The Works of Tacitus
tr. by Alfred John Church and William Jackson Brodribb
[1864-1877]
Tacitus: History Book 3 [50]
50. As winter was approaching, and the low country was flooded by the Padus,
the army marched on without its heavy baggage. The standards and eagles of the
victorious legions, the old and wounded soldiers, and even many effective men,
were left at Verona. The auxiliary infantry and cavalry, with some picked troops
from the legions, appeared sufficient for a war that was all but finished. They
had been joined by the 11th legion, which at first had hesitated, but now in
the hour of success felt alarm at having stood aloof. A recent levy of 6000
Dalmatians was attached to the legion. They were under the command of Pompeius
Silvanus, a man of consular rank; the real direction of affairs was in the hands
of Annius Bassus, the legate of the legion. This officer contrived, under an
appearance of submission, to govern Silvanus, a leader without vigour, and apt
to waste in words the opportunities of action. Bassus, with his unobtrusive
energy, was ready for everything that had to be done. To these forces were added
the elite of the marines of the Ravenna fleet, who demanded permission to serve
in the legions. The crews were made up with Dalmatians. The army and generals
halted at the Temple of Fortune, undecided as to their line of action. They
had heard that the Praetorian Guard had marched out of Rome, and they supposed
that the Apennines were occupied with troops. The generals, finding themselves
in a country utterly impoverished by war, were terrified by the scarcity of
provisions and the mutinous clamours of the soldiery, who incessantly demanded
the “clavarium,” as the donative was called. They had provided neither money
nor corn, and they were embarrassed by the general impatience and rapacity;
for what they might have obtained was plundered.
51. I have the very highest authority for asserting, that there was among
the conquerors such an impious disregard of right and wrong, that a private
cavalry soldier declared he had slain his brother in the late battle, and claimed
a reward from the generals. The common law of humanity on the one hand forbade
them to reward this act of blood, the necessities of the war on the other forbade
them to punish it. They put him off, on the ground that the obligation was too
great to be immediately discharged. Nothing more is recorded. In the earlier
civil wars indeed a similar horror had occurred. In the battle with Cinna at
the Janiculum, a soldier in Pompey’s army, as Sisenna tells us, slew his own
brother, and, on discovering the horrible deed he had committed, destroyed himself.
So much more earnest among our ancestors was the honour paid to virtue, and
the remorse that waited on crime. These and like instances, drawn from the recollections
of the past, I shall mention not irrelevantly, whenever the subject and the
occasion shall call for some example of goodness or some solace in the presence
of evil.
52. Antonius and the other generals of the party judged it expedient to send
forward the cavalry and explore the whole of Umbria for some point where the
Apennines presented a more gentle ascent, and also to bring up the eagles and
standards and all the troops at Verona, while they were to cover the Padus and
the sea with convoys. Some there were among the generals who were contriving
delays, for Antonius in fact was now becoming too great a man, and their hopes
from Mucianus were more definite. That commander, troubled at so speedy a success,
and imagining that unless he occupied Rome in person he should lose all share
in the glory of the war, continued to write in ambiguous terms to Varus and
Antonius, enlarging at one time on the necessity of following up their operations,
at another on the advantage of delay, and with expressions so worded that he
could, according to the event, repudiate a disastrous, or claim a successful
policy. To Plotius Griphus, who had lately been raised by Vespasian to the senatorial
rank and appointed to command a legion, as well as to all others on whom he
could fully rely, he gave plainer instructions. All these men sent replies reflecting
unfavourably on the precipitancy of Varus and Antonius, and suiting the wishes
of Mucianus. By forwarding these letters to Vespasian he had accomplished this
much, that the measures and achievements of Antonius were not valued according
to his hopes.
53. Antonius was indignant, and blamed Mucianus, whose calumnies had depreciated
his own hazardous achievements. Nor was he temperate in his expressions, for
he was habitually violent in language, and was unaccustomed to obey. He wrote
a letter to Vespasian in terms more arrogant than should be addressed to an
Emperor, and not without implied reproach against Mucianus. “It was I,” he said,
“who brought into the field the legions of Pannonia; my instigations roused
the generals in Moesia; my courageous resolution forced a passage through the
Alps, seized on Italy, and cut off the succours from Germany and Rhaetia. The
discomfiture of the disunited and scattered legions of Vitellius by a fierce
charge of cavalry, and afterwards by the steady strength of the infantry in
a conflict that lasted for a day and a night, was indeed a most glorious achievement,
and it was my work. For the destruction of Cremona the war must be answerable;
the civil strifes of former days cost the State more terrible loss and the overthrow
of many cities. Not with messages and letters, but with my arm and my sword,
have I served my Emperor. I would not seek to hinder the renown of those who
in the meanwhile have reduced Asia to tranquillity. They had at heart the peace
of Moesia, I the safety and security of Italy. By my earnest representations
Gaul and Spain, the most powerful region of the world, have been won for Vespasian.
But all my efforts have been wasted, if they alone who have not shared the peril
obtain its rewards.” The meaning of all this did not escape Mucianus, and there
arose a deadly feud, cherished by Antonius with frankness, by Mucianus with
reserve, and therefore with the greater bitterness.
54. Vitellius, after his power had been shattered at Cremona, endeavoured
to suppress the tidings of the disaster, and by this foolish attempt at concealment
he put off, not indeed his troubles, but only the application of the remedy.
Had he avowed and discussed his position, he had some chance, some strength,
left; whereas, on the contrary, when he pretended that all was prosperous, he
aggravated his perils by falsehood. A strange silence was observed in his presence
as to the war; throughout the country all discussion was prohibited, and so,
many who would have told the truth had it been allowed, finding it forbidden,
spread rumours exaggerating the calamity. The generals of the enemy failed not
to magnify the report of their strength, for they sent back any spies of Vitellius
whom they captured, after conducting them round the camp in order that they
might learn the force of the victorious army. All of these persons Vitellius
questioned in secret, and then ordered that they should be put to death. Singular
bravery was displayed by a centurion, Julius Agrestis, who, after several interviews,
in which he had in vain endeavoured to rouse Vitellius to courage, prevailed
on the Emperor to send him in person to see what was the strength of the enemy’s
resources, and what had happened at Cremona. He did not seek to escape the notice
of Antonius by making his observations in secret, but avowed the emperor’s instructions
and his own purpose, and asked leave to see everything. Persons were sent to
shew him the field of battle, the remains of Cremona, and the captured legions.
He then made his way back to Vitellius, and when the Emperor denied the truth
of the intelligence which he brought, and even charged him with having been
bribed, “Since,” he replied, “you require some decisive proof, and I can no
longer serve you in any other way either by my life or death I will give you
a proof which you can believe.” So he departed, and confirmed his statement
by a voluntary death. Some say that he was slain by order of Vitellius, but
they bear the same testimony to his loyalty and courage.
55. Vitellius, who seemed like a man roused from slumber ordered Julius Priscus
and Alfenius Varus, with fourteen of the Praetorian cohorts and the entire force
of cavalry, to occupy the Apennines. A legion of troops drafted from the fleet
followed. So many thousand troops, comprising the picked men and horses of the
army, had they been under the direction of a different general, would have been
quite equal even to aggressive operations. The rest of the Praetorian cohorts
were entrusted to Lucius Vitellius, brother of the Emperor, for the defence
of the capital. Vitellius, while he abated nothing of his habitual indulgence,
with a precipitancy prompted by alarm, anticipated the elections, at which he
appointed consuls for several years. With a profuse liberality, he granted treaties
to allies, and the rights of Latin citizenship to foreigners; some he relieved
by the remission of tribute, others by exemptions; in a word, utterly careless
of the future, he mutilated the resources of the Empire. But the mob was attracted
by the magnificence of his bounties. The most foolish bought these favours with
money; the wise held that to be invalid, which could neither be given nor received
without ruin to the State. Yielding at length to the importunity of the army,
which had taken up its position at Mevania, and accompanied by a numerous train
of senators, into which many were brought by ambition and more by fear, he entered
the camp, undecided in purpose and at the mercy of faithless counsels.
56. While he was haranguing his troops (marvellous to relate) such a multitude
of ill-omened birds flew over him, as to obscure with a dark cloud the light
of day. There occurred another terrible presage. A bull escaped from the altar,
scattered the preparations for sacrifice, and was finally slain far from the
spot where the victims are usually struck down. But the most portentous spectacle
of all was Vitellius himself, ignorant of military matters and without forethought
in his plans, even asking others about the order of march, about the business
of reconnoitring, and the discretion to be used in pushing on or protracting
the campaign, betraying in his countenance and gait his alarm at every fresh
piece of intelligence, and finally drinking to intoxication. At last, weary
of the camp, and having received tidings of the defection of the fleet at Misenum,
he returned to Rome, trembling at every new disaster, but reckless of the final
result. For though it was open to him to have crossed the Apennines with an
army in unimpaired vigour, and to have attacked in the field an enemy suffering
from cold and scant supplies, yet, by dividing his forces, he abandoned to destruction
or captivity troops of the keenest courage and faithful to the last, against
the judgment of the most experienced among the centurions, who, had they been
consulted, would have told him the truth. They were all kept at a distance by
the intimate friends of Vitellius; for the Emperor’s ears were so formed, that
all profitable counsels were offensive to him, and that he would hear nothing
but what would please and ruin.
57. The fleet at Misenum, so much can be done in times of civil discord by
the daring of even a single man, was drawn into revolt by Claudius Faventinus,
a centurion cashiered by Galba, who forged letters in the name of Vespasian
offering a reward for treachery. The fleet was under the command of Claudius
Apollinaris, a man neither firm in his loyalty, nor energetic in his treason.
Apinius Tiro, who had filled the office of praetor, and who then happened to
be at Minturnae, offered to head the revolt. By these men the colonies and municipal
towns were drawn into the movement, and as Puteoli was particularly zealous
for Vespasian, while Capua on the other hand remained loyal to Vitellius, they
introduced their municipal jealousy into the civil war. Claudius Julianus, who
had lately exercised an indulgent rule over the fleet at Misenum, was selected
by Vitellius to soothe the irritation of the soldiery. He was supported by a
city cohort and a troop of gladiators whose chief officer he was. As soon as
the two camps were pitched, Julianus, without much hesitation, went over to
the side of Vespasian, and they then occupied Tarracina, which was protected
by its fortifications and position rather than by any ability of theirs.
58. Vitellius, when informed of these events, left a portion of his army
at Narnia under the command of the prefect of the Praetorian Guard, and deputed
his brother Lucius with six cohorts of infantry and 500 cavalry to encounter
the danger that now threatened him on the side of Campania. Sick at heart, he
found relief in the zeal of the soldiers and in the shouts with which the people
clamoured for arms, while he gave the delusive name of an army and of Roman
legions to a cowardly mob, that would not venture on any thing beyond words.
At the instance of his freedmen (for his friends were the less faithful the
more distinguished their rank) he ordered the tribes to be convoked, and to
those who gave in their names administered the oath of service. As the numbers
were excessive, he divided the business of enrolment between the consuls. He
required the Senators to furnish a prescribed number of slaves and a certain
weight of silver. The Roman Knights offered their services and money, and even
the freedmen voluntarily sought the privilege of doing the same. This pretence
of loyalty, dictated at first by fear, passed into enthusiasm, and many expressed
compassion, not so much for Vitellius, as for the fallen condition of the Imperial
power. Vitellius himself failed not to draw out their sympathies by his pitiable
looks, his voice, and his tears; he was liberal in his promises and even extravagant,
as men in their alarm naturally are. He even expressed a wish to be saluted
as Caesar, a title which he had formerly rejected. But now he had a superstitious
feeling about the name; and it is a fact that in the moment of terror the counsels
of the wise and the voice of the rabble are listened to with equal respect.
But as all movements that originate in thoughtless impulse, however vigorous
in their beginnings, become feeble after a time, the throng of Senators and
Knights gradually melted away, dispersing at first tardily and during the absence
of the Emperor, but before long with a contemptuous indifference to his presence,
till, ashamed of the failure of his efforts, Vitellius waived his claims to
services which were not offered.
59. As the occupation of Mevania, and the apparent revival of the war with
new vigour, had struck terror into Italy, so now did the timorous retreat of
Vitellius give an unequivocal bias in favour of the Flavianists. The Samnites,
the Peligni, and the Marsi, roused themselves, jealous at having been anticipated
by Campania, and, as men who serve a new master, were energetic in all the duties
of war. The army, however, was much distressed by bad weather in its passage
over the Apennines, and since they could hardly struggle through the snow, though
their march was unmolested, they perceived what danger they would have had to
encounter, had not Vitellius been made to turn back by that good fortune, which,
not less often than the wisdom of their counsels, helped the Flavianist generals.
Here they fell in with Petilius Cerialis, who had escaped the sentries of Vitellius
by a rustic disguise and by his knowledge of the country. There was a near relationship
between Cerialis and Vespasian, and he was not without reputation as a soldier.
He was therefore admitted to rank among the generals. It has been said by many
that the means of escape were likewise open to Flavius Sabinus and to Domitian,
and indeed messengers, dispatched by Antonius, contrived under various disguises
to make their way to them, offering them a place of refuge and a protecting
force. Sabinus pleaded his ill health, unsuited to toil and adventure. Domitian
did not want the courage, but he feared that the guards whom Vitellius had set
over him, though they offered to accompany him in his flight, had treacherous
designs. And Vitellius himself, out of a regard for his own connexions, did
not meditate any cruelty against Domitian.
Leave A Comment