The Works of Tacitus
tr. by Alfred John Church and William Jackson Brodribb
[1864-1877]
Tacitus: History Book 2 [90]
90. The next day, as if he were addressing the Senate and people of another
State, he pronounced a high panegyric on himself, extolling his own energy and
moderation, though his enormities were known to the very persons who were present
and to the whole of Italy, his progress through which had been disgraced by
sloth and profligacy. Yet the mob, who had no patriotic anxieties, and who,
without distinguishing between truth and falsehood, had learnt the lesson of
habitual flattery, applauded him with shouts and acclamations, and, reluctant
as he was to assume the name of Augustus, extorted from him a compliance as
idle as his previous refusal.
91. The country, ready to find a meaning in every circumstance, regarded
it as an omen of gloomy import that Vitellius, on obtaining the office of supreme
Pontiff, should have issued a proclamation concerning the public religious ceremonial
on the 18th of July, a day which from old times the disasters of Cremera and
Allia had marked as unlucky. Thus utterly regardless of all law human and divine,
with freedmen and friends as reckless as himself, he lived as if he were among
a set of drunkards. Still at the consular elections he was present in company
with the candidates like an ordinary citizen, and by shewing himself as a spectator
in the theatre, as a partisan in the circus, he courted every breath of applause
from the lowest rabble. Agreeable and popular as this conduct would have been,
had it been prompted by noble qualities, it was looked upon as undignified and
contemptible from the remembrance of his past life. He habitually appeared in
the Senate even when unimportant matters were under discussion; and it once
happened that Priscus Helvidius, the praetor elect, had spoken against his wishes.
Though at the moment provoked, he only called on the tribunes of the people
to support his insulted authority, and then, when his friends, who feared his
resentment was deeper than it appeared, sought to appease him, he replied that
it was nothing strange that two senators in a Commonwealth should disagree:
he had himself been in the habit of opposing Thrasea. Most of them laughed at
the effrontery of such a comparison, though some were pleased at the very circumstance
of his having selected, not one of the most influential men of the time, but
Thrasea, as his model of true glory.
92. He had advanced to the command of the Praetorian Guard Publius Sabinus,
a prefect of the cohort, and Julius Priscus, then only a centurion. It was through
the influence of Caecina and Valens that they respectively rose to power. Though
always at variance, these two men left no authority to Vitellius. The functions
of Empire were discharged by Caecina and Valens. They had long before been led
to suspect each other by animosities scarcely concealed amid the cares of the
campaign and the camp, and aggravated by unprincipled friends and a state of
society calculated to produce such feuds. In their struggles for popularity,
in their long retinues, and in the vast crowds at their levees, they vied with
each other and challenged comparison, while the favour of Vitellius inclined
first to one, and then to the other. There can never be complete confidence
in a power which is excessive. Vitellius himself, who was ever varying between
sudden irritation and unseasonable fondness, they at once despised and feared.
Still this had not made them less keen to seize on palaces and gardens and all
the wealth of the Empire, while a sad and needy throng of nobles, whom with
their children Galba had restored to their country, received no relief from
the compassion of the Emperor. By an edict which gratified the leading men of
the State, while it approved itself even to the populace, Vitellius gave back
to the returned exiles their rights over their freedmen, although servile ingenuity
sought in every way to neutralise the boon, concealing money in quarters which
either obscurity or rank rendered secure. Some freedmen had made their way into
the palace of the Emperor, and thus became more powerful even than their patrons.
93. Meanwhile the soldiers, as their numbers overflowed the crowded camp,
dispersed throughout the porticoes, the temples, and the whole capital, did
not know their own headquarters, kept no watch, and ceased to brace themselves
by toil. Amidst the allurements of the city and all shameful excesses, they
wasted their strength in idleness, and their energies in riot. At last, reckless
even of health, a large portion of them quartered themselves in the notoriously
pestilential neighbourhood of the Vatican; hence ensued a great mortality in
the ranks. The Tiber was close at hand, and their extreme eagerness for the
water and their impatience of the heat weakened the constitutions of the Germans
and Gauls, always liable to disease. To make matters worse, the organisation
of the service was deranged by unprincipled intrigue and favour. Sixteen Praetorian
and four city cohorts were being raised, each to consist of a thousand men.
In this levy Valens ventured to do more than his rival on the pretence of his
having rescued Caecina himself from peril. Doubtless his arrival had restored
the fortunes of the party, and his victory had reversed the unfavourable rumours
occasioned by his tardy advance. The entire army too of Lower Germany was attached
to him; this circumstance, it is thought, first made the allegiance of Caecina
waver.
94. Much however as Vitellius indulged his generals, his soldiers enjoyed
yet greater licence. Every one chose his own service. However unfit, he might,
if he preferred it, be enrolled among the soldiers of the capital. Soldiers
again of good character were allowed, if they so wished, to remain with the
legions, or in the cavalry; and this was the choice of many who were worn out
with disease, or who shrank from the unhealthiness of the climate. But the main
strength of the legions and cavalry was drafted from them, while the old glory
of the Praetorian camp was destroyed by these 20,000 men indiscriminately taken
rather than chosen out of the whole army. While Vitellius was haranguing the
troops, the men called out for the execution of Asiaticus, and of Flavius and
Rufinus, the Gallic chieftains, because they had fought for Vindex. He never
checked these cries; for to say nothing of the cowardice natural to that feeble
soul, he was aware that the distribution of a donative was imminent, and, having
no money, he lavished everything else on the soldiers. A contribution in the
form of a tax was exacted from the freedmen of former Emperors in proportion
to the number of their slaves. Vitellius himself, thinking only how to squander,
was building a stable for his charioteers, was filling the circus with shows
of gladiators and wild beasts, and fooling away his money as if he had the most
abundant supplies.
95. Moreover Caecina and Valens celebrated the birthday of Vitellius by exhibiting
in every quarter of the city shows of gladiators on a vast and hitherto unparalleled
scale. He pleased the most infamous characters, but utterly disgusted all the
respectable citizens, by building altars in the Campus Martius, and performing
funeral rites to Nero. Victims were slaughtered and burnt in the name of the
State; the pile was kindled by the Augustales, an order of the priesthood dedicated
by the Emperor Tiberius to the Julian family, just as Romulus had dedicated
one to king Tatius. Within four months from the victory of Bedriacum, Asiaticus,
the Emperor’s freedman, was rivalling the Polycleti, the Patrobii, and all the
old hateful names. No one sought promotion in that court by integrity or diligence;
the sole road to power was to glut the insatiable appetites of Vitellius by
prodigal entertainments, extravagance, and riot. The Emperor himself, thinking
it enough to enjoy the present, and without a thought for the future, is believed
to have squandered nine hundred million sesterces in a very few months. Rome,
as miserable as she was great, afflicted in one year by an Otho and a Vitellius,
what with the Vinii, the Fabii, the Iceli, and the Asiatici, passed through
all vicissitudes of infamy, till there came Mucianus and Marcellus, and different
men rather than a different morality.
96. The first revolt of which Vitellius received tidings was that of the
3rd legion, despatches having been sent by Aponius Saturninus before he too
attached himself to the party of Vespasian. Aponius, however, agitated by the
unexpected occurrence, had not written all the particulars, and flattering friends
softened down its import. “It was,” they said, “a mutiny of only a single legion;
the loyalty of the other armies was unshaken.” Vitellius in addressing the soldiers
spoke to the same effect. He inveighed against the lately disbanded Praetorians,
and asserted that false rumours were circulated by them, and that there was
no fear of a civil war. The name of Vespasian he suppressed, and soldiers were
dispersed through the city to check the popular gossip. This more than anything
else kept these rumours alive.
97. Nevertheless Vitellius summoned auxiliary troops from Germany, Britain,
and Spain, tardily, however, and with an attempt to conceal his necessities.
The legates and the provinces were equally slow. Hordeonius Flaccus, who was
beginning to suspect the Batavians, feared that he should have a war on his
own hands, and Vettius Bolanus had in Britain a province never very quiet; and
both these officers were wavering in their allegiance. Spain too, which then
was without a governor of consular rank, showed no alacrity. The legates of
the three legions, equal in authority, and ready, while Vitellius was prosperous,
to vie in obedience, stood aloof with one consent from his falling fortunes.
In Africa, the legion, and the auxiliary infantry levied by Clodius Macer and
soon after disbanded by Galba, again entered the service at the order of Vitellius,
while all the rest of the youth promptly gave in their names. Vitellius had
ruled that province as proconsul with integrity and popularity; Vespasian’s
government had been infamous and odious. The allies formed conjectures accordingly
as to the manner in which each would reign, but the result contradicted them.
98. At first Valerius Festus, the legate, loyally seconded the zeal of the
provincials. Soon he began to waver, supporting Vitellius in his public dispatches
and edicts, Vespasian in his secret correspondence, and intending to hold by
the one or the other according as they might succeed. Some soldiers and centurions,
coming through Rhaetia and Gaul, were seized with letters and edicts from Vespasian,
and on being sent to Vitellius were put to death. More, however, eluded discovery,
escaping either through the faithful protection of friends or by their own tact.
Thus the preparations of Vitellius became known, while the plans of Vespasian
were for the most part kept secret. At first the supineness of Vitellius was
in fault; afterwards the occupation of the Pannonian Alps with troops stopped
all intelligence. And on the sea the prevalent Etesian winds favoured an eastward
voyage, but hindered all return.
99. At length Vitellius, appalled by the irruption of the enemy and by the
menacing intelligence from every quarter, ordered Caecina and Valens to take
the field. Caecina was sent on in advance; Valens, who was just recovering from
a severe illness, was delayed by weakness. Far different was the appearance
of the German army as it marched out of the capital. All strength had departed
from their bodies, all energy from their spirits. Slowly, and with thin ranks,
the column moved along, their weapons feebly grasped, their horses spiritless.
The soldiers, impatient of the heat, the dust, and the weather, in proportion
as they were less capable of enduring toil, were more ready for mutiny. All
this was aggravated by the old vanity of Caecina, and by the indolence that
had of late crept over him; presuming on the excessive favour of fortune, he
had abandoned himself to luxury. Perhaps he meditated perfidy, and it was part
of his policy to enervate the courage of the army. Many believe that his fidelity
had been shaken by the suggestions of Flavius Sabinus, who employed Rubrius
Gallus as the bearer of communications intimating that the conditions of desertion
would be held binding by Vespasian. At the same time he was reminded of his
hatred and jealousy of Fabius Valens. Being inferior to his rival in influence
with Vitellius, he should seek to secure favour and power with the new Emperor.
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