THUCYDIDES, Peloponnesian War book 2

The History of the Peloponnesian War

By Thucydides
Written about 431 BC

Translated by Richard Crawley

London 1910.

The Second Book

Chapter VI

Beginning of the Peloponnesian War – First Invasion of Attica – Funeral Oration
of Pericles

The war between the Athenians and Peloponnesians and the allies on either side
now really begins. For now all intercourse except through the medium of heralds
ceased, and hostilities were commenced and prosecuted without intermission. The
history follows the chronological order of events by summers and winters.

The thirty years’ truce which was entered into after the conquest of Euboea lasted
fourteen years. In the fifteenth, in the forty-eighth year of the priestess-ship
of Chrysis at Argos, in the ephorate of Aenesias at Sparta, in the last month but
two of the archonship of Pythodorus at Athens, and six months after the battle of
Potidaea, just at the beginning of spring, a Theban force a little over three hundred
strong, under the command of their Boeotarchs, Pythangelus, son of Phyleides, and
Diemporus, son of Onetorides, about the first watch of the night, made an armed
entry into Plataea, a town of Boeotia in alliance with Athens. The gates were opened
to them by a Plataean called Naucleides, who, with his party, had invited them in,
meaning to put to death the citizens of the opposite party, bring over the city
to Thebes, and thus obtain power for themselves. This was arranged through Eurymachus,
son of Leontiades, a person of great influence at Thebes. For Plataea had always
been at variance with Thebes; and the latter, foreseeing that war was at hand, wished
to surprise her old enemy in time of peace, before hostilities had actually broken
out. Indeed this was how they got in so easily without being observed, as no guard
had been posted. After the soldiers had grounded arms in the market-place, those
who had invited them in wished them to set to work at once and go to their enemies’
houses. This, however, the Thebans refused to do, but determined to make a conciliatory
proclamation, and if possible to come to a friendly understanding with the citizens.
Their herald accordingly invited any who wished to resume their old place in the
confederacy of their countrymen to ground arms with them, for they thought that
in this way the city would readily join them.

On becoming aware of the presence of the Thebans within their gates, and of the
sudden occupation of the town, the Plataeans concluded in their alarm that more
had entered than was really the case, the night preventing their seeing them. They
accordingly came to terms and, accepting the proposal, made no movement; especially
as the Thebans offered none of them any violence. But somehow or other, during the
negotiations, they discovered the scanty numbers of the Thebans, and decided that
they could easily attack and overpower them; the mass of the Plataeans being averse
to revolting from Athens. At all events they resolved to attempt it. Digging through
the party walls of the houses, they thus managed to join each other without being
seen going through the streets, in which they placed wagons without the beasts in
them, to serve as a barricade, and arranged everything else as seemed convenient
for the occasion. When everything had been done that circumstances permitted, they
watched their opportunity and went out of their houses against the enemy. It was
still night, though daybreak was at hand: in daylight it was thought that their
attack would be met by men full of courage and on equal terms with their assailants,
while in darkness it would fall upon panic-stricken troops, who would also be at
a disadvantage from their enemy’s knowledge of the locality. So they made their
assault at once, and came to close quarters as quickly as they could.

The Thebans, finding themselves outwitted, immediately closed up to repel all
attacks made upon them. Twice or thrice they beat back their assailants. But the
men shouted and charged them, the women and slaves screamed and yelled from the
houses and pelted them with stones and tiles; besides, it had been raining hard
all night; and so at last their courage gave way, and they turned and fled through
the town. Most of the fugitives were quite ignorant of the right ways out, and this,
with the mud, and the darkness caused by the moon being in her last quarter, and
the fact that their pursuers knew their way about and could easily stop their escape,
proved fatal to many. The only gate open was the one by which they had entered,
and this was shut by one of the Plataeans driving the spike of a javelin into the
bar instead of the bolt; so that even here there was no longer any means of exit.
They were now chased all over the town. Some got on the wall and threw themselves
over, in most cases with a fatal result. One party managed to find a deserted gate,
and obtaining an axe from a woman, cut through the bar; but as they were soon observed
only a few succeeded in getting out. Others were cut off in detail in different
parts of the city. The most numerous and compact body rushed into a large building
next to the city wall: the doors on the side of the street happened to be open,
and the Thebans fancied that they were the gates of the town, and that there was
a passage right through to the outside. The Plataeans, seeing their enemies in a
trap, now consulted whether they should set fire to the building and burn them just
as they were, or whether there was anything else that they could do with them; until
at length these and the rest of the Theban survivors found wandering about the town
agreed to an unconditional surrender of themselves and their arms to the Plataeans.

While such was the fate of the party in Plataea, the rest of the Thebans who
were to have joined them with all their forces before daybreak, in case of anything
miscarrying with the body that had entered, received the news of the affair on the
road, and pressed forward to their succour. Now Plataea is nearly eight miles from
Thebes, and their march delayed by the rain that had fallen in the night, for the
river Asopus had risen and was not easy of passage; and so, having to march in the
rain, and being hindered in crossing the river, they arrived too late, and found
the whole party either slain or captive. When they learned what had happened, they
at once formed a design against the Plataeans outside the city. As the attack had
been made in time of peace, and was perfectly unexpected, there were of course men
and stock in the fields; and the Thebans wished if possible to have some prisoners
to exchange against their countrymen in the town, should any chance to have been
taken alive. Such was their plan. But the Plataeans suspected their intention almost
before it was formed, and becoming alarmed for their fellow citizens outside the
town, sent a herald to the Thebans, reproaching them for their unscrupulous attempt
to seize their city in time of peace, and warning them against any outrage on those
outside. Should the warning be disregarded, they threatened to put to death the
men they had in their hands, but added that, on the Thebans retiring from their
territory, they would surrender the prisoners to their friends. This is the Theban
account of the matter, and they say that they had an oath given them. The Plataeans,
on the other hand, do not admit any promise of an immediate surrender, but make
it contingent upon subsequent negotiation: the oath they deny altogether. Be this
as it may, upon the Thebans retiring from their territory without committing any
injury, the Plataeans hastily got in whatever they had in the country and immediately
put the men to death. The prisoners were a hundred and eighty in number; Eurymachus,
the person with whom the traitors had negotiated, being one.

This done, the Plataeans sent a messenger to Athens, gave back the dead to the
Thebans under a truce, and arranged things in the city as seemed best to meet the
present emergency. The Athenians meanwhile, having had word of the affair sent them
immediately after its occurrence, had instantly seized all the Boeotians in Attica,
and sent a herald to the Plataeans to forbid their proceeding to extremities with
their Theban prisoners without instructions from Athens. The news of the men’s death
had of course not arrived; the first messenger having left Plataea just when the
Thebans entered it, the second just after their defeat and capture; so there was
no later news. Thus the Athenians sent orders in ignorance of the facts; and the
herald on his arrival found the men slain. After this the Athenians marched to Plataea
and brought in provisions, and left a garrison in the place, also taking away the
women and children and such of the men as were least efficient.

After the affair at Plataea, the treaty had been broken by an overt act, and
Athens at once prepared for war, as did also Lacedaemon and her allies. They resolved
to send embassies to the King and to such other of the barbarian powers as either
party could look to for assistance, and tried to ally themselves with the independent
states at home. Lacedaemon, in addition to the existing marine, gave orders to the
states that had declared for her in Italy and Sicily to build vessels up to a grand
total of five hundred, the quota of each city being determined by its size, and
also to provide a specified sum of money. Till these were ready they were to remain
neutral and to admit single Athenian ships into their harbours. Athens on her part
reviewed her existing confederacy, and sent embassies to the places more immediately
round Peloponnese- Corcyra, Cephallenia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus- perceiving that
if these could be relied on she could carry the war all round Peloponnese.

And if both sides nourished the boldest hopes and put forth their utmost strength
for the war, this was only natural. Zeal is always at its height at the commencement
of an undertaking; and on this particular occasion Peloponnese and Athens were both
full of young men whose inexperience made them eager to take up arms, while the
rest of Hellas stood straining with excitement at the conflict of its leading cities.
Everywhere predictions were being recited and oracles being chanted by such persons
as collect them, and this not only in the contending cities. Further, some while
before this, there was an earthquake at Delos, for the first time in the memory
of the Hellenes. This was said and thought to be ominous of the events impending;
indeed, nothing of the kind that happened was allowed to pass without remark. The
good wishes of men made greatly for the Lacedaemonians, especially as they proclaimed
themselves the liberators of Hellas. No private or public effort that could help
them in speech or action was omitted; each thinking that the cause suffered wherever
he could not himself see to it. So general was the indignation felt against Athens,
whether by those who wished to escape from her empire, or were apprehensive of being
absorbed by it. Such were the preparations and such the feelings with which the
contest opened.

The allies of the two belligerents were the following. These were the allies
of Lacedaemon: all the Peloponnesians within the Isthmus except the Argives and
Achaeans, who were neutral; Pellene being the only Achaean city that first joined
in the war, though her example was afterwards followed by the rest. Outside Peloponnese
the Megarians, Locrians, Boeotians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians.
Of these, ships were furnished by the Corinthians, Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians,
Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians; and cavalry by the Boeotians, Phocians, and
Locrians. The other states sent infantry. This was the Lacedaemonian confederacy.
That of Athens comprised the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians in Naupactus,
most of the Acarnanians, the Corcyraeans, Zacynthians, and some tributary cities
in the following countries, viz., Caria upon the sea with her Dorian neighbours,
Ionia, the Hellespont, the Thracian towns, the islands lying between Peloponnese
and Crete towards the east, and all the Cyclades except Melos and Thera. Of these,
ships were furnished by Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra, infantry and money by the rest.
Such were the allies of either party and their resources for the war.

Immediately after the affair at Plataea, Lacedaemon sent round orders to the
cities in Peloponnese and the rest of her confederacy to prepare troops and the
provisions requisite for a foreign campaign, in order to invade Attica. The several
states were ready at the time appointed and assembled at the Isthmus: the contingent
of each city being two-thirds of its whole force. After the whole army had mustered,
the Lacedaemonian king, Archidamus, the leader of the expedition, called together
the generals of all the states and the principal persons and officers, and exhorted
them as follows:

“Peloponnesians and allies, our fathers made many campaigns both within and without
Peloponnese, and the elder men among us here are not without experience in war.
Yet we have never set out with a larger force than the present; and if our numbers
and efficiency are remarkable, so also is the power of the state against which we
march. We ought not then to show ourselves inferior to our ancestors, or unequal
to our own reputation. For the hopes and attention of all Hellas are bent upon the
present effort, and its sympathy is with the enemy of the hated Athens. Therefore,
numerous as the invading army may appear to be, and certain as some may think it
that our adversary will not meet us in the field, this is no sort of justification
for the least negligence upon the march; but the officers and men of each particular
city should always be prepared for the advent of danger in their own quarters. The
course of war cannot be foreseen, and its attacks are generally dictated by the
impulse of the moment; and where overweening self-confidence has despised preparation,
a wise apprehension often been able to make head against superior numbers. Not that
confidence is out of place in an army of invasion, but in an enemy’s country it
should also be accompanied by the precautions of apprehension: troops will by this
combination be best inspired for dealing a blow, and best secured against receiving
one. In the present instance, the city against which we are going, far from being
so impotent for defence, is on the contrary most excellently equipped at all points;
so that we have every reason to expect that they will take the field against us,
and that if they have not set out already before we are there, they will certainly
do so when they see us in their territory wasting and destroying their property.
For men are always exasperated at suffering injuries to which they are not accustomed,
and on seeing them inflicted before their very eyes; and where least inclined for
reflection, rush with the greatest heat to action. The Athenians are the very people
of all others to do this, as they aspire to rule the rest of the world, and are
more in the habit of invading and ravaging their neighbours’ territory, than of
seeing their own treated in the like fashion. Considering, therefore, the power
of the state against which we are marching, and the greatness of the reputation
which, according to the event, we shall win or lose for our ancestors and ourselves,
remember as you follow where you may be led to regard discipline and vigilance as
of the first importance, and to obey with alacrity the orders transmitted to you;
as nothing contributes so much to the credit and safety of an army as the union
of large bodies by a single discipline.”

With this brief speech dismissing the assembly, Archidamus first sent off Melesippus,
son of Diacritus, a Spartan, to Athens, in case she should be more inclined to submit
on seeing the Peloponnesians actually on the march. But the Athenians did not admit
into the city or to their assembly, Pericles having already carried a motion against
admitting either herald or embassy from the Lacedaemonians after they had once marched
out. The herald was accordingly sent away without an audience, and ordered to be
beyond the frontier that same day; in future, if those who sent him had a proposition
to make, they must retire to their own territory before they dispatched embassies
to Athens. An escort was sent with Melesippus to prevent his holding communication
with any one. When he reached the frontier and was just going to be dismissed, he
departed with these words: “This day will be the beginning of great misfortunes
to the Hellenes.” As soon as he arrived at the camp, and Archidamus learnt that
the Athenians had still no thoughts of submitting, he at length began his march,
and advanced with his army into their territory. Meanwhile the Boeotians, sending
their contingent and cavalry to join the Peloponnesian expedition, went to Plataea
with the remainder and laid waste the country.

While the Peloponnesians were still mustering at the Isthmus, or on the march
before they invaded Attica, Pericles, son of Xanthippus, one of the ten generals
of the Athenians, finding that the invasion was to take place, conceived the idea
that Archidamus, who happened to be his friend, might possibly pass by his estate
without ravaging it. This he might do, either from a personal wish to oblige him,
or acting under instructions from Lacedaemon for the purpose of creating a prejudice
against him, as had been before attempted in the demand for the expulsion of the
accursed family. He accordingly took the precaution of announcing to the Athenians
in the assembly that, although Archidamus was his friend, yet this friendship should
not extend to the detriment of the state, and that in case the enemy should make
his houses and lands an exception to the rest and not pillage them, he at once gave
them up to be public property, so that they should not bring him into suspicion.
He also gave the citizens some advice on their present affairs in the same strain
as before. They were to prepare for the war, and to carry in their property from
the country. They were not to go out to battle, but to come into the city and guard
it, and get ready their fleet, in which their real strength lay. They were also
to keep a tight rein on their allies- the strength of Athens being derived from
the money brought in by their payments, and success in war depending principally
upon conduct and capital. had no reason to despond. Apart from other sources of
income, an average revenue of six hundred talents of silver was drawn from the tribute
of the allies; and there were still six thousand talents of coined silver in the
Acropolis, out of nine thousand seven hundred that had once been there, from which
the money had been taken for the porch of the Acropolis, the other public buildings,
and for Potidaea. This did not include the uncoined gold and silver in public and
private offerings, the sacred vessels for the processions and games, the Median
spoils, and similar resources to the amount of five hundred talents. To this he
added the treasures of the other temples. These were by no means inconsiderable,
and might fairly be used. Nay, if they were ever absolutely driven to it, they might
take even the gold ornaments of Athene herself; for the statue contained forty talents
of pure gold and it was all removable. This might be used for self-preservation,
and must every penny of it be restored. Such was their financial position- surely
a satisfactory one. Then they had an army of thirteen thousand heavy infantry, besides
sixteen thousand more in the garrisons and on home duty at Athens. This was at first
the number of men on guard in the event of an invasion: it was composed of the oldest
and youngest levies and the resident aliens who had heavy armour. The Phaleric wall
ran for four miles, before it joined that round the city; and of this last nearly
five had a guard, although part of it was left without one, viz., that between the
Long Wall and the Phaleric. Then there were the Long Walls to Piraeus, a distance
of some four miles and a half, the outer of which was manned. Lastly, the circumference
of Piraeus with Munychia was nearly seven miles and a half; only half of this, however,
was guarded. Pericles also showed them that they had twelve hundred horse including
mounted archers, with sixteen hundred archers unmounted, and three hundred galleys
fit for service. Such were the resources of Athens in the different departments
when the Peloponnesian invasion was impending and hostilities were being commenced.
Pericles also urged his usual arguments for expecting a favourable issue to the
war.

The Athenians listened to his advice, and began to carry in their wives and children
from the country, and all their household furniture, even to the woodwork of their
houses which they took down. Their sheep and cattle they sent over to Euboea and
the adjacent islands. But they found it hard to move, as most of them had been always
used to live in the country.

From very early times this had been more the case with the Athenians than with
others. Under Cecrops and the first kings, down to the reign of Theseus, Attica
had always consisted of a number of independent townships, each with its own town
hall and magistrates. Except in times of danger the king at Athens was not consulted;
in ordinary seasons they carried on their government and settled their affairs without
his interference; sometimes even they waged war against him, as in the case of the
Eleusinians with Eumolpus against Erechtheus. In Theseus, however, they had a king
of equal intelligence and power; and one of the chief features in his organization
of the country was to abolish the council-chambers and magistrates of the petty
cities, and to merge them in the single council-chamber and town hall of the present
capital. Individuals might still enjoy their private property just as before, but
they were henceforth compelled to have only one political centre, viz., Athens;
which thus counted all the inhabitants of Attica among her citizens, so that when
Theseus died he left a great state behind him. Indeed, from him dates the Synoecia,
or Feast of Union; which is paid for by the state, and which the Athenians still
keep in honour of the goddess. Before this the city consisted of the present citadel
and the district beneath it looking rather towards the south. This is shown by the
fact that the temples of the other deities, besides that of Athene, are in the citadel;
and even those that are outside it are mostly situated in this quarter of the city,
as that of the Olympian Zeus, of the Pythian Apollo, of Earth, and of Dionysus in
the Marshes, the same in whose honour the older Dionysia are to this day celebrated
in the month of Anthesterion not only by the Athenians but also by their Ionian
descendants. There are also other ancient temples in this quarter. The fountain
too, which, since the alteration made by the tyrants, has been called Enneacrounos,
or Nine Pipes, but which, when the spring was open, went by the name of Callirhoe,
or Fairwater, was in those days, from being so near, used for the most important
offices. Indeed, the old fashion of using the water before marriage and for other
sacred purposes is still kept up. Again, from their old residence in that quarter,
the citadel is still known among Athenians as the city.

The Athenians thus long lived scattered over Attica in independent townships.
Even after the centralization of Theseus, old habit still prevailed; and from the
early times down to the present war most Athenians still lived in the country with
their families and households, and were consequently not at all inclined to move
now, especially as they had only just restored their establishments after the Median
invasion. Deep was their trouble and discontent at abandoning their houses and the
hereditary temples of the ancient constitution, and at having to change their habits
of life and to bid farewell to what each regarded as his native city.

When they arrived at Athens, though a few had houses of their own to go to, or
could find an asylum with friends or relatives, by far the greater number had to
take up their dwelling in the parts of the city that were not built over and in
the temples and chapels of the heroes, except the Acropolis and the temple of the
Eleusinian Demeter and such other Places as were always kept closed. The occupation
of the plot of ground lying below the citadel called the Pelasgian had been forbidden
by a curse; and there was also an ominous fragment of a Pythian oracle which said:

Leave the Pelasgian parcel desolate, Woe worth the day that men inhabit it!

Yet this too was now built over in the necessity of the moment. And in my opinion,
if the oracle proved true, it was in the opposite sense to what was expected. For
the misfortunes of the state did not arise from the unlawful occupation, but the
necessity of the occupation from the war; and though the god did not mention this,
he foresaw that it would be an evil day for Athens in which the plot came to be
inhabited. Many also took up their quarters in the towers of the walls or wherever
else they could. For when they were all come in, the city proved too small to hold
them; though afterwards they divided the Long Walls and a great part of Piraeus
into lots and settled there. All this while great attention was being given to the
war; the allies were being mustered, and an armament of a hundred ships equipped
for Peloponnese. Such was the state of preparation at Athens.

Meanwhile the army of the Peloponnesians was advancing. The first town they came
to in Attica was Oenoe, where they to enter the country. Sitting down before it,
they prepared to assault the wall with engines and otherwise. Oenoe, standing upon
the Athenian and Boeotian border, was of course a walled town, and was used as a
fortress by the Athenians in time of war. So the Peloponnesians prepared for their
assault, and wasted some valuable time before the place. This delay brought the
gravest censure upon Archidamus. Even during the levying of the war he had credit
for weakness and Athenian sympathies by the half measures he had advocated; and
after the army had assembled he had further injured himself in public estimation
by his loitering at the Isthmus and the slowness with which the rest of the march
had been conducted. But all this was as nothing to the delay at Oenoe. During this
interval the Athenians were carrying in their property; and it was the belief of
the Peloponnesians that a quick advance would have found everything still out, had
it not been for his procrastination. Such was the feeling of the army towards Archidamus
during the siege. But he, it is said, expected that the Athenians would shrink from
letting their land be wasted, and would make their submission while it was still
uninjured; and this was why he waited.

But after he had assaulted Oenoe, and every possible attempt to take it had failed,
as no herald came from Athens, he at last broke up his camp and invaded Attica.
This was about eighty days after the Theban attempt upon Plataea, just in the middle
of summer, when the corn was ripe, and Archidamus, son of Zeuxis, king of Lacedaemon,
was in command. Encamping in Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, they began their ravages,
and putting to flight some Athenian horse at a place called Rheiti, or the Brooks,
they then advanced, keeping Mount Aegaleus on their right, through Cropia, until
they reached Acharnae, the largest of the Athenian demes or townships. Sitting down
before it, they formed a camp there, and continued their ravages for a long while.

The reason why Archidamus remained in order of battle at Acharnae during this
incursion, instead of descending into the plain, is said to have been this. He hoped
that the Athenians might possibly be tempted by the multitude of their youth and
the unprecedented efficiency of their service to come out to battle and attempt
to stop the devastation of their lands. Accordingly, as they had met him at Eleusis
or the Thriasian plain, he tried if they could be provoked to a sally by the spectacle
of a camp at Acharnae. He thought the place itself a good position for encamping;
and it seemed likely that such an important part of the state as the three thousand
heavy infantry of the Acharnians would refuse to submit to the ruin of their property,
and would force a battle on the rest of the citizens. On the other hand, should
the Athenians not take the field during this incursion, he could then fearlessly
ravage the plain in future invasions, and extend his advance up to the very walls
of Athens. After the Acharnians had lost their own property they would be less willing
to risk themselves for that of their neighbours; and so there would be division
in the Athenian counsels. These were the motives of Archidamus for remaining at
Acharnae.

In the meanwhile, as long as the army was at Eleusis and the Thriasian plain,
hopes were still entertained of its not advancing any nearer. It was remembered
that Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, king of Lacedaemon, had invaded Attica with
a Peloponnesian army fourteen years before, but had retreated without advancing
farther than Eleusis and Thria, which indeed proved the cause of his exile from
Sparta, as it was thought he had been bribed to retreat. But when they saw the army
at Acharnae, barely seven miles from Athens, they lost all patience. The territory
of Athens was being ravaged before the very eyes of the Athenians, a sight which
the young men had never seen before and the old only in the Median wars; and it
was naturally thought a grievous insult, and the determination was universal, especially
among the young men, to sally forth and stop it. Knots were formed in the streets
and engaged in hot discussion; for if the proposed sally was warmly recommended,
it was also in some cases opposed. Oracles of the most various import were recited
by the collectors, and found eager listeners in one or other of the disputants.
Foremost in pressing for the sally were the Acharnians, as constituting no small
part of the army of the state, and as it was their land that was being ravaged.
In short, the whole city was in a most excited state; Pericles was the object of
general indignation; his previous counsels were totally forgotten; he was abused
for not leading out the army which he commanded, and was made responsible for the
whole of the public suffering.

He, meanwhile, seeing anger and infatuation just now in the ascendant, and of
his wisdom in refusing a sally, would not call either assembly or meeting of the
people, fearing the fatal results of a debate inspired by passion and not by prudence.
Accordingly he addressed himself to the defence of the city, and kept it as quiet
as possible, though he constantly sent out cavalry to prevent raids on the lands
near the city from flying parties of the enemy. There was a trifling affair at Phrygia
between a squadron of the Athenian horse with the Thessalians and the Boeotian cavalry;
in which the former had rather the best of it, until the heavy infantry advanced
to the support of the Boeotians, when the Thessalians and Athenians were routed
and lost a few men, whose bodies, however, were recovered the same day without a
truce. The next day the Peloponnesians set up a trophy. Ancient alliance brought
the Thessalians to the aid of Athens; those who came being the Larisaeans, Pharsalians,
Cranonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, and Pheraeans. The Larisaean commanders were
Polymedes and Aristonus, two party leaders in Larisa; the Pharsalian general was
Menon; each of the other cities had also its own commander.

In the meantime the Peloponnesians, as the Athenians did not come out to engage
them, broke up from Acharnae and ravaged some of the demes between Mount Parnes
and Brilessus. While they were in Attica the Athenians sent off the hundred ships
which they had been preparing round Peloponnese, with a thousand heavy infantry
and four hundred archers on board, under the command of Carcinus, son of Xenotimus,
Proteas, son of Epicles, and Socrates, son of Antigenes. This armament weighed anchor
and started on its cruise, and the Peloponnesians, after remaining in Attica as
long as their provisions lasted, retired through Boeotia by a different road to
that by which they had entered. As they passed Oropus they ravaged the territory
of Graea, which is held by the Oropians from Athens, and reaching Peloponnese broke
up to their respective cities.

After they had retired the Athenians set guards by land and sea at the points
at which they intended to have regular stations during the war. They also resolved
to set apart a special fund of a thousand talents from the moneys in the Acropolis.
This was not to be spent, but the current expenses of the war were to be otherwise
provided for. If any one should move or put to the vote a proposition for using
the money for any purpose whatever except that of defending the city in the event
of the enemy bringing a fleet to make an attack by sea, it should be a capital offence.
With this sum of money they also set aside a special fleet of one hundred galleys,
the best ships of each year, with their captains. None of these were to be used
except with the money and against the same peril, should such peril arise.

Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred ships round Peloponnese, reinforced by
a Corcyraean squadron of fifty vessels and some others of the allies in those parts,
cruised about the coasts and ravaged the country. Among other places they landed
in Laconia and made an assault upon Methone; there being no garrison in the place,
and the wall being weak. But it so happened that Brasidas, son of Tellis, a Spartan,
was in command of a guard for the defence of the district. Hearing of the attack,
he hurried with a hundred heavy infantry to the assistance of the besieged, and
dashing through the army of the Athenians, which was scattered over the country
and had its attention turned to the wall, threw himself into Methone. He lost a
few men in making good his entrance, but saved the place and won the thanks of Sparta
by his exploit, being thus the first officer who obtained this notice during the
war. The Athenians at once weighed anchor and continued their cruise. Touching at
Pheia in Elis, they ravaged the country for two days and defeated a picked force
of three hundred men that had come from the vale of Elis and the immediate neighbourhood
to the rescue. But a stiff squall came down upon them, and, not liking to face it
in a place where there was no harbour, most of them got on board their ships, and
doubling Point Ichthys sailed into the port of Pheia. In the meantime the Messenians,
and some others who could not get on board, marched over by land and took Pheia.
The fleet afterwards sailed round and picked them up and then put to sea; Pheia
being evacuated, as the main army of the Eleans had now come up. The Athenians continued
their cruise, and ravaged other places on the coast.

About the same time the Athenians sent thirty ships to cruise round Locris and
also to guard Euboea; Cleopompus, son of Clinias, being in command. Making descents
from the fleet he ravaged certain places on the sea-coast, and captured Thronium
and took hostages from it. He also defeated at Alope the Locrians that had assembled
to resist him.

During the summer the Athenians also expelled the Aeginetans with their wives
and children from Aegina, on the ground of their having been the chief agents in
bringing the war upon them. Besides, Aegina lies so near Peloponnese that it seemed
safer to send colonists of their own to hold it, and shortly afterwards the settlers
were sent out. The banished Aeginetans found an asylum in Thyrea, which was given
to them by Lacedaemon, not only on account of her quarrel with Athens, but also
because the Aeginetans had laid her under obligations at the time of the earthquake
and the revolt of the Helots. The territory of Thyrea is on the frontier of Argolis
and Laconia, reaching down to the sea. Those of the Aeginetans who did not settle
here were scattered over the rest of Hellas.

The same summer, at the beginning of a new lunar month, the only time by the
way at which it appears possible, the sun was eclipsed after noon. After it had
assumed the form of a crescent and some of the stars had come out, it returned to
its natural shape.

During the same summer Nymphodorus, son of Pythes, an Abderite, whose sister
Sitalces had married, was made their proxenus by the Athenians and sent for to Athens.
They had hitherto considered him their enemy; but he had great influence with Sitalces,
and they wished this prince to become their ally. Sitalces was the son of Teres
and King of the Thracians. Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first to establish
the great kingdom of the Odrysians on a scale quite unknown to the rest of Thrace,
a large portion of the Thracians being independent. This Teres is in no way related
to Tereus who married Pandion’s daughter Procne from Athens; nor indeed did they
belong to the same part of Thrace. Tereus lived in Daulis, part of what is now called
Phocis, but which at that time was inhabited by Thracians. It was in this land that
the women perpetrated the outrage upon Itys; and many of the poets when they mention
the nightingale call it the Daulian bird. Besides, Pandion in contracting an alliance
for his daughter would consider the advantages of mutual assistance, and would naturally
prefer a match at the above moderate distance to the journey of many days which
separates Athens from the Odrysians. Again the names are different; and this Teres
was king of the Odrysians, the first by the way who attained to any power. Sitalces,
his son, was now sought as an ally by the Athenians, who desired his aid in the
reduction of the Thracian towns and of Perdiccas. Coming to Athens, Nymphodorus
concluded the alliance with Sitalces and made his son Sadocus an Athenian citizen,
and promised to finish the war in Thrace by persuading Sitalces to send the Athenians
a force of Thracian horse and targeteers. He also reconciled them with Perdiccas,
and induced them to restore Therme to him; upon which Perdiccas at once joined the
Athenians and Phormio in an expedition against the Chalcidians. Thus Sitalces, son
of Teres, King of the Thracians, and Perdiccas, son of Alexander, King of the Macedonians,
became allies of Athens.

Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred vessels were still cruising round Peloponnese.
After taking Sollium, a town belonging to Corinth, and presenting the city and territory
to the Acarnanians of Palaira, they stormed Astacus, expelled its tyrant Evarchus,
and gained the place for their confederacy. Next they sailed to the island of Cephallenia
and brought it over without using force. Cephallenia lies off Acarnania and Leucas,
and consists of four states, the Paleans, Cranians, Samaeans, and Pronaeans. Not
long afterwards the fleet returned to Athens. Towards the autumn of this year the
Athenians invaded the Megarid with their whole levy, resident aliens included, under
the command of Pericles, son of Xanthippus. The Athenians in the hundred ships round
Peloponnese on their journey home had just reached Aegina, and hearing that the
citizens at home were in full force at Megara, now sailed over and joined them.
This was without doubt the largest army of Athenians ever assembled, the state being
still in the flower of her strength and yet unvisited by the plague. Full ten thousand
heavy infantry were in the field, all Athenian citizens, besides the three thousand
before Potidaea. Then the resident aliens who joined in the incursion were at least
three thousand strong; besides which there was a multitude of light troops. They
ravaged the greater part of the territory, and then retired. Other incursions into
the Megarid were afterwards made by the Athenians annually during the war, sometimes
only with cavalry, sometimes with all their forces. This went on until the capture
of Nisaea. Atalanta also, the desert island off the Opuntian coast, was towards
the end of this summer converted into a fortified post by the Athenians, in order
to prevent privateers issuing from Opus and the rest of Locris and plundering Euboea.
Such were the events of this summer after the return of the Peloponnesians from
Attica.

In the ensuing winter the Acarnanian Evarchus, wishing to return to Astacus,
persuaded the Corinthians to sail over with forty ships and fifteen hundred heavy
infantry and restore him; himself also hiring some mercenaries. In command of the
force were Euphamidas, son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus, son of Timocrates, and Eumachus,
son of Chrysis, who sailed over and restored him and, after failing in an attempt
on some places on the Acarnanian coast which they were desirous of gaining, began
their voyage home. Coasting along shore they touched at Cephallenia and made a descent
on the Cranian territory, and losing some men by the treachery of the Cranians,
who fell suddenly upon them after having agreed to treat, put to sea somewhat hurriedly
and returned home.

In the same winter the Athenians gave a funeral at the public cost to those who
had first fallen in this war. It was a custom of their ancestors, and the manner
of it is as follows. Three days before the ceremony, the bones of the dead are laid
out in a tent which has been erected; and their friends bring to their relatives
such offerings as they please. In the funeral procession cypress coffins are borne
in cars, one for each tribe; the bones of the deceased being placed in the coffin
of their tribe. Among these is carried one empty bier decked for the missing, that
is, for those whose bodies could not be recovered. Any citizen or stranger who pleases,
joins in the procession: and the female relatives are there to wail at the burial.
The dead are laid in the public sepulchre in the Beautiful suburb of the city, in
which those who fall in war are always buried; with the exception of those slain
at Marathon, who for their singular and extraordinary valour were interred on the
spot where they fell. After the bodies have been laid in the earth, a man chosen
by the state, of approved wisdom and eminent reputation, pronounces over them an
appropriate panegyric; after which all retire. Such is the manner of the burying;
and throughout the whole of the war, whenever the occasion arose, the established
custom was observed. Meanwhile these were the first that had fallen, and Pericles,
son of Xanthippus, was chosen to pronounce their eulogium. When the proper time
arrived, he advanced from the sepulchre to an elevated platform in order to be heard
by as many of the crowd as possible, and spoke as follows: “

Most of my predecessors in this place have commended him who made this speech
part of the law, telling us that it is well that it should be delivered at the burial
of those who fall in battle. For myself, I should have thought that the worth which
had displayed itself in deeds would be sufficiently rewarded by honours also shown
by deeds; such as you now see in this funeral prepared at the people’s cost. And
I could have wished that the reputations of many brave men were not to be imperilled
in the mouth of a single individual, to stand or fall according as he spoke well
or ill. For it is hard to speak properly upon a subject where it is even difficult
to convince your hearers that you are speaking the truth. On the one hand, the friend
who is familiar with every fact of the story may think that some point has not been
set forth with that fullness which he wishes and knows it to deserve; on the other,
he who is a stranger to the matter may be led by envy to suspect exaggeration if
he hears anything above his own nature. For men can endure to hear others praised
only so long as they can severally persuade themselves of their own ability to equal
the actions recounted: when this point is passed, envy comes in and with it incredulity.
However, since our ancestors have stamped this custom with their approval, it becomes
my duty to obey the law and to try to satisfy your several wishes and opinions as
best I may. “

I shall begin with our ancestors: it is both just and proper that they should
have the honour of the first mention on an occasion like the present. They dwelt
in the country without break in the succession from generation to generation, and
handed it down free to the present time by their valour. And if our more remote
ancestors deserve praise, much more do our own fathers, who added to their inheritance
the empire which we now possess, and spared no pains to be able to leave their acquisitions
to us of the present generation. Lastly, there are few parts of our dominions that
have not been augmented by those of us here, who are still more or less in the vigour
of life; while the mother country has been furnished by us with everything that
can enable her to depend on her own resources whether for war or for peace. That
part of our history which tells of the military achievements which gave us our several
possessions, or of the ready valour with which either we or our fathers stemmed
the tide of Hellenic or foreign aggression, is a theme too familiar to my hearers
for me to dilate on, and I shall therefore pass it by. But what was the road by
which we reached our position, what the form of government under which our greatness
grew, what the national habits out of which it sprang; these are questions which
I may try to solve before I proceed to my panegyric upon these men; since I think
this to be a subject upon which on the present occasion a speaker may properly dwell,
and to which the whole assemblage, whether citizens or foreigners, may listen with
advantage.”

Our constitution does not copy the laws of neighbouring states; we are rather
a pattern to others than imitators ourselves. Its administration favours the many
instead of the few; this is why it is called a democracy. If we look to the laws,
they afford equal justice to all in their private differences; if no social standing,
advancement in public life falls to reputation for capacity, class considerations
not being allowed to interfere with merit; nor again does poverty bar the way, if
a man is able to serve the state, he is not hindered by the obscurity of his condition.
The freedom which we enjoy in our government extends also to our ordinary life.
There, far from exercising a jealous surveillance over each other, we do not feel
called upon to be angry with our neighbour for doing what he likes, or even to indulge
in those injurious looks which cannot fail to be offensive, although they inflict
no positive penalty. But all this ease in our private relations does not make us
lawless as citizens. Against this fear is our chief safeguard, teaching us to obey
the magistrates and the laws, particularly such as regard the protection of the
injured, whether they are actually on the statute book, or belong to that code which,
although unwritten, yet cannot be broken without acknowledged disgrace. “

Further, we provide plenty of means for the mind to refresh itself from business.
We celebrate games and sacrifices all the year round, and the elegance of our private
establishments forms a daily source of pleasure and helps to banish the spleen;
while the magnitude of our city draws the produce of the world into our harbour,
so that to the Athenian the fruits of other countries are as familiar a luxury as
those of his own.

“If we turn to our military policy, there also we differ from our antagonists.
We throw open our city to the world, and never by alien acts exclude foreigners
from any opportunity of learning or observing, although the eyes of an enemy may
occasionally profit by our liberality; trusting less in system and policy than to
the native spirit of our citizens; while in education, where our rivals from their
very cradles by a painful discipline seek after manliness, at Athens we live exactly
as we please, and yet are just as ready to encounter every legitimate danger. In
proof of this it may be noticed that the Lacedaemonians do not invade our country
alone, but bring with them all their confederates; while we Athenians advance unsupported
into the territory of a neighbour, and fighting upon a foreign soil usually vanquish
with ease men who are defending their homes. Our united force was never yet encountered
by any enemy, because we have at once to attend to our marine and to dispatch our
citizens by land upon a hundred different services; so that, wherever they engage
with some such fraction of our strength, a success against a detachment is magnified
into a victory over the nation, and a defeat into a reverse suffered at the hands
of our entire people. And yet if with habits not of labour but of ease, and courage
not of art but of nature, we are still willing to encounter danger, we have the
double advantage of escaping the experience of hardships in anticipation and of
facing them in the hour of need as fearlessly as those who are never free from them.”

Nor are these the only points in which our city is worthy of admiration. We cultivate
refinement without extravagance and knowledge without effeminacy; wealth we employ
more for use than for show, and place the real disgrace of poverty not in owning
to the fact but in declining the struggle against it. Our public men have, besides
politics, their private affairs to attend to, and our ordinary citizens, though
occupied with the pursuits of industry, are still fair judges of public matters;
for, unlike any other nation, regarding him who takes no part in these duties not
as unambitious but as useless, we Athenians are able to judge at all events if we
cannot originate, and, instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in
the way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at
all. Again, in our enterprises we present the singular spectacle of daring and deliberation,
each carried to its highest point, and both united in the same persons; although
usually decision is the fruit of ignorance, hesitation of reflection. But the palm
of courage will surely be adjudged most justly to those, who best know the difference
between hardship and pleasure and yet are never tempted to shrink from danger. In
generosity we are equally singular, acquiring our friends by conferring, not by
receiving, favours. Yet, of course, the doer of the favour is the firmer friend
of the two, in order by continued kindness to keep the recipient in his debt; while
the debtor feels less keenly from the very consciousness that the return he makes
will be a payment, not a free gift. And it is only the Athenians, who, fearless
of consequences, confer their benefits not from calculations of expediency, but
in the confidence of liberality. “

In short, I say that as a city we are the school of Hellas, while I doubt if
the world can produce a man who, where he has only himself to depend upon, is equal
to so many emergencies, and graced by so happy a versatility, as the Athenian. And
that this is no mere boast thrown out for the occasion, but plain matter of fact,
the power of the state acquired by these habits proves. For Athens alone of her
contemporaries is found when tested to be greater than her reputation, and alone
gives no occasion to her assailants to blush at the antagonist by whom they have
been worsted, or to her subjects to question her title by merit to rule. Rather,
the admiration of the present and succeeding ages will be ours, since we have not
left our power without witness, but have shown it by mighty proofs; and far from
needing a Homer for our panegyrist, or other of his craft whose verses might charm
for the moment only for the impression which they gave to melt at the touch of fact,
we have forced every sea and land to be the highway of our daring, and everywhere,
whether for evil or for good, have left imperishable monuments behind us. Such is
the Athens for which these men, in the assertion of their resolve not to lose her,
nobly fought and died; and well may every one of their survivors be ready to suffer
in her cause. “

Indeed if I have dwelt at some length upon the character of our country, it has
been to show that our stake in the struggle is not the same as theirs who have no
such blessings to lose, and also that the panegyric of the men over whom I am now
speaking might be by definite proofs established. That panegyric is now in a great
measure complete; for the Athens that I have celebrated is only what the heroism
of these and their like have made her, men whose fame, unlike that of most Hellenes,
will be found to be only commensurate with their deserts. And if a test of worth
be wanted, it is to be found in their closing scene, and this not only in cases
in which it set the final seal upon their merit, but also in those in which it gave
the first intimation of their having any. For there is justice in the claim that
steadfastness in his country’s battles should be as a cloak to cover a man’s other
imperfections; since the good action has blotted out the bad, and his merit as a
citizen more than outweighed his demerits as an individual. But none of these allowed
either wealth with its prospect of future enjoyment to unnerve his spirit, or poverty
with its hope of a day of freedom and riches to tempt him to shrink from danger.
No, holding that vengeance upon their enemies was more to be desired than any personal
blessings, and reckoning this to be the most glorious of hazards, they joyfully
determined to accept the risk, to make sure of their vengeance, and to let their
wishes wait; and while committing to hope the uncertainty of final success, in the
business before them they thought fit to act boldly and trust in themselves. Thus
choosing to die resisting, rather than to live submitting, they fled only from dishonour,
but met danger face to face, and after one brief moment, while at the summit of
their fortune, escaped, not from their fear, but from their glory. “

So died these men as became Athenians. You, their survivors, must determine to
have as unfaltering a resolution in the field, though you may pray that it may have
a happier issue. And not contented with ideas derived only from words of the advantages
which are bound up with the defence of your country, though these would furnish
a valuable text to a speaker even before an audience so alive to them as the present,
you must yourselves realize the power of Athens, and feed your eyes upon her from
day to day, till love of her fills your hearts; and then, when all her greatness
shall break upon you, you must reflect that it was by courage, sense of duty, and
a keen feeling of honour in action that men were enabled to win all this, and that
no personal failure in an enterprise could make them consent to deprive their country
of their valour, but they laid it at her feet as the most glorious contribution
that they could offer. For this offering of their lives made in common by them all
they each of them individually received that renown which never grows old, and for
a sepulchre, not so much that in which their bones have been deposited, but that
noblest of shrines wherein their glory is laid up to be eternally remembered upon
every occasion on which deed or story shall call for its commemoration. For heroes
have the whole earth for their tomb; and in lands far from their own, where the
column with its epitaph declares it, there is enshrined in every breast a record
unwritten with no tablet to preserve it, except that of the heart. These take as
your model and, judging happiness to be the fruit of freedom and freedom of valour,
never decline the dangers of war. For it is not the miserable that would most justly
be unsparing of their lives; these have nothing to hope for: it is rather they to
whom continued life may bring reverses as yet unknown, and to whom a fall, if it
came, would be most tremendous in its consequences. And surely, to a man of spirit,
the degradation of cowardice must be immeasurably more grievous than the unfelt
death which strikes him in the midst of his strength and patriotism! “

Comfort, therefore, not condolence, is what I have to offer to the parents of
the dead who may be here. Numberless are the chances to which, as they know, the
life of man is subject; but fortunate indeed are they who draw for their lot a death
so glorious as that which has caused your mourning, and to whom life has been so
exactly measured as to terminate in the happiness in which it has been passed. Still
I know that this is a hard saying, especially when those are in question of whom
you will constantly be reminded by seeing in the homes of others blessings of which
once you also boasted: for grief is felt not so much for the want of what we have
never known, as for the loss of that to which we have been long accustomed. Yet
you who are still of an age to beget children must bear up in the hope of having
others in their stead; not only will they help you to forget those whom you have
lost, but will be to the state at once a reinforcement and a security; for never
can a fair or just policy be expected of the citizen who does not, like his fellows,
bring to the decision the interests and apprehensions of a father. While those of
you who have passed your prime must congratulate yourselves with the thought that
the best part of your life was fortunate, and that the brief span that remains will
be cheered by the fame of the departed. For it is only the love of honour that never
grows old; and honour it is, not gain, as some would have it, that rejoices the
heart of age and helplessness. “

Turning to the sons or brothers of the dead, I see an arduous struggle before
you. When a man is gone, all are wont to praise him, and should your merit be ever
so transcendent, you will still find it difficult not merely to overtake, but even
to approach their renown. The living have envy to contend with, while those who
are no longer in our path are honoured with a goodwill into which rivalry does not
enter. On the other hand, if I must say anything on the subject of female excellence
to those of you who will now be in widowhood, it will be all comprised in this brief
exhortation. Great will be your glory in not falling short of your natural character;
and greatest will be hers who is least talked of among the men, whether for good
or for bad. “

My task is now finished. I have performed it to the best of my ability, and in
word, at least, the requirements of the law are now satisfied. If deeds be in question,
those who are here interred have received part of their honours already, and for
the rest, their children will be brought up till manhood at the public expense:
the state thus offers a valuable prize, as the garland of victory in this race of
valour, for the reward both of those who have fallen and their survivors. And where
the rewards for merit are greatest, there are found the best citizens. “

And now that you have brought to a close your lamentations for your relatives,
you may depart.”

Chapter VII.

Second Year of the War – The Plague of Athens – Position and Policy of Pericles
– Fall of Potidaea.

SUCH was the funeral that took place during this winter, with which the first
year of the war came to an end. In the first days of summer the Lacedaemonians and
their allies, with two-thirds of their forces as before, invaded Attica, under the
command of Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, King of Lacedaemon, and sat down and laid
waste the country. Not many days after their arrival in Attica the plague first
began to show itself among the Athenians. It was said that it had broken out in
many places previously in the neighbourhood of Lemnos and elsewhere; but a pestilence
of such extent and mortality was nowhere remembered. Neither were the physicians
at first of any service, ignorant as they were of the proper way to treat it, but
they died themselves the most thickly, as they visited the sick most often; nor
did any human art succeed any better. Supplications in the temples, divinations,
and so forth were found equally futile, till the overwhelming nature of the disaster
at last put a stop to them altogether.

It first began, it is said, in the parts of Ethiopia above Egypt, and thence
descended into Egypt and Libya and into most of the King’s country. Suddenly falling
upon Athens, it first attacked the population in Piraeus- which was the occasion
of their saying that the Peloponnesians had poisoned the reservoirs, there being
as yet no wells there- and afterwards appeared in the upper city, when the deaths
became much more frequent. All speculation as to its origin and its causes, if causes
can be found adequate to produce so great a disturbance, I leave to other writers,
whether lay or professional; for myself, I shall simply set down its nature, and
explain the symptoms by which perhaps it may be recognized by the student, if it
should ever break out again. This I can the better do, as I had the disease myself,
and watched its operation in the case of others.

That year then is admitted to have been otherwise unprecedentedly free from sickness;
and such few cases as occurred all determined in this. As a rule, however, there
was no ostensible cause; but people in good health were all of a sudden attacked
by violent heats in the head, and redness and inflammation in the eyes, the inward
parts, such as the throat or tongue, becoming bloody and emitting an unnatural and
fetid breath. These symptoms were followed by sneezing and hoarseness, after which
the pain soon reached the chest, and produced a hard cough. When it fixed in the
stomach, it upset it; and discharges of bile of every kind named by physicians ensued,
accompanied by very great distress. In most cases also an ineffectual retching followed,
producing violent spasms, which in some cases ceased soon after, in others much
later. Externally the body was not very hot to the touch, nor pale in its appearance,
but reddish, livid, and breaking out into small pustules and ulcers. But internally
it burned so that the patient could not bear to have on him clothing or linen even
of the very lightest description; or indeed to be otherwise than stark naked. What
they would have liked best would have been to throw themselves into cold water;
as indeed was done by some of the neglected sick, who plunged into the rain-tanks
in their agonies of unquenchable thirst; though it made no difference whether they
drank little or much. Besides this, the miserable feeling of not being able to rest
or sleep never ceased to torment them. The body meanwhile did not waste away so
long as the distemper was at its height, but held out to a marvel against its ravages;
so that when they succumbed, as in most cases, on the seventh or eighth day to the
internal inflammation, they had still some strength in them. But if they passed
this stage, and the disease descended further into the bowels, inducing a violent
ulceration there accompanied by severe diarrhoea, this brought on a weakness which
was generally fatal. For the disorder first settled in the head, ran its course
from thence through the whole of the body, and, even where it did not prove mortal,
it still left its mark on the extremities; for it settled in the privy parts, the
fingers and the toes, and many escaped with the loss of these, some too with that
of their eyes. Others again were seized with an entire loss of memory on their first
recovery, and did not know either themselves or their friends.

But while the nature of the distemper was such as to baffle all description,
and its attacks almost too grievous for human nature to endure, it was still in
the following circumstance that its difference from all ordinary disorders was most
clearly shown. All the birds and beasts that prey upon human bodies, either abstained
from touching them (though there were many lying unburied), or died after tasting
them. In proof of this, it was noticed that birds of this kind actually disappeared;
they were not about the bodies, or indeed to be seen at all. But of course the effects
which I have mentioned could best be studied in a domestic animal like the dog.

Such then, if we pass over the varieties of particular cases which were many
and peculiar, were the general features of the distemper. Meanwhile the town enjoyed
an immunity from all the ordinary disorders; or if any case occurred, it ended in
this. Some died in neglect, others in the midst of every attention. No remedy was
found that could be used as a specific; for what did good in one case, did harm
in another. Strong and weak constitutions proved equally incapable of resistance,
all alike being swept away, although dieted with the utmost precaution. By far the
most terrible feature in the malady was the dejection which ensued when any one
felt himself sickening, for the despair into which they instantly fell took away
their power of resistance, and left them a much easier prey to the disorder; besides
which, there was the awful spectacle of men dying like sheep, through having caught
the infection in nursing each other. This caused the greatest mortality. On the
one hand, if they were afraid to visit each other, they perished from neglect; indeed
many houses were emptied of their inmates for want of a nurse: on the other, if
they ventured to do so, death was the consequence. This was especially the case
with such as made any pretensions to goodness: honour made them unsparing of themselves
in their attendance in their friends’ houses, where even the members of the family
were at last worn out by the moans of the dying, and succumbed to the force of the
disaster. Yet it was with those who had recovered from the disease that the sick
and the dying found most compassion. These knew what it was from experience, and
had now no fear for themselves; for the same man was never attacked twice- never
at least fatally. And such persons not only received the congratulations of others,
but themselves also, in the elation of the moment, half entertained the vain hope
that they were for the future safe from any disease whatsoever.

An aggravation of the existing calamity was the influx from the country into
the city, and this was especially felt by the new arrivals. As there were no houses
to receive them, they had to be lodged at the hot season of the year in stifling
cabins, where the mortality raged without restraint. The bodies of dying men lay
one upon another, and half-dead creatures reeled about the streets and gathered
round all the fountains in their longing for water. The sacred places also in which
they had quartered themselves were full of corpses of persons that had died there,
just as they were; for as the disaster passed all bounds, men, not knowing what
was to become of them, became utterly careless of everything, whether sacred or
profane. All the burial rites before in use were entirely upset, and they buried
the bodies as best they could. Many from want of the proper appliances, through
so many of their friends having died already, had recourse to the most shameless
sepultures: sometimes getting the start of those who had raised a pile, they threw
their own dead body upon the stranger’s pyre and ignited it; sometimes they tossed
the corpse which they were carrying on the top of another that was burning, and
so went off.

Nor was this the only form of lawless extravagance which owed its origin to the
plague. Men now coolly ventured on what they had formerly done in a corner, and
not just as they pleased, seeing the rapid transitions produced by persons in prosperity
suddenly dying and those who before had nothing succeeding to their property. So
they resolved to spend quickly and enjoy themselves, regarding their lives and riches
as alike things of a day. Perseverance in what men called honour was popular with
none, it was so uncertain whether they would be spared to attain the object; but
it was settled that present enjoyment, and all that contributed to it, was both
honourable and useful. Fear of gods or law of man there was none to restrain them.
As for the first, they judged it to be just the same whether they worshipped them
or not, as they saw all alike perishing; and for the last, no one expected to live
to be brought to trial for his offences, but each felt that a far severer sentence
had been already passed upon them all and hung ever over their heads, and before
this fell it was only reasonable to enjoy life a little.

Such was the nature of the calamity, and heavily did it weigh on the Athenians;
death raging within the city and devastation without. Among other things which they
remembered in their distress was, very naturally, the following verse which the
old men said had long ago been uttered:

A Dorian war shall come and with it death.

So a dispute arose as to whether dearth and not death had not been the word in
the verse; but at the present juncture, it was of course decided in favour of the
latter; for the people made their recollection fit in with their sufferings. I fancy,
however, that if another Dorian war should ever afterwards come upon us, and a dearth
should happen to accompany it, the verse will probably be read accordingly. The
oracle also which had been given to the Lacedaemonians was now remembered by those
who knew of it. When the god was asked whether they should go to war, he answered
that if they put their might into it, victory would be theirs, and that he would
himself be with them. With this oracle events were supposed to tally. For the plague
broke out as soon as the Peloponnesians invaded Attica, and never entering Peloponnese
(not at least to an extent worth noticing), committed its worst ravages at Athens,
and next to Athens, at the most populous of the other towns. Such was the history
of the plague.

After ravaging the plain, the Peloponnesians advanced into the Paralian region
as far as Laurium, where the Athenian silver mines are, and first laid waste the
side looking towards Peloponnese, next that which faces Euboea and Andros. But Pericles,
who was still general, held the same opinion as in the former invasion, and would
not let the Athenians march out against them.

However, while they were still in the plain, and had not yet entered the Paralian
land, he had prepared an armament of a hundred ships for Peloponnese, and when all
was ready put out to sea. On board the ships he took four thousand Athenian heavy
infantry, and three hundred cavalry in horse transports, and then for the first
time made out of old galleys; fifty Chian and Lesbian vessels also joining in the
expedition. When this Athenian armament put out to sea, they left the Peloponnesians
in Attica in the Paralian region. Arriving at Epidaurus in Peloponnese they ravaged
most of the territory, and even had hopes of taking the town by an assault: in this
however they were not successful. Putting out from Epidaurus, they laid waste the
territory of Troezen, Halieis, and Hermione, all towns on the coast of Peloponnese,
and thence sailing to Prasiai, a maritime town in Laconia, ravaged part of its territory,
and took and sacked the place itself; after which they returned home, but found
the Peloponnesians gone and no longer in Attica.

During the whole time that the Peloponnesians were in Attica and the Athenians
on the expedition in their ships, men kept dying of the plague both in the armament
and in Athens. Indeed it was actually asserted that the departure of the Peloponnesians
was hastened by fear of the disorder; as they heard from deserters that it was in
the city, and also could see the burials going on. Yet in this invasion they remained
longer than in any other, and ravaged the whole country, for they were about forty
days in Attica.

The same summer Hagnon, son of Nicias, and Cleopompus, son of Clinias, the colleagues
of Pericles, took the armament of which he had lately made use, and went off upon
an expedition against the Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace and Potidaea, which
was still under siege. As soon as they arrived, they brought up their engines against
Potidaea and tried every means of taking it, but did not succeed either in capturing
the city or in doing anything else worthy of their preparations. For the plague
attacked them here also, and committed such havoc as to cripple them completely,
even the previously healthy soldiers of the former expedition catching the infection
from Hagnon’s troops; while Phormio and the sixteen hundred men whom he commanded
only escaped by being no longer in the neighbourhood of the Chalcidians. The end
of it was that Hagnon returned with his ships to Athens, having lost one thousand
and fifty out of four thousand heavy infantry in about forty days; though the soldiers
stationed there before remained in the country and carried on the siege of Potidaea.

After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians a change came over the spirit
of the Athenians. Their land had now been twice laid waste; and war and pestilence
at once pressed heavy upon them. They began to find fault with Pericles, as the
author of the war and the cause of all their misfortunes, and became eager to come
to terms with Lacedaemon, and actually sent ambassadors thither, who did not however
succeed in their mission. Their despair was now complete and all vented itself upon
Pericles. When he saw them exasperated at the present turn of affairs and acting
exactly as he had anticipated, he called an assembly, being (it must be remembered)
still general, with the double object of restoring confidence and of leading them
from these angry feelings to a calmer and more hopeful state of mind. He accordingly
came forward and spoke as follows:

“I was not unprepared for the indignation of which I have been the object, as
I know its causes; and I have called an assembly for the purpose of reminding you
upon certain points, and of protesting against your being unreasonably irritated
with me, or cowed by your sufferings. I am of opinion that national greatness is
more for the advantage of private citizens, than any individual well-being coupled
with public humiliation. A man may be personally ever so well off, and yet if his
country be ruined he must be ruined with it; whereas a flourishing commonwealth
always affords chances of salvation to unfortunate individuals. Since then a state
can support the misfortunes of private citizens, while they cannot support hers,
it is surely the duty of every one to be forward in her defence, and not like you
to be so confounded with your domestic afflictions as to give up all thoughts of
the common safety, and to blame me for having counselled war and yourselves for
having voted it. And yet if you are angry with me, it is with one who, as I believe,
is second to no man either in knowledge of the proper policy, or in the ability
to expound it, and who is moreover not only a patriot but an honest one. A man possessing
that knowledge without that faculty of exposition might as well have no idea at
all on the matter: if he had both these gifts, but no love for his country, he would
be but a cold advocate for her interests; while were his patriotism not proof against
bribery, everything would go for a price. So that if you thought that I was even
moderately distinguished for these qualities when you took my advice and went to
war, there is certainly no reason now why I should be charged with having done wrong.
“

For those of course who have a free choice in the matter and whose fortunes are
not at stake, war is the greatest of follies. But if the only choice was between
submission with loss of independence, and danger with the hope of preserving that
independence, in such a case it is he who will not accept the risk that deserves
blame, not he who will. I am the same man and do not alter, it is you who change,
since in fact you took my advice while unhurt, and waited for misfortune to repent
of it; and the apparent error of my policy lies in the infirmity of your resolution,
since the suffering that it entails is being felt by every one among you, while
its advantage is still remote and obscure to all, and a great and sudden reverse
having befallen you, your mind is too much depressed to persevere in your resolves.
For before what is sudden, unexpected, and least within calculation, the spirit
quails; and putting all else aside, the plague has certainly been an emergency of
this kind. Born, however, as you are, citizens of a great state, and brought up,
as you have been, with habits equal to your birth, you should be ready to face the
greatest disasters and still to keep unimpaired the lustre of your name. For the
judgment of mankind is as relentless to the weakness that falls short of a recognized
renown, as it is jealous of the arrogance that aspires higher than its due. Cease
then to grieve for your private afflictions, and address yourselves instead to the
safety of the commonwealth. “

If you shrink before the exertions which the war makes necessary, and fear that
after all they may not have a happy result, you know the reasons by which I have
often demonstrated to you the groundlessness of your apprehensions. If those are
not enough, I will now reveal an advantage arising from the greatness of your dominion,
which I think has never yet suggested itself to you, which I never mentioned in
my previous speeches, and which has so bold a sound that I should scarce adventure
it now, were it not for the unnatural depression which I see around me. You perhaps
think that your empire extends only over your allies; I will declare to you the
truth. The visible field of action has two parts, land and sea. In the whole of
one of these you are completely supreme, not merely as far as you use it at present,
but also to what further extent you may think fit: in fine, your naval resources
are such that your vessels may go where they please, without the King or any other
nation on earth being able to stop them. So that although you may think it a great
privation to lose the use of your land and houses, still you must see that this
power is something widely different; and instead of fretting on their account, you
should really regard them in the light of the gardens and other accessories that
embellish a great fortune, and as, in comparison, of little moment. You should know
too that liberty preserved by your efforts will easily recover for us what we have
lost, while, the knee once bowed, even what you have will pass from you. Your fathers
receiving these possessions not from others, but from themselves, did not let slip
what their labour had acquired, but delivered them safe to you; and in this respect
at least you must prove yourselves their equals, remembering that to lose what one
has got is more disgraceful than to be balked in getting, and you must confront
your enemies not merely with spirit but with disdain. Confidence indeed a blissful
ignorance can impart, ay, even to a coward’s breast, but disdain is the privilege
of those who, like us, have been assured by reflection of their superiority to their
adversary. And where the chances are the same, knowledge fortifies courage by the
contempt which is its consequence, its trust being placed, not in hope, which is
the prop of the desperate, but in a judgment grounded upon existing resources, whose
anticipations are more to be depended upon. “

Again, your country has a right to your services in sustaining the glories of
her position. These are a common source of pride to you all, and you cannot decline
the burdens of empire and still expect to share its honours. You should remember
also that what you are fighting against is not merely slavery as an exchange for
independence, but also loss of empire and danger from the animosities incurred in
its exercise. Besides, to recede is no longer possible, if indeed any of you in
the alarm of the moment has become enamoured of the honesty of such an unambitious
part. For what you hold is, to speak somewhat plainly, a tyranny; to take it perhaps
was wrong, but to let it go is unsafe. And men of these retiring views, making converts
of others, would quickly ruin a state; indeed the result would be the same if they
could live independent by themselves; for the retiring and unambitious are never
secure without vigorous protectors at their side; in fine, such qualities are useless
to an imperial city, though they may help a dependency to an unmolested servitude.
“

But you must not be seduced by citizens like these or angry with me- who, if
I voted for war, only did as you did yourselves- in spite of the enemy having invaded
your country and done what you could be certain that he would do, if you refused
to comply with his demands; and although besides what we counted for, the plague
has come upon us- the only point indeed at which our calculation has been at fault.
It is this, I know, that has had a large share in making me more unpopular than
I should otherwise have been- quite undeservedly, unless you are also prepared to
give me the credit of any success with which chance may present you. Besides, the
hand of heaven must be borne with resignation, that of the enemy with fortitude;
this was the old way at Athens, and do not you prevent it being so still. Remember,
too, that if your country has the greatest name in all the world, it is because
she never bent before disaster; because she has expended more life and effort in
war than any other city, and has won for herself a power greater than any hitherto
known, the memory of which will descend to the latest posterity; even if now, in
obedience to the general law of decay, we should ever be forced to yield, still
it will be remembered that we held rule over more Hellenes than any other Hellenic
state, that we sustained the greatest wars against their united or separate powers,
and inhabited a city unrivalled by any other in resources or magnitude. These glories
may incur the censure of the slow and unambitious; but in the breast of energy they
will awake emulation, and in those who must remain without them an envious regret.
Hatred and unpopularity at the moment have fallen to the lot of all who have aspired
to rule others; but where odium must be incurred, true wisdom incurs it for the
highest objects. Hatred also is short-lived; but that which makes the splendour
of the present and the glory of the future remains for ever unforgotten. Make your
decision, therefore, for glory then and honour now, and attain both objects by instant
and zealous effort: do not send heralds to Lacedaemon, and do not betray any sign
of being oppressed by your present sufferings, since they whose minds are least
sensitive to calamity, and whose hands are most quick to meet it, are the greatest
men and the greatest communities.”

Such were the arguments by which Pericles tried to cure the Athenians of their
anger against him and to divert their thoughts from their immediate afflictions.
As a community he succeeded in convincing them; they not only gave up all idea of
sending to Lacedaemon, but applied themselves with increased energy to the war;
still as private individuals they could not help smarting under their sufferings,
the common people having been deprived of the little that they were possessed, while
the higher orders had lost fine properties with costly establishments and buildings
in the country, and, worst of all, had war instead of peace. In fact, the public
feeling against him did not subside until he had been fined. Not long afterwards,
however, according to the way of the multitude, they again elected him general and
committed all their affairs to his hands, having now become less sensitive to their
private and domestic afflictions, and understanding that he was the best man of
all for the public necessities. For as long as he was at the head of the state during
the peace, he pursued a moderate and conservative policy; and in his time its greatness
was at its height. When the war broke out, here also he seems to have rightly gauged
the power of his country. He outlived its commencement two years and six months,
and the correctness of his previsions respecting it became better known by his death.
He told them to wait quietly, to pay attention to their marine, to attempt no new
conquests, and to expose the city to no hazards during the war, and doing this,
promised them a favourable result. What they did was the very contrary, allowing
private ambitions and private interests, in matters apparently quite foreign to
the war, to lead them into projects unjust both to themselves and to their allies-
projects whose success would only conduce to the honour and advantage of private
persons, and whose failure entailed certain disaster on the country in the war.
The causes of this are not far to seek. Pericles indeed, by his rank, ability, and
known integrity, was enabled to exercise an independent control over the multitude-
in short, to lead them instead of being led by them; for as he never sought power
by improper means, he was never compelled to flatter them, but, on the contrary,
enjoyed so high an estimation that he could afford to anger them by contradiction.
Whenever he saw them unseasonably and insolently elated, he would with a word reduce
them to alarm; on the other hand, if they fell victims to a panic, he could at once
restore them to confidence. In short, what was nominally a democracy became in his
hands government by the first citizen. With his successors it was different. More
on a level with one another, and each grasping at supremacy, they ended by committing
even the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude. This, as might
have been expected in a great and sovereign state, produced a host of blunders,
and amongst them the Sicilian expedition; though this failed not so much through
a miscalculation of the power of those against whom it was sent, as through a fault
in the senders in not taking the best measures afterwards to assist those who had
gone out, but choosing rather to occupy themselves with private cabals for the leadership
of the commons, by which they not only paralysed operations in the field, but also
first introduced civil discord at home. Yet after losing most of their fleet besides
other forces in Sicily, and with faction already dominant in the city, they could
still for three years make head against their original adversaries, joined not only
by the Sicilians, but also by their own allies nearly all in revolt, and at last
by the King’s son, Cyrus, who furnished the funds for the Peloponnesian navy. Nor
did they finally succumb till they fell the victims of their own intestine disorders.
So superfluously abundant were the resources from which the genius of Pericles foresaw
an easy triumph in the war over the unaided forces of the Peloponnesians.

During the same summer the Lacedaemonians and their allies made an expedition
with a hundred ships against Zacynthus, an island lying off the coast of Elis, peopled
by a colony of Achaeans from Peloponnese, and in alliance with Athens. There were
a thousand Lacedaemonian heavy infantry on board, and Cnemus, a Spartan, as admiral.
They made a descent from their ships, and ravaged most of the country; but as the
inhabitants would not submit, they sailed back home.

At the end of the same summer the Corinthian Aristeus, Aneristus, Nicolaus, and
Stratodemus, envoys from Lacedaemon, Timagoras, a Tegean, and a private individual
named Pollis from Argos, on their way to Asia to persuade the King to supply funds
and join in the war, came to Sitalces, son of Teres in Thrace, with the idea of
inducing him, if possible, to forsake the alliance of Athens and to march on Potidaea
then besieged by an Athenian force, and also of getting conveyed by his means to
their destination across the Hellespont to Pharnabazus, who was to send them up
the country to the King. But there chanced to be with Sitalces some Athenian ambassadors-
Learchus, son of Callimachus, and Ameiniades, son of Philemon- who persuaded Sitalces’
son, Sadocus, the new Athenian citizen, to put the men into their hands and thus
prevent their crossing over to the King and doing their part to injure the country
of his choice. He accordingly had them seized, as they were travelling through Thrace
to the vessel in which they were to cross the Hellespont, by a party whom he had
sent on with Learchus and Ameiniades, and gave orders for their delivery to the
Athenian ambassadors, by whom they were brought to Athens. On their arrival, the
Athenians, afraid that Aristeus, who had been notably the prime mover in the previous
affairs of Potidaea and their Thracian possessions, might live to do them still
more mischief if he escaped, slew them all the same day, without giving them a trial
or hearing the defence which they wished to offer, and cast their bodies into a
pit; thinking themselves justified in using in retaliation the same mode of warfare
which the Lacedaemonians had begun, when they slew and cast into pits all the Athenian
and allied traders whom they caught on board the merchantmen round Peloponnese.
Indeed, at the outset of the war, the Lacedaemonians butchered as enemies all whom
they took on the sea, whether allies of Athens or neutrals.

About the same time towards the close of the summer, the Ambraciot forces, with
a number of barbarians that they had raised, marched against the Amphilochian Argos
and the rest of that country. The origin of their enmity against the Argives was
this. This Argos and the rest of Amphilochia were colonized by Amphilochus, son
of Amphiaraus. Dissatisfied with the state of affairs at home on his return thither
after the Trojan War, he built this city in the Ambracian Gulf, and named it Argos
after his own country. This was the largest town in Amphilochia, and its inhabitants
the most powerful. Under the pressure of misfortune many generations afterwards,
they called in the Ambraciots, their neighbours on the Amphilochian border, to join
their colony; and it was by this union with the Ambraciots that they learnt their
present Hellenic speech, the rest of the Amphilochians being barbarians. After a
time the Ambraciots expelled the Argives and held the city themselves. Upon this
the Amphilochians gave themselves over to the Acarnanians; and the two together
called the Athenians, who sent them Phormio as general and thirty ships; upon whose
arrival they took Argos by storm, and made slaves of the Ambraciots; and the Amphilochians
and Acarnanians inhabited the town in common. After this began the alliance between
the Athenians and Acarnanians. The enmity of the Ambraciots against the Argives
thus commenced with the enslavement of their citizens; and afterwards during the
war they collected this armament among themselves and the Chaonians, and other of
the neighbouring barbarians. Arrived before Argos, they became masters of the country;
but not being successful in their attacks upon the town, returned home and dispersed
among their different peoples.

Such were the events of the summer. The ensuing winter the Athenians sent twenty
ships round Peloponnese, under the command of Phormio, who stationed himself at
Naupactus and kept watch against any one sailing in or out of Corinth and the Crissaean
Gulf. Six others went to Caria and Lycia under Melesander, to collect tribute in
those parts, and also to prevent the Peloponnesian privateers from taking up their
station in those waters and molesting the passage of the merchantmen from Phaselis
and Phoenicia and the adjoining continent. However, Melesander, going up the country
into Lycia with a force of Athenians from the ships and the allies, was defeated
and killed in battle, with the loss of a number of his troops.

The same winter the Potidaeans at length found themselves no longer able to hold
out against their besiegers. The inroads of the Peloponnesians into Attica had not
had the desired effect of making the Athenians raise the siege. Provisions there
were none left; and so far had distress for food gone in Potidaea that, besides
a number of other horrors, instances had even occurred of the people having eaten
one another. in this extremity they at last made proposals for capitulating to the
Athenian generals in command against them- Xenophon, son of Euripides, Hestiodorus,
son of Aristocleides, and Phanomachus, son of Callimachus. The generals accepted
their proposals, seeing the sufferings of the army in so exposed a position; besides
which the state had already spent two thousand talents upon the siege. The terms
of the capitulation were as follows: a free passage out for themselves, their children,
wives and auxiliaries, with one garment apiece, the women with two, and a fixed
sum of money for their journey. Under this treaty they went out to Chalcidice and
other places, according as was their power. The Athenians, however, blamed the generals
for granting terms without instructions from home, being of opinion that the place
would have had to surrender at discretion. They afterwards sent settlers of their
own to Potidaea, and colonized it. Such were the events of the winter, and so ended
the second year of this war of which Thucydides was the historian.

Chapter VIII.

Third Year of the War – Investment of Plataea – Naval Victories of Phormio –
Thracian Irruption into Macedonia under Sitalces.

THE next summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, instead of invading Attica,
marched against Plataea, under the command of Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king
of the Lacedaemonians. He had encamped his army and was about to lay waste the country,
when the Plataeans hastened to send envoys to him, and spoke as follows: “Archidamus
and Lacedaemonians, in invading the Plataean territory, you do what is wrong in
itself, and worthy neither of yourselves nor of the fathers who begot you. Pausanias,
son of Cleombrotus, your countryman, after freeing Hellas from the Medes with the
help of those Hellenes who were willing to undertake the risk of the battle fought
near our city, offered sacrifice to Zeus the Liberator in the marketplace of Plataea,
and calling all the allies together restored to the Plataeans their city and territory,
and declared it independent and inviolate against aggression or conquest. Should
any such be attempted, the allies present were to help according to their power.
Your fathers rewarded us thus for the courage and patriotism that we displayed at
that perilous epoch; but you do just the contrary, coming with our bitterest enemies,
the Thebans, to enslave us. We appeal, therefore, to the gods to whom the oaths
were then made, to the gods of your ancestors, and lastly to those of our country,
and call upon you to refrain from violating our territory or transgressing the oaths,
and to let us live independent, as Pausanias decreed.”

The Plataeans had got thus far when they were cut short by Archidamus saying:
“There is justice, Plataeans, in what you say, if you act up to your words. According,
to the grant of Pausanias, continue to be independent yourselves, and join in freeing
those of your fellow countrymen who, after sharing in the perils of that period,
joined in the oaths to you, and are now subject to the Athenians; for it is to free
them and the rest that all this provision and war has been made. I could wish that
you would share our labours and abide by the oaths yourselves; if this is impossible,
do what we have already required of you- remain neutral, enjoying your own; join
neither side, but receive both as friends, neither as allies for the war. With this
we shall be satisfied.” Such were the words of Archidamus. The Plataeans, after
hearing what he had to say, went into the city and acquainted the people with what
had passed, and presently returned for answer that it was impossible for them to
do what he proposed without consulting the Athenians, with whom their children and
wives now were; besides which they had their fears for the town. After his departure,
what was to prevent the Athenians from coming and taking it out of their hands,
or the Thebans, who would be included in the oaths, from taking advantage of the
proposed neutrality to make a second attempt to seize the city? Upon these points
he tried to reassure them by saying: “You have only to deliver over the city and
houses to us Lacedaemonians, to point out the boundaries of your land, the number
of your fruit-trees, and whatever else can be numerically stated, and yourselves
to withdraw wherever you like as long as the war shall last. When it is over we
will restore to you whatever we received, and in the interim hold it in trust and
keep it in cultivation, paying you a sufficient allowance.”

When they had heard what he had to say, they re-entered the city, and after consulting
with the people said that they wished first to acquaint the Athenians with this
proposal, and in the event of their approving to accede to it; in the meantime they
asked him to grant them a truce and not to lay waste their territory. He accordingly
granted a truce for the number of days requisite for the journey, and meanwhile
abstained from ravaging their territory. The Plataean envoys went to Athens, and
consulted with the Athenians, and returned with the following message to those in
the city: “The Athenians say, Plataeans, that they never hitherto, since we became
their allies, on any occasion abandoned us to an enemy, nor will they now neglect
us, but will help us according to their ability; and they adjure you by the oaths
which your fathers swore, to keep the alliance unaltered.”

On the delivery of this message by the envoys, the Plataeans resolved not to
be unfaithful to the Athenians but to endure, if it must be, seeing their lands
laid waste and any other trials that might come to them, and not to send out again,
but to answer from the wall that it was impossible for them to do as the Lacedaemonians
proposed. As soon as he had received this answer, King Archidamus proceeded first
to make a solemn appeal to the gods and heroes of the country in words following:
“Ye gods and heroes of the Plataean territory, be my witnesses that not as aggressors
originally, nor until these had first departed from the common oath, did we invade
this land, in which our fathers offered you their prayers before defeating the Medes,
and which you made auspicious to the Hellenic arms; nor shall we be aggressors in
the measures to which we may now resort, since we have made many fair proposals
but have not been successful. Graciously accord that those who were the first to
offend may be puished for it, and that vengeance may be attained by those who would
righteously inflict it.”

After this appeal to the gods Archidamus put his army in motion. First he enclosed
the town with a palisade formedof the fruit-trees which they cut down, to prevent
further egress from Plataea; next they threw up a mound against the city, hoping
that the largeness of the force employed would ensure the speedy reduction ofthe
place. They accordingly cut down timber from Cithaeron, and built it up on either
side, laying it like lattice-work to serve as a wall to keep the mound from spreading
abroad, and carried to it wood and stnes and earth and whatever other material might
help to complete it. They continued to work at the mound for seventy days and nights
without intermission, being divided into relief parties to allow of some beig employed
in carrying while others took sleep and refreshment; the Lacedaemonian officer attached
to each contingent keeping the men to the work. But the Plataeans, observing the
progress of the mound, constucted a wall of wood and fixed it upon that part of
the city wall against which the mound was being erected, and built up bricks inside
it which they took from the neighbouring houses. The timbers served to bid the building
together, and to prevent its becoming weak as it advanced in height; it had also
a covering of skins and hides, which protected the woodwork against the attacks
of burning missiles and allowed te men to work in safety. Thus the wall was raised
to a great height, and the mound opposite made no less rpid progress. The Plataeans
also thought of another expedient; they pulled out part of the wall upon which the
mound abutted, and carried the earth into the city.

Discovering this the Peloponnesians twistedup clay in wattles of reed and threw
it into the breach formed in the mound, in order to give it consistency and prevent
its being carried away like the soil. Stopped in this way the Plataeans changed
their mode of operation, and digging a mine from the town calculated their way under
the mound, and began to carry off its material as before. This went on for a long
while without the enemy outside finding it out, so that for all they threw on the
top their mound made no progress in proportion, being carried away from beneath
and constantly settling down in the vacuum. But the Plataeans, fearing that even
thus they might not be able to hold out against the superior numbers of the enemy,
had yet another invention. They stopped working at the large building in front of
the mound, and starting at either end of it inside from the old low wall, built
a new one in the form of a crescent running in towards the town; in order that in
the event of the great wall being taken this might remain, and the enemy have to
throw up a fresh mound against it, and as they advanced within might not only have
their trouble over again, but also be exposed to missiles on their flanks. While
raising the mound the Peloponnesians also brought up engines against the city, one
of which was brought up upon the mound against the great building and shook down
a good piece of it, to the no small alarm of the Plataeans. Others were advanced
against different parts of the wall but were lassoed and broken by the Plataeans;
who also hung up great beams by long iron chains from either extremity of two poles
laid on the wall and projecting over it, and drew them up at an angle whenever any
point was threatened by the engine, and loosing their hold let the beam go with
its chains slack, so that it fell with a run and snapped off the nose of the battering
ram.

After this the Peloponnesians, finding that their engines effected nothing, and
that their mound was met by the counterwork, concluded that their present means
of offence were unequal to the taking of the city, and prepared for its circumvallation.
First, however, they determined to try the effects of fire and see whether they
could not, with the help of a wind, burn the town, as it was not a large one; indeed
they thought of every possible expedient by which the place might be reduced without
the expense of a blockade. They accordingly brought faggots of brushwood and threw
them from the mound, first into the space between it and the wall; and this soon
becoming full from the number of hands at work, they next heaped the faggots up
as far into the town as they could reach from the top, and then lighted the wood
by setting fire to it with sulphur and pitch. The consequence was a fire greater
than any one had ever yet seen produced by human agency, though it could not of
course be compared to the spontaneous conflagrations sometimes known to occur through
the wind rubbing the branches of a mountain forest together. And this fire was not
only remarkable for its magnitude, but was also, at the end of so many perils, within
an ace of proving fatal to the Plataeans; a great part of the town became entirely
inaccessible, and had a wind blown upon it, in accordance with the hopes of the
enemy, nothing could have saved them. As it was, there is also a story of heavy
rain and thunder having come on by which the fire was put out and the danger averted.

Failing in this last attempt the Peloponnesians left a portion of their forces
on the spot, dismissing the rest, and built a wall of circumvallation round the
town, dividing the ground among the various cities present; a ditch being made within
and without the lines, from which they got their bricks. All being finished by about
the rising of Arcturus, they left men enough to man half the wall, the rest being
manned by the Boeotians, and drawing off their army dispersed to their several cities.
The Plataeans had before sent off their wives and children and oldest men and the
mass of the non-combatants to Athens; so that the number of the besieged left in
the place comprised four hundred of their own citizens, eighty Athenians, and a
hundred and ten women to bake their bread. This was the sum total at the commencement
of the siege, and there was no one else within the walls, bond or free. Such were
the arrangements made for the blockade of Plataea.

The same summer and simultaneously with the expedition against Plataea, the Athenians
marched with two thousand heavy infantry and two hundred horse against the Chalcidians
in the direction of Thrace and the Bottiaeans, just as the corn was getting ripe,
under the command of Xenophon, son of Euripides, with two colleagues. Arriving before
Spartolus in Bottiaea, they destroyed the corn and had some hopes of the city coming
over through the intrigues of a faction within. But those of a different way of
thinking had sent to Olynthus; and a garrison of heavy infantry and other troops
arrived accordingly. These issuing from Spartolus were engaged by the Athenians
in front of the town: the Chalcidian heavy infantry, and some auxiliaries with them,
were beaten and retreated into Spartolus; but the Chalcidian horse and light troops
defeated the horse and light troops of the Athenians. The Chalcidians had already
a few targeteers from Crusis, and presently after the battle were joined by some
others from Olynthus; upon seeing whom the light troops from Spartolus, emboldened
by this accession and by their previous success, with the help of the Chalcidian
horse and the reinforcement just arrived again attacked the Athenians, who retired
upon the two divisions which they had left with their baggage. Whenever the Athenians
advanced, their adversary gave way, pressing them with missiles the instant they
began to retire. The Chalcidian horse also, riding up and charging them just as
they pleased, at last caused a panic amongst them and routed and pursued them to
a great distance. The Athenians took refuge in Potidaea, and afterwards recovered
their dead under truce, and returned to Athens with the remnant of their army; four
hundred and thirty men and all the generals having fallen. The Chalcidians and Bottiaeans
set up a trophy, took up their dead, and dispersed to their several cities.

The same summer, not long after this, the Ambraciots and Chaonians, being desirous
of reducing the whole of Acarnania and detaching it from Athens, persuaded the Lacedaemonians
to equip a fleet from their confederacy and send a thousand heavy infantry to Acarnania,
representing that, if a combined movement were made by land and sea, the coast Acarnanians
would be unable to march, and the conquest of Zacynthus and Cephallenia easily following
on the possession of Acarnania, the cruise round Peloponnese would be no longer
so convenient for the Athenians. Besides which there was a hope of taking Naupactus.
The Lacedaemonians accordingly at once sent off a few vessels with Cnemus, who was
still high admiral, and the heavy infantry on board; and sent round orders for the
fleet to equip as quickly as possible and sail to Leucas. The Corinthians were the
most forward in the business; the Ambraciots being a colony of theirs. While the
ships from Corinth, Sicyon, and the neighbourhood were getting ready, and those
from Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia, which had arrived before, were walting for
them at Leucas, Cnemus and his thousand heavy infantry had run into the gulf, giving
the slip to Phormio, the commander of the Athenian squadron stationed off Naupactus,
and began at once to prepare for the land expedition. The Hellenic troops with him
consisted of the Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians, and the thousand Peloponnesians
with whom he came; the barbarian of a thousand Chaonians, who, belonging to a nation
that has no king, were led by Photys and Nicanor, the two members of the royal family
to whom the chieftainship for that year had been confided. With the Chaonians came
also some Thesprotians, like them without a king, some Molossians and Atintanians
led by Sabylinthus, the guardian of King Tharyps who was still a minor, and some
Paravaeans, under their king Oroedus, accompanied by a thousand Orestians, subjects
of King Antichus and placed by him under the command of Oroedus. There were also
a thousand Macedonians sent by Perdiccas without the knowledge of the Athenians,
but they arrived too late. With this force Cnemus set out, without waiting for the
fleet from Corinth. Passing through the territory of Amphilochian Argos, and sacking
the open village of Limnaea, they advanced to Stratus the Acarnanian capital; this
once taken, the rest of the country, they felt convinced, would speedily follow.

The Acarnanians, finding themselves invaded by a large army by land, and from
the sea threatened by a hostile fleet, made no combined attempt at resistance, but
remained to defend their homes, and sent for help to Phormio, who replied that,
when a fleet was on the point of sailing from Corinth, it was impossible for him
to leave Naupactus unprotected. The Peloponnesians meanwhile and their allies advanced
upon Stratus in three divisions, with the intention of encamping near it and attempting
the wall by force if they failed to succeed by negotiation. The order of march was
as follows: the centre was occupied by the Chaonians and the rest of the barbarians,
with the Leucadians and Anactorians and their followers on the right, and Cnemus
with the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots on the left; each division being a long way
off from, and sometimes even out of sight of, the others. The Hellenes advanced
in good order, keeping a look-out till they encamped in a good position; but the
Chaonians, filled with self-confidence, and having the highest character for courage
among the tribes of that part of the continent, without waiting to occupy their
camp, rushed on with the rest of the barbarians, in the idea that they should take
the town by assault and obtain the sole glory of the enterprise. While they were
coming on, the Stratians, becoming aware how things stood, and thinking that the
defeat of this division would considerably dishearten the Hellenes behind it, occupied
the environs of the town with ambuscades, and as soon as they approached engaged
them at close quarters from the city and the ambuscades. A panic seizing the Chaonians,
great numbers of them were slain; and as soon as they were seen to give way the
rest of the barbarians turned and fled. Owing to the distance by which their allies
had preceded them, neither of the Hellenic divisions knew anything of the battle,
but fancied they were hastening on to encamp. However, when the flying barbarians
broke in upon them, they opened their ranks to receive them, brought their divisions
together, and stopped quiet where they were for the day; the Stratians not offering
to engage them, as the rest of the Acarnanians had not yet arrived, but contenting
themselves with slinging at them from a distance, which distressed them greatly,
as there was no stirring without their armour. The Acarnanians would seem to excel
in this mode of warfare.

As soon as night fell, Cnemus hastily drew off his army to the river Anapus,
about nine miles from Stratus, recovering his dead next day under truce, and being
there joined by the friendly Oeniadae, fell back upon their city before the enemy’s
reinforcements came up. From hence each returned home; and the Stratians set up
a trophy for the battle with the barbarians.

Meanwhile the fleet from Corinth and the rest of the confederates in the Crissaean
Gulf, which was to have co-operated with Cnemus and prevented the coast Acarnanians
from joining their countrymen in the interior, was disabled from doing so by being
compelled about the same time as the battle at Stratus to fight with Phormio and
the twenty Athenian vessels stationed at Naupactus. For they were watched, as they
coasted along out of the gulf, by Phormio, who wished to attack in the open sea.
But the Corinthians and allies had started for Acarnania without any idea of fighting
at sea, and with vessels more like transports for carrying soldiers; besides which,
they never dreamed of the twenty Athenian ships venturing to engage their forty-seven.
However, while they were coasting along their own shore, there were the Athenians
sailing along in line with them; and when they tried to cross over from Patrae in
Achaea to the mainland on the other side, on their way to Acarnania, they saw them
again coming out from Chalcis and the river Evenus to meet them. They slipped from
their moorings in the night, but were observed, and were at length compelled to
fight in mid passage. Each state that contributed to the armament had its own general;
the Corinthian commanders were Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The Peloponnesians
ranged their vessels in as large a circle as possible without leaving an opening,
with the prows outside and the sterns in; and placed within all the small craft
in company, and their five best sailers to issue out at a moment’s notice and strengthen
any point threatened by the enemy.

The Athenians, formed in line, sailed round and round them, and forced them to
contract their circle, by continually brushing past and making as though they would
attack at once, having been previously cautioned by Phormio not to do so till he
gave the signal. His hope was that the Peloponnesians would not retain their order
like a force on shore, but that the ships would fall foul of one another and the
small craft cause confusion; and if the wind should blow from the gulf (in expectation
of which he kept sailing round them, and which usually rose towards morning), they
would not, he felt sure, remain steady an instant. He also thought that it rested
with him to attack when he pleased, as his ships were better sailers, and that an
attack timed by the coming of the wind would tell best. When the wind came down,
the enemy’s ships were now in a narrow space, and what with the wind and the small
craft dashing against them, at once fell into confusion: ship fell foul of ship,
while the crews were pushing them off with poles, and by their shouting, swearing,
and struggling with one another, made captains’ orders and boatswains’ cries alike
inaudible, and through being unable for want of practice to clear their oars in
the rough water, prevented the vessels from obeying their helmsmen properly. At
this moment Phormio gave the signal, and the Athenians attacked. Sinking first one
of the admirals, they then disabled all they came across, so that no one thought
of resistance for the confusion, but fled for Patrae and Dyme in Achaea. The Athenians
gave chase and captured twelve ships, and taking most of the men out of them sailed
to Molycrium, and after setting up a trophy on the promontory of Rhium and dedicating
a ship to Poseidon, returned to Naupactus. As for the Peloponnesians, they at once
sailed with their remaining ships along the coast from Dyme and Patrae to Cyllene,
the Eleian arsenal; where Cnemus, and the ships from Leucas that were to have joined
them, also arrived after the battle at Stratus.

The Lacedaemonians now sent to the fleet to Cnemus three commissioners- Timocrates,
Bradidas, and Lycophron- with orders to prepare to engage again with better fortune,
and not to be driven from the sea by a few vessels; for they could not at all account
for their discomfiture, the less so as it was their first attempt at sea; and they
fancied that it was not that their marine was so inferior, but that there had been
misconduct somewhere, not considering the long experience of the Athenians as compared
with the little practice which they had had themselves. The commissioners were accordingly
sent in anger. As soon as they arrived they set to work with Cnemus to order ships
from the different states, and to put those which they already had in fighting order.
Meanwhile Phormio sent word to Athens of their preparations and his own victory,
and desired as many ships as possible to be speedily sent to him, as he stood in
daily expectation of a battle. Twenty were accordingly sent, but instructions were
given to their commander to go first to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys, who
was proxenus of the Athenians, had persuaded them to sail against Cydonia, promising
to procure the reduction of that hostile town; his real wish being to oblige the
Polichnitans, neighbours of the Cydonians. He accordingly went with the ships to
Crete, and, accompanied by the Polichnitans, laid waste the lands of the Cydonians;
and, what with adverse winds and stress of weather wasted no little time there.

While the Athenians were thus detained in Crete, the Peloponnesians in Cyllene
got ready for battle, and coasted along to Panormus in Achaea, where their land
army had come to support them. Phormio also coasted along to Molycrian Rhium, and
anchored outside it with twenty ships, the same as he had fought with before. This
Rhium was friendly to the Athenians. The other, in Peloponnese, lies opposite to
it; the sea between them is about three-quarters of a mile broad, and forms the
mouth of the Crissaean gulf. At this, the Achaean Rhium, not far off Panormus, where
their army lay, the Peloponnesians now cast anchor with seventy-seven ships, when
they saw the Athenians do so. For six or seven days they remained opposite each
other, practising and preparing for the battle; the one resolved not to sail out
of the Rhia into the open sea, for fear of the disaster which had already happened
to them, the other not to sail into the straits, thinking it advantageous to the
enemy, to fight in the narrows. At last Cnemus and Brasidas and the rest of the
Peloponnesian commanders, being desirous of bringing on a battle as soon as possible,
before reinforcements should arrive from Athens, and noticing that the men were
most of them cowed by the previous defeat and out of heart for the business, first
called them together and encouraged them as follows: “

Peloponnesians, the late engagement, which may have made some of you afraid of
the one now in prospect, really gives no just ground for apprehension. Preparation
for it, as you know, there was little enough; and the object of our voyage was not
so much to fight at sea as an expedition by land. Besides this, the chances of war
were largely against us; and perhaps also inexperience had something to do with
our failure in our first naval action. It was not, therefore, cowardice that produced
our defeat, nor ought the determination which force has not quelled, but which still
has a word to say with its adversary, to lose its edge from the result of an accident;
but admitting the possibility of a chance miscarriage, we should know that brave
hearts must be always brave, and while they remain so can never put forward inexperience
as an excuse for misconduct. Nor are you so behind the enemy in experience as you
are ahead of him in courage; and although the science of your opponents would, if
valour accompanied it, have also the presence of mind to carry out at in emergency
the lesson it has learnt, yet a faint heart will make all art powerless in the face
of danger. For fear takes away presence of mind, and without valour art is useless.
Against their superior experience set your superior daring, and against the fear
induced by defeat the fact of your having been then unprepared; remember, too, that
you have always the advantage of superior numbers, and of engaging off your own
coast, supported by your heavy infantry; and as a rule, numbers and equipment give
victory. At no point, therefore, is defeat likely; and as for our previous mistakes,
the very fact of their occurrence will teach us better for the future. Steersmen
and sailors may, therefore, confidently attend to their several duties, none quitting
the station assigned to them: as for ourselves, we promise to prepare for the engagement
at least as well as your previous commanders, and to give no excuse for any one
misconducting himself. Should any insist on doing so, he shall meet with the punishment
he deserves, while the brave shall be honoured with the appropriate rewards of valour.”

The Peloponnesian commanders encouraged their men after this fashion. Phormio,
meanwhile, being himself not without fears for the courage of his men, and noticing
that they were forming in groups among themselves and were alarmed at the odds against
them, desired to call them together and give them confidence and counsel in the
present emergency. He had before continually told them, and had accustomed their
minds to the idea, that there was no numerical superiority that they could not face;
and the men themselves had long been persuaded that Athenians need never retire
before any quantity of Peloponnesian vessels. At the moment, however, he saw that
they were dispirited by the sight before them, and wishing to refresh their confidence,
called them together and spoke as follows: “

I see, my men, that you are frightened by the number of the enemy, and I have
accordingly called you together, not liking you to be afraid of what is not really
terrible. In the first place, the Peloponnesians, already defeated, and not even
themselves thinking that they are a match for us, have not ventured to meet us on
equal terms, but have equipped this multitude of ships against us. Next, as to that
upon which they most rely, the courage which they suppose constitutional to them,
their confidence here only arises from the success which their experience in land
service usually gives them, and which they fancy will do the same for them at sea.
But this advantage will in all justice belong to us on this element, if to them
on that; as they are not superior to us in courage, but we are each of us more confident,
according to our experience in our particular department. Besides, as the Lacedaemonians
use their supremacy over their allies to promote their own glory, they are most
of them being brought into danger against their will, or they would never, after
such a decided defeat, have ventured upon a fresh engagement. You need not, therefore,
be afraid of their dash. You, on the contrary, inspire a much greater and better
founded alarm, both because of your late victory and also of their belief that we
should not face them unless about to do something worthy of a success so signal.
An adversary numerically superior, like the one before us, comes into action trusting
more to strength than to resolution; while he who voluntarily confronts tremendous
odds must have very great internal resources to draw upon. For these reasons the
Peloponnesians fear our irrational audacity more than they would ever have done
a more commensurate preparation. Besides, many armaments have before now succumbed
to an inferior through want of skill or sometimes of courage; neither of which defects
certainly are ours. As to the battle, it shall not be, if I can help it, in the
strait, nor will I sail in there at all; seeing that in a contest between a number
of clumsily managed vessels and a small, fast, well-handled squadron, want of sea
room is an undoubted disadvantage. One cannot run down an enemy properly without
having a sight of him a good way off, nor can one retire at need when pressed; one
can neither break the line nor return upon his rear, the proper tactics for a fast
sailer; but the naval action necessarily becomes a land one, in which numbers must
decide the matter. For all this I will provide as far as can be. Do you stay at
your posts by your ships, and be sharp at catching the word of command, the more
so as we are observing one another from so short a distance; and in action think
order and silence all-important- qualities useful in war generally, and in naval
engagements in particular; and behave before the enemy in a manner worthy of your
past exploits. The issues you will fight for are great- to destroy the naval hopes
of the Peloponnesians or to bring nearer to the Athenians their fears for the sea.
And I may once more remind you that you have defeated most of them already; and
beaten men do not face a danger twice with the same determination.”

Such was the exhortation of Phormio. The Peloponnesians finding that the Athenians
did not sail into the gulf and the narrows, in order to lead them in whether they
wished it or not, put out at dawn, and forming four abreast, sailed inside the gulf
in the direction of their own country, the right wing leading as they had lain at
anchor. In this wing were placed twenty of their best sailers; so that in the event
of Phormio thinking that their object was Naupactus, and coasting along thither
to save the place, the Athenians might not be able to escape their onset by getting
outside their wing, but might be cut off by the vessels in question. As they expected,
Phormio, in alarm for the place at that moment emptied of its garrison, as soon
as he saw them put out, reluctantly and hurriedly embarked and sailed along shore;
the Messenian land forces moving along also to support him. The Peloponnesians seeing
him coasting along with his ships in single file, and by this inside the gulf and
close inshore as they so much wished, at one signal tacked suddenly and bore down
in line at their best speed on the Athenians, hoping to cut off the whole squadron.
The eleven leading vessels, however, escaped the Peloponnesian wing and its sudden
movement, and reached the more open water; but the rest were overtaken as they tried
to run through, driven ashore and disabled; such of the crews being slain as had
not swum out of them. Some of the ships the Peloponnesians lashed to their own,
and towed off empty; one they took with the men in it; others were just being towed
off, when they were saved by the Messenians dashing into the sea with their armour
and fighting from the decks that they had boarded.

Thus far victory was with the Peloponnesians, and the Athenian fleet destroyed;
the twenty ships in the right wing being meanwhile in chase of the eleven Athenian
vessels that had escaped their sudden movement and reached the more open water.
These, with the exception of one ship, all outsailed them and got safe into Naupactus,
and forming close inshore opposite the temple of Apollo, with their prows facing
the enemy, prepared to defend themselves in case the Peloponnesians should sail
inshore against them. After a while the Peloponnesians came up, chanting the paean
for their victory as they sailed on; the single Athenian ship remaining being chased
by a Leucadian far ahead of the rest. But there happened to be a merchantman lying
at anchor in the roadstead, which the Athenian ship found time to sail round, and
struck the Leucadian in chase amidships and sank her. An exploit so sudden and unexpected
produced a panic among the Peloponnesians; and having fallen out of order in the
excitement of victory, some of them dropped their oars and stopped their way in
order to let the main body come up- an unsafe thing to do considering how near they
were to the enemy’s prows; while others ran aground in the shallows, in their ignorance
of the localities.

Elated at this incident, the Athenians at one word gave a cheer, and dashed at
the enemy, who, embarrassed by his mistakes and the disorder in which he found himself,
only stood for an instant, and then fled for Panormus, whence he had put out. The
Athenians following on his heels took the six vessels nearest them, and recovered
those of their own which had been disabled close inshore and taken in tow at the
beginning of the action; they killed some of the crews and took some prisoners.
On board the Leucadian which went down off the merchantman, was the Lacedaemonian
Timocrates, who killed himself when the ship was sunk, and was cast up in the harbour
of Naupactus. The Athenians on their return set up a trophy on the spot from which
they had put out and turned the day, and picking up the wrecks and dead that were
on their shore, gave back to the enemy their dead under truce. The Peloponnesians
also set up a trophy as victors for the defeat inflicted upon the ships they had
disabled in shore, and dedicated the vessel which they had taken at Achaean Rhium,
side by side with the trophy. After this, apprehensive of the reinforcement expected
from Athens, all except the Leucadians sailed into the Crissaean Gulf for Corinth.
Not long after their retreat, the twenty Athenian ships, which were to have joined
Phormio before the battle, arrived at Naupactus.

Thus the summer ended. Winter was now at hand; but dispersing the fleet, which
had retired to Corinth and the Crissaean Gulf, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian
captains allowed themselves to be persuaded by the Megarians to make an attempt
upon Piraeus, the port of Athens, which from her decided superiority at sea had
been naturally left unguarded and open. Their plan was as follows: The men were
each to take their oar, cushion, and rowlock thong, and, going overland from Corinth
to the sea on the Athenian side, to get to Megara as quickly as they could, and
launching forty vessels, which happened to be in the docks at Nisaea, to sail at
once to Piraeus. There was no fleet on the look-out in the harbour, and no one had
the least idea of the enemy attempting a surprise; while an open attack would, it
was thought, never be deliberately ventured on, or, if in contemplation, would be
speedily known at Athens. Their plan formed, the next step was to put it in execution.
Arriving by night and launching the vessels from Nisaea, they sailed, not to Piraeus
as they had originally intended, being afraid of the risk, besides which there was
some talk of a wind having stopped them, but to the point of Salamis that looks
towards Megara; where there was a fort and a squadron of three ships to prevent
anything sailing in or out of Megara. This fort they assaulted, and towed off the
galleys empty, and surprising the inhabitants began to lay waste the rest of the
island.

Meanwhile fire signals were raised to alarm Athens, and a panic ensued there
as serious as any that occurred during the war. The idea in the city was that the
enemy had already sailed into Piraeus: in Piraeus it was thought that they had taken
Salamis and might at any moment arrive in the port; as indeed might easily have
been done if their hearts had been a little firmer: certainly no wind would have
prevented them. As soon as day broke, the Athenians assembled in full force, launched
their ships, and embarking in haste and uproar went with the fleet to Salamis, while
their soldiery mounted guard in Piraeus. The Peloponnesians, on becoming aware of
the coming relief, after they had overrun most of Salamis, hastily sailed off with
their plunder and captives and the three ships from Fort Budorum to Nisaea; the
state of their ships also causing them some anxiety, as it was a long while since
they had been launched, and they were not water-tight. Arrived at Megara, they returned
back on foot to Corinth. The Athenians finding them no longer at Salamis, sailed
back themselves; and after this made arrangements for guarding Piraeus more diligently
in future, by closing the harbours, and by other suitable precautions.

About the same time, at the beginning of this winter, Sitalces, son of Teres,
the Odrysian king of Thrace, made an expedition against Perdiccas, son of Alexander,
king of Macedonia, and the Chalcidians in the neighbourhood of Thrace; his object
being to enforce one promise and fulfil another. On the one hand Perdiccas had made
him a promise, when hard pressed at the commencement of the war, upon condition
that Sitalces should reconcile the Athenians to him and not attempt to restore his
brother and enemy, the pretender Philip, but had not offered to fulfil his engagement;
on the other he, Sitalces, on entering into alliance with the Athenians, had agreed
to put an end to the Chalcidian war in Thrace. These were the two objects of his
invasion. With him he brought Amyntas, the son of Philip, whom he destined for the
throne of Macedonia, and some Athenian envoys then at his court on this business,
and Hagnon as general; for the Athenians were to join him against the Chalcidians
with a fleet and as many soldiers as they could get together.

Beginning with the Odrysians, he first called out the Thracian tribes subject
to him between Mounts Haemus and Rhodope and the Euxine and Hellespont; next the
Getae beyond Haemus, and the other hordes settled south of the Danube in the neighbourhood
of the Euxine, who, like the Getae, border on the Scythians and are armed in the
same manner, being all mounted archers. Besides these he summoned many of the hill
Thracian independent swordsmen, called Dii and mostly inhabiting Mount Rhodope,
some of whom came as mercenaries, others as volunteers; also the Agrianes and Laeaeans,
and the rest of the Paeonian tribes in his empire, at the confines of which these
lay, extending up to the Laeaean Paeonians and the river Strymon, which flows from
Mount Scombrus through the country of the Agrianes and Laeaeans; there the empire
of Sitalces ends and the territory of the independent Paeonians begins. Bordering
on the Triballi, also independent, were the Treres and Tilataeans, who dwell to
the north of Mount Scombrus and extend towards the setting sun as far as the river
Oskius. This river rises in the same mountains as the Nestus and Hebrus, a wild
and extensive range connected with Rhodope.

The empire of the Odrysians extended along the seaboard from Abdera to the mouth
of the Danube in the Euxine. The navigation of this coast by the shortest route
takes a merchantman four days and four nights with a wind astern the whole way:
by land an active man, travelling by the shortest road, can get from Abdera to the
Danube in eleven days. Such was the length of its coast line. Inland from Byzantium
to the Laeaeans and the Strymon, the farthest limit of its extension into the interior,
it is a journey of thirteen days for an active man. The tribute from all the barbarian
districts and the Hellenic cities, taking what they brought in under Seuthes, the
successor of Sitalces, who raised it to its greatest height, amounted to about four
hundred talents in gold and silver. There were also presents in gold and silver
to a no less amount, besides stuff, plain and embroidered, and other articles, made
not only for the king, but also for the Odrysian lords and nobles. For there was
here established a custom opposite to that prevailing in the Persian kingdom, namely,
of taking rather than giving; more disgrace being attached to not giving when asked
than to asking and being refused; and although this prevailed elsewhere in Thrace,
it was practised most extensively among the powerful Odrysians, it being impossible
to get anything done without a present. It was thus a very powerful kingdom; in
revenue and general prosperity surpassing all in Europe between the Ionian Gulf
and the Euxine, and in numbers and military resources coming decidedly next to the
Scythians, with whom indeed no people in Europe can bear comparison, there not being
even in Asia any nation singly a match for them if unanimous, though of course they
are not on a level with other races in general intelligence and the arts of civilized
life.

It was the master of this empire that now prepared to take the field. When everything
was ready, he set out on his march for Macedonia, first through his own dominions,
next over the desolate range of Cercine that divides the Sintians and Paeonians,
crossing by a road which he had made by felling the timber on a former campaign
against the latter people. Passing over these mountains, with the Paeonians on his
right and the Sintians and Maedians on the left, he finally arrived at Doberus,
in Paeonia, losing none of his army on the march, except perhaps by sickness, but
receiving some augmentations, many of the independent Thracians volunteering to
join him in the hope of plunder; so that the whole is said to have formed a grand
total of a hundred and fifty thousand. Most of this was infantry, though there was
about a third cavalry, furnished principally by the Odrysians themselves and next
to them by the Getae. The most warlike of the infantry were the independent swordsmen
who came down from Rhodope; the rest of the mixed multitude that followed him being
chiefly formidable by their numbers.

Assembling in Doberus, they prepared for descending from the heights upon Lower
Macedonia, where the dominions of Perdiccas lay; for the Lyncestae, Elimiots, and
other tribes more inland, though Macedonians by blood, and allies and dependants
of their kindred, still have their own separate governments. The country on the
sea coast, now called Macedonia, was first acquired by Alexander, the father of
Perdiccas, and his ancestors, originally Temenids from Argos. This was effected
by the expulsion from Pieria of the Pierians, who afterwards inhabited Phagres and
other places under Mount Pangaeus, beyond the Strymon (indeed the country between
Pangaeus and the sea is still called the Pierian Gulf); of the Bottiaeans, at present
neighbours of the Chalcidians, from Bottia, and by the acquisition in Paeonia of
a narrow strip along the river Axius extending to Pella and the sea; the district
of Mygdonia, between the Axius and the Strymon, being also added by the expulsion
of the Edonians. From Eordia also were driven the Eordians, most of whom perished,
though a few of them still live round Physca, and the Almopians from Almopia. These
Macedonians also conquered places belonging to the other tribes, which are still
theirs- Anthemus, Crestonia, Bisaltia, and much of Macedonia proper. The whole is
now called Macedonia, and at the time of the invasion of Sitalces, Perdiccas, Alexander’s
son, was the reigning king.

These Macedonians, unable to take the field against so numerous an invader, shut
themselves up in such strong places and fortresses as the country possessed. Of
these there was no great number, most of those now found in the country having been
erected subsequently by Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, on his accession, who also
cut straight roads, and otherwise put the kingdom on a better footing as regards
horses, heavy infantry, and other war material than had been done by all the eight
kings that preceded him. Advancing from Doberus, the Thracian host first invaded
what had been once Philip’s government, and took Idomene by assault, Gortynia, Atalanta,
and some other places by negotiation, these last coming over for love of Philip’s
son, Amyntas, then with Sitalces. Laying siege to Europus, and failing to take it,
he next advanced into the rest of Macedonia to the left of Pella and Cyrrhus, not
proceeding beyond this into Bottiaea and Pieria, but staying to lay waste Mygdonia,
Crestonia, and Anthemus. The Macedonians never even thought of meeting him with
infantry; but the Thracian host was, as opportunity offered, attacked by handfuls
of their horse, which had been reinforced from their allies in the interior. Armed
with cuirasses, and excellent horsemen, wherever these charged they overthrew all
before them, but ran considerable risk in entangling themselves in the masses of
the enemy, and so finally desisted from these efforts, deciding that they were not
strong enough to venture against numbers so superior.

Meanwhile Sitalces opened negotiations with Perdiccas on the objects of his expedition;
and finding that the Athenians, not believing that he would come, did not appear
with their fleet, though they sent presents and envoys, dispatched a large part
of his army against the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, and shutting them up inside
their walls laid waste their country. While he remained in these parts, the people
farther south, such as the Thessalians, Magnetes, and the other tribes subject to
the Thessalians, and the Hellenes as far as Thermopylae, all feared that the army
might advance against them, and prepared accordingly. These fears were shared by
the Thracians beyond the Strymon to the north, who inhabited the plains, such as
the Panaeans, the Odomanti, the Droi, and the Dersaeans, all of whom are independent.
It was even matter of conversation among the Hellenes who were enemies of Athens
whether he might not be invited by his ally to advance also against them. Meanwhile
he held Chalcidice and Bottice and Macedonia, and was ravaging them all; but finding
that he was not succeeding in any of the objects of his invasion, and that his army
was without provisions and was suffering from the severity of the season, he listened
to the advice of Seuthes, son of Spardacus, his nephew and highest officer, and
decided to retreat without delay. This Seuthes had been secretly gained by Perdiccas
by the promise of his sister in marriage with a rich dowry. In accordance with this
advice, and after a stay of thirty days in all, eight of which were spent in Chalcidice,
he retired home as quickly as he could; and Perdiccas afterwards gave his sister
Stratonice to Seuthes as he had promised. Such was the history of the expedition
of Sitalces.

In the course of this winter, after the dispersion of the Peloponnesian fleet,
the Athenians in Naupactus, under Phormio, coasted along to Astacus and disembarked,
and marched into the interior of Acarnania with four hundred Athenian heavy infantry
and four hundred Messenians. After expelling some suspected persons from Stratus,
Coronta, and other places, and restoring Cynes, son of Theolytus, to Coronta, they
returned to their ships, deciding that it was impossible in the winter season to
march against Oeniadae, a place which, unlike the rest of Acarnania, had been always
hostile to them; for the river Achelous flowing from Mount Pindus through Dolopia
and the country of the Agraeans and Amphilochians and the plain of Acarnania, past
the town of Stratus in the upper part of its course, forms lakes where it falls
into the sea round Oeniadae, and thus makes it impracticable for an army in winter
by reason of the water. Opposite to Oeniadae lie most of the islands called Echinades,
so close to the mouths of the Achelous that that powerful stream is constantly forming
deposits against them, and has already joined some of the islands to the continent,
and seems likely in no long while to do the same with the rest. For the current
is strong, deep, and turbid, and the islands are so thick together that they serve
to imprison the alluvial deposit and prevent its dispersing, lying, as they do,
not in one line, but irregularly, so as to leave no direct passage for the water
into the open sea. The islands in question are uninhabited and of no great size.
There is also a story that Alcmaeon, son of Amphiraus, during his wanderings after
the murder of his mother was bidden by Apollo to inhabit this spot, through an oracle
which intimated that he would have no release from his terrors until he should find
a country to dwell in which had not been seen by the sun, or existed as land at
the time he slew his mother; all else being to him polluted ground. Perplexed at
this, the story goes on to say, he at last observed this deposit of the Achelous,
and considered that a place sufficient to support life upon, might have been thrown
up during the long interval that had elapsed since the death of his mother and the
beginning of his wanderings. Settling, therefore, in the district round Oeniadae,
he founded a dominion, and left the country its name from his son Acarnan. Such
is the story we have received concerning Alcmaeon.

The Athenians and Phormio putting back from Acarnania and arriving at Naupactus,
sailed home to Athens in the spring, taking with them the ships that they had captured,
and such of the prisoners made in the late actions as were freemen; who were exchanged,
man for man. And so ended this winter, and the third year of this war, of which
Thucydides was the historian.

The End of book 2