in, and all order was at an end, each man wanting to cross first, and the attacks
of the enemy making it difficult to cross at all; forced to huddle together, they
fell against and trod down one another, some dying immediately upon the javelins,
others getting entangled together and stumbling over the articles of baggage, without
being able to rise again. Meanwhile the opposite bank, which was steep, was lined
by the Syracusans, who showered missiles down upon the Athenians, most of them drinking
greedily and heaped together in disorder in the hollow bed of the river. The Peloponnesians
also came down and butchered them, especially those in the water, which was thus
immediately spoiled, but which they went on drinking just the same, mud and all,
bloody as it was, most even fighting to have it.
At last, when many dead now lay piled one upon another in the stream, and part
of the army had been destroyed at the river, and the few that escaped from thence
cut off by the cavalry, Nicias surrendered himself to Gylippus, whom he trusted
more than he did the Syracusans, and told him and the Lacedaemonians to do what
they liked with him, but to stop the slaughter of the soldiers. Gylippus, after
this, immediately gave orders to make prisoners; upon which the rest were brought
together alive, except a large number secreted by the soldiery, and a party was
sent in pursuit of the three hundred who had got through the guard during the night,
and who were now taken with the rest. The number of the enemy collected as public
property was not considerable; but that secreted was very large, and all Sicily
was filled with them, no convention having been made in their case as for those
taken with Demosthenes. Besides this, a large portion were killed outright, the
carnage being very great, and not exceeded by any in this Sicilian war. In the numerous
other encounters upon the march, not a few also had fallen. Nevertheless many escaped,
some at the moment, others served as slaves, and then ran away subsequently. These
found refuge at Catana.
The Syracusans and their allies now mustered and took up the spoils and as many
prisoners as they could, and went back to the city. The rest of their Athenian and
allied captives were deposited in the quarries, this seeming the safest way of keeping
them; but Nicias and Demosthenes were butchered, against the will of Gylippus, who
thought that it would be the crown of his triumph if he could take the enemy’s generals
to Lacedaemon. One of them, as it happened, Demosthenes, was one of her greatest
enemies, on account of the affair of the island and of Pylos; while the other, Nicias,
was for the same reasons one of her greatest friends, owing to his exertions to
procure the release of the prisoners by persuading the Athenians to make peace.
For these reasons the Lacedaemonians felt kindly towards him; and it was in this
that Nicias himself mainly confided when he surrendered to Gylippus. But some of
the Syracusans who had been in correspondence with him were afraid, it was said,
of his being put to the torture and troubling their success by his revelations;
others, especially the Corinthians, of his escaping, as he was wealthy, by means
of bribes, and living to do them further mischief; and these persuaded the allies
and put him to death. This or the like was the cause of the death of a man who,
of all the Hellenes in my time, least deserved such a fate, seeing that the whole
course of his life had been regulated with strict attention to virtue.
The prisoners in the quarries were at first hardly treated by the Syracusans.
Crowded in a narrow hole, without any roof to cover them, the heat of the sun and
the stifling closeness of the air tormented them during the day, and then the nights,
which came on autumnal and chilly, made them ill by the violence of the change;
besides, as they had to do everything in the same place for want of room, and the
bodies of those who died of their wounds or from the variation in the temperature,
or from similar causes, were left heaped together one upon another, intolerable
stenches arose; while hunger and thirst never ceased to afflict them, each man during
eight months having only half a pint of water and a pint of corn given him daily.
In short, no single suffering to be apprehended by men thrust into such a place
was spared them. For some seventy days they thus lived all together, after which
all, except the Athenians and any Siceliots or Italiots who had joined in the expedition,
were sold. The total number of prisoners taken it would be difficult to state exactly,
but it could not have been less than seven thousand. This was the greatest Hellenic
achievement of any in thig war, or, in my opinion, in Hellenic history; at once
most glorious to the victors, and most calamitous to the conquered. They were beaten
at all points and altogether; all that they suffered was great; they were destroyed,
as the saying is, with a total destruction, their fleet, their army, everything
was destroyed, and few out of many returned home. Such were the events in Sicily.

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