The Works of Tacitus
tr. by Alfred John Church and William Jackson Brodribb
[1864-1877]
Tacitus: History Book 2 [30]
30. While they were fortifying a camp at Ticinum, the news of Caecina’s defeat
reached them, and the mutiny nearly broke out afresh from an impression that
underhand dealing and delay on the part of Valens had kept them away from the
battle. They refused all rest; they would not wait for their general; they advanced
in front of the standards, and hurried on the standard-bearers. After a rapid
march they joined Caecina. The character of Valens did not stand well with Caecina’s
army. They complained that, though so much weaker in numbers, they had been
exposed to the whole force of the enemy, thus at once excusing themselves, and
extolling, in the implied flattery, the strength of the new arrivals, who might,
they feared, despise them as beaten and spiritless soldiers. Though Valens had
the stronger army, nearly double the number of legions and auxiliaries, yet
the partialities of the soldiers inclined to Caecina, not only from the geniality
of heart, which he was thought more ready to display, but even from his vigorous
age, his commanding person, and a certain superficial attractiveness which he
possessed. The result was a jealousy between the two generals. Caecina ridiculed
his colleague as a man of foul and infamous character; Valens retorted with
charges of emptiness and vanity. But concealing their enmity, they devoted themselves
to their common interest, and in frequent letters, without any thought of pardon,
heaped all manner of charges upon Otho, while the Othonianist generals, though
they had the most abundant materials for invective against Vitellius, refrained
from employing them.
31. In fact, before the death of these two men (and it was by his death that
Otho gained high renown, as Vitellius incurred by his the foulest infamy), Vitellius
with his indolent luxury was less dreaded than Otho with his ardent passions.
The murder of Galba had made the one terrible and odious, while no one reckoned
against the other the guilt of having begun the war. Vitellius with his sensuality
and gluttony was his own enemy; Otho, with his profligacy, his cruelty, and
his recklessness, was held to be more dangerous to the Commonwealth. When Caecina
and Valens had united their forces, the Vitellianists had no longer any reason
to delay giving battle with their whole strength. Otho deliberated as to whether
protracting the war or risking an engagement were the better course. Then Suetonius
Paullinus, thinking that it befitted his reputation, which was such that no
one at that period was looked upon as a more skilful soldier, to give an opinion
on the whole conduct of the war, contended that impatience would benefit the
enemy, while delay would serve their own cause.
32. “The entire army of Vitellius,” he said, “has already arrived. Nor have
they much strength in their rear, since Gaul is ready to rise, and to abandon
the banks of the Rhine, when such hostile tribes are ready to burst in, would
not answer his purpose. A hostile people and an intervening sea keep from him
the army of Britain; Spain is not over full of troops; Gallia Narbonensis has
been cowed by the attack of our ships and by a defeat; Italy beyond the Padus
is shut in by the Alps, cannot be relieved from the sea, and has been exhausted
by the passage of his army. For that army there is no where any corn, and without
supplies an army cannot be kept together. Then the Germans, the most formidable
part of the enemy’s forces, should the war be protracted into the summer, will
sink with enfeebled frames under the change of country and climate. Many a war,
formidable in its first impetuosity, has passed into nothing through the weariness
of delay. We, on the other hand, have on all sides abundant resources and loyal
adherents. We have Pannonia, Moesia, Dalmatia, the East with its armies yet
intact, we have Italy and Rome, the capital of the Empire, the Senate, and the
people, names that never lose their splendour, though they may sometimes be
eclipsed. We have the wealth of the State and of private individuals. We have
a vast supply of money, which in a civil war is a mightier weapon than the sword.
Our soldiers are inured to the climate of Italy or to yet greater heat. We have
the river Padus on our front, and cities strongly garrisoned and fortified,
none of which will surrender to the enemy, as the defence of Placentia has proved.
Let Otho therefore protract the war. In a few days the 14th legion, itself highly
renowned, will arrive with the troops from Moesia. He may then again consider
the question, and should a battle be resolved on, we shall fight with increased
strength.”
33. Marius Celsus acquiesced in the opinion of Paullinus; and Annius Gallus,
who a few days before had been seriously injured by the fall of his horse, was
reported to agree by those who had been sent to ascertain his opinion. Otho
was inclined to risk a decisive battle. His brother Titianus, and Proculus,
the prefect of the Praetorian Guard, ignorant and therefore impatient, declared
that fortune, the Gods, and the genius of Otho, were with their counsels, and
would be with their enterprises. That no one might dare to oppose their views,
they had taken refuge in flattery. It having been resolved to give battle, it
became a question whether it would be better for the Emperor to be present in
person, or to withdraw. Paullinus and Celsus no longer opposed, for they would
not seem to put the Emperor in the way of peril, and these same men who suggested
the baser policy prevailed on him to retire to Brixellum, and thus secure from
the hazards of the field, to reserve himself for the administration of empire.
That day first gave the death-blow to the party of Otho. Not only did a strong
detachment of the Praetorian cohorts, of the bodyguard, and of the cavalry,
depart with him, but the spirit of those who remained was broken, for the men
suspected their generals, and Otho, who alone had the confidence of the soldiers,
while he himself trusted in none but them, had left the generals’ authority
on a doubtful footing.
34. Nothing of this escaped the Vitellianists, for, as is usual in civil
wars, there were many deserters, and the spies, while busy in inquiring into
the plans of the enemy, failed to conceal their own. Meanwhile Caecina and Valens
remained quiet, and watched intently for the moment when the enemy in his blindness
should rush upon destruction, and found the usual substitute for wisdom in waiting
for the folly of others. They began to form a bridge, making a feint of crossing
the Padus, in the face of an opposing force of gladiators; they wished also
to keep their own soldiers from passing their unoccupied time in idleness. Boats
were ranged at equal distances from each other, connected at both ends by strong
beams, and with their heads turned against the current, while anchors were thrown
out above to keep the bridge firm. The cables, however, instead of being taut,
hung loose in the water, in order that as the stream rose the vessels might
rise without their arrangement being disturbed. On the end of the bridge was
placed a turret; it was built out on the last boat, and from it engines and
machines might be worked to repel the enemy. The soldiers of Otho also raised
a turret on the opposite bank, and hurled from it stones and flaming missiles.
35. In the middle of the river was an island. While the gladiators were making
their way to it in boats, the Germans swam and outstripped them. A considerable
number, as it chanced, had effected the passage, when Macer, having manned some
light gallies, attacked them with the most active of his gladiators. But the
gladiator has not in battle the firmness of the regular soldier, and now, as
they stood on rocking vessels, they could not direct their blows like men who
had a sure footing on land. As the men in their alarm made confused movements,
rowers and combatants were mingled together in disorder; upon this, the Germans
themselves leapt into the shallows, laid hold of the boats, climbed over the
gunwales, or sank them with their hands. All this passed in the sight of both
armies, and the more it delighted the Vitellianists, the more vehemently did
the Othonianists curse the cause and author of the disaster.
36. The conflict was terminated by the flight of the vanquished, who carried
off what boats were left. Then they cried out for the execution of Macer. He
had been wounded by a javelin thrown from a distance, and the soldiers had made
a rush upon him with drawn swords, when he was saved by the interference of
the tribunes and centurions. Soon after Vestricius Spurinna, having received
orders to that effect from Otho, joined with his cohorts, leaving but a moderate
force in garrison at Placentia. After this Otho sent Flavius Sabinus, consul
elect, to take the command of the troops which had been under Macer; the soldiers
were delighted by this change of generals, while the generals were led by these
continual outbreaks to regard with disgust so hateful a service.
37. I find it stated by some authors that either the dread of or the disgust
felt for both Emperors, whose wickedness and infamy were coming out every day
into more open notoriety, made the two armies hesitate whether they should not
cease their strife, and either themselves consult together, or allow the Senate
to choose an Emperor; and that, for this reason, Otho’s generals recommended
a certain measure of delay, Paullinus especially entertaining hopes for himself,
on the ground that he was the senior among the men of consular rank, that he
was well known as a soldier, and had attained great distinction and fame by
his campaigns in Britain. Though I would allow that there were some few who
in their secret wishes prayed for peace in the stead of disorder, for a worthy
and blameless Emperor in the room of men utterly worthless and wicked, yet I
cannot suppose that Paullinus, wise as he was, could have hoped in an age thoroughly
depraved to find such moderation in the common herd, as that men, who in their
passion for war had trampled peace under foot, should now in their affection
for peace renounce the charms of war; nor can I think that armies differing
in language and in character, could have united in such an agreement; or that
lieutenants and generals, who were for the most part burdened by the consciousness
of profligacy, of poverty, and of crime, could have endured any Emperor who
was not himself stained by vice, as well as bound by obligation to themselves.
38. That old passion for power which has been ever innate in man increased
and broke out as the Empire grew in greatness. In a state of moderate dimensions
equality was easily preserved; but when the world had been subdued, when all
rival kings and cities had been destroyed, and men had leisure to covet wealth
which they might enjoy in security, the early conflicts between the patricians
and the people were kindled into flame. At one time the tribunes were factious,
at another the consuls had unconstitutional power; it was in the capital and
the forum that we first essayed civil wars. Then rose C. Marius, sprung from
the very dregs of the populace, and L. Sulla, the most ruthless of the patricians,
who perverted into absolute dominion the liberty which had yielded to their
arms. After them came Cn. Pompeius, with a character more disguised but no way
better. Henceforth men’s sole object was supreme power. Legions formed of Roman
citizens did not lay down their arms at Pharsalia and Philippi, much less were
the armies of Otho and Vitellius likely of their own accord to abandon their
strife. They were driven into civil war by the same wrath from heaven, the same
madness among men, the same incentives to crime. That these wars were terminated
by what we may call single blows, was owing to want of energy in the chiefs.
But these reflections on the character of ancient and modern times have carried
me too far from my subject. I now return to the course of events.
39. Otho having started for Brixellum, the honours of supreme command devolved
on his brother Titianus, while the real power and control were in the hands
of the prefect Proculus. Celsus and Paullinus, as no one made any use of their
skill, did but screen with their idle title of general the blunders of others.
The tribunes and centurions were perplexed to see that better men were despised,
and that the most worthless carried the day. The common soldiers were full of
eagerness, but liked to criticise rather than to obey the orders of their officers.
It was resolved to move the camp forward to the fourth milestone from Bedriacum,
but it was done so unskilfully, that though it was spring, and there were so
many rivers in the neighbourhood, the troops were distressed for want of water.
Then the subject of giving battle was discussed, Otho in his despatches ever
urging them to make haste, and the soldiers demanding that the Emperor should
be present at the conflict; many begged that the troops quartered beyond the
Padus should be brought up. It is not so easy to determine what was best to
be done, as it is to be sure that what was done was the very worst.
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